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While members of the southern Sudanese Dinka tribe converted to Christianity in 
large numbers in the early 1990s, the Lost Boys, a largely Dinka group of young men 
who were separated from their families during the Sudanese civil war in the late 1980s, 
had a distinct conversion experience in refugees camps.  Using first-person interviews 
and participant observation with a group of Lost Boys resettled in Denver, and historical 
and ethnographic data, this research seeks to explain why the Lost Boys converted to 
Christianity and the role that it played in their identity in refugee camps in Ethiopia and 
Kenya, and continues to play in their lives in Denver. Findings include the Lost Boys‟ 
need to adapt to radically changed circumstances that separated them from the central 
components of their lives—their families, villages, and cattle—and retention of the Dinka 
values of pragmatism and group autonomy, which allowed the Lost Boys to accept the 
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Who are the Lost Boys? 
 
Within in the last few years the “Lost Boys” of Sudan have gained celebrity status 
in the U.S.  They have appeared on Oprah, the cover of The New York Times Magazine 
and have been featured on an episode of the Christian-themed sitcom “Seventh Heaven.” 
Numerous books, both fictional and non-fictional, have been written about the Lost Boys.  
Even their nickname, taken from the movie Peter Pan
1
 seemingly plays into this pop 
culture status.  Their lives however, have been anything but glamorous.  
 The Lost Boys‟ story began in 1983, when Sudan‟s long-ranging civil war was 
reignited.  The boys, who lived in what was at the time the largely animist southern part 
of Sudan, were forced to flee when their villages were attacked by soldiers and raiders 
from the mainly Muslim/Arab north of the country. During these raids, many of the boys‟ 
parents and sisters were either killed or kidnapped (and in some cases, subsequently 
enslaved) and their villages burned.  Many of the boys credit the fact that they were away 
tending to cattle in far-off fields as their reason for escaping (Human Rights Watch 
Report/Africa 1994, 10).  Others were able to run or hide.  Alternately, Human Rights 
Watch/Africa has asserted that the Lost Boys were sent, and in some cases taken, from 
their families and sent to refugee camps to receive military training by the southern army, 
the Sudan People‟s Liberation Army (SPLA) (Human Rights Watch/Africa 1994, 8).   In 
                                               
1 Rumors persist about who exactly came up with this name, however it seems most likely that it was either 
journalists or aide workers in the refugee camps. 
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any case, this was the beginning of a trek that would take the Lost Boys hundreds of 
miles to refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya.  The boys, who generally had brought no 
food or water with them, were forced to eat leaves, soft mud, and sometimes to drink 
their own urine in order to survive. Lions and hyenas attacked the boys at random, and 
many were killed.
2
  The boys‟ ordeal was not over yet.  After many years in the Ethiopian 
camps, Mengistu, the Ethiopian dictator who had been allowing the refugee camps on 
Ethiopian soil, was overthrown.  The rebels that overthrew him were hostile to the 
Sudanese refugees believing (sometimes correctly) that they sided with the Marxist 
Mengistu, and as a result, most of the boys fled back to Sudan, under attack (Human 
Rights Watch Report 1994, 14).  Another harrowing trek ensued for the boys, across the 
Gilo River that divides Ethiopia and Sudan, and eventually to Kenya, to more stable 
refugee camps.  
Although some boys had been exposed to Christianity in their villages and already 
considered themselves Christians, it was in the camps that many were taught about 
Christianity and encouraged to choose Christian names.  This happened largely through 
contact with Sudanese priests and church laypersons, a topic which will be discussed in 
more detail later on (in Chapters 6 and 7).  The boys‟ contact with Christians continued 
as efforts to resettle them across the U.S. began, in particular because many of the 
resettlement agencies that received and helped resettle the Lost Boys were faith-based 
(Bixler 2005, 84).  
                                               
2 Stories about the Lost Boys‟ journey often include what seem to be requisite elements such as lion attacks 
and the consumption of mud and urine.  Because of their close similarity, they are sometimes regarded as 
apocryphal, although without doubt, many young men experienced these and other more horrific 
happenings on their way to the refugee camps. 
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Lost Boys in Denver 
 In Denver, the African Community Center (ECDC/ACC), a secular, nonprofit 
organization, and Ecumenical Refugee Services (ERS), a faith-based, but non-
denominational agency, both assisted in resettling the Lost Boys, oftentimes working 
through local church congregations. Furthermore, many of the volunteers who helped the 
boys in their transition to American life were Christians who had heard about the boys 
through their churches.  Church seems to be the one thing that has remained constant in 
these boys‟ lives and many cite religion as the reason the they have been able to survive 
their ordeal (DeLuca and Bruch 2005, 32).   
 The number of Lost Boys living in the Denver/Boulder metro area numbers 
approximately 80 young men (DeLuca and Bruch 2005, 32).  Since the spring of 2006, a 
handful of young women, sometimes known as the “Lost Girls,” but who have often 
traveled different paths than the Lost Boys to reach the United States, were also placed in 
Boulder.  The community is a tightly knit one, with Lost Boys generally living together, 
sometimes four to five young men in an apartment, scattered throughout Denver, Aurora, 
Lakewood, Westminster and Boulder and various other suburbs in the Denver 
metropolitan area.  The young men who I came to know were largely Dinka (with only 
one exception), and almost entirely from the Bor area of southern Sudan. Although the 
Lost Boy population is made up of several tribes including Nuer, Dinka, and Equatorian 
men from all over southern Sudan, it is often believed the Bor area was the hardest hit by 
the civil war, particularly because this is where a strong resistance to the northern 
government was formed and many SPLA members were drawn (Nikkel 1997, 87, Jok 
and Hutchinson 1999, 128). Because of this, the area produced a large percentage of the 
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Lost Boy population. Early resettlement of Lost Boys from Bor in Denver also 
contributed to this concentration.   
Many of the young men work at least one full-time job and attend four and two-
year colleges full-time as well, while others are working on their GEDs or saving up to 
pursue education.  The Lost Boys of Denver are pursuing degrees in psychology, 
phlebotomy, business, and pharmacology among other fields and work a variety of jobs, 
in factories, at Wal-Mart, as maintenance workers, in college financial aid offices and 
computer labs.  Still others work at a local specialty health shop and as city bus drivers.  
All of the Lost Boys send large portions of their income to family members and friends in 
Sudan or in refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda.    
Although Lost Boys are often assumed to be orphaned and completely without 
family, many, to their own amazement as well, have found that they have relatives, a 
mother or father, or a couple of siblings, still alive in Sudan.  There have been miraculous 
stories of Lost Boys in Denver spotting pictures of parents in news publications, online, 
and on TV who they thought were dead.  Some of the Lost Boys of Denver have been 
able to return to Sudan to see parents and siblings they have not seen in fifteen or twenty 
years.  In December of 2007, six Lost Boys from Denver traveled to southern Sudan with 
a local nonprofit, Project Education Sudan (PES) an organization that helps raise money 
to build schools in the villages of southern Sudan that the Lost Boys are from.  PES also 
helps reunite Lost Boys with their families when these schools are built.  I have been 
privileged to work with this organization and it is through PES that I first was introduced 
to the Lost Boy community of Denver.  In March of 2008 I had the opportunity to travel 
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to southern Sudan with PES to assist with conducting a needs assessment for women in 
three villages as well as help teach income literacy workshops for the women of the three 
villages. I was also able to witness one of the Lost Boys whom I interviewed for this 
thesis be reunited with his father after over twenty years of separation.  
 The Lost Boys in Denver, as is the case with most Lost Boys resettled in Western 
countries, have had to make dramatic changes in their lives.  The boys spent years caring 
for themselves in the refugee camps, attending church, school, and bible study classes 
and sometimes working as teachers if they possessed advanced English skills or doing 
odd jobs for elders.  Despite this, the grueling schedules of work and school in the U.S. 
are a major departure from the relative freedom that they had in the camps.  Much of the 
Lost Boy community in Denver is engaged in work or school seven days a week and 
often any free time these men have is filled with church activities, fundraising with 
groups such as PES, and the occasional soccer game. As in the refugee camps, church 
forms the pinnacle of social life for Denver‟s Lost Boy community.   
Although the Lost Boys as a group retain a very cohesive identity, church 
constitutes one of the few places where they are able to gather as a group.  One particular 
group of four young men that I came to know live together in an apartment only a few 
blocks from the apartment I lived in when I was conducting fieldwork with them. Three 
of the roommates are cousins and all four of the men grew up in neighboring areas of 
Bor.  Because of this, I assumed that they saw each other often and from their behavior at 
church, I assumed that they were very close.  I was therefore surprised when I asked one 
of the young men to pass along a question to his roommate/cousin, only to be told that 
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they rarely saw each other and they hardly ever had schedules that overlapped.  
Considering all that these men had been through together, it was surprising to find that 
church seemed to be the only time in their busy weeks that they could catch up with 
relatives and friend—even with those whom they shared an apartment!   
With the Lost Boys‟ schedules being what they are, it was very hard to find time 
to schedule interviews with them.  I often felt guilty asking for interviews when I knew I 
was cutting into valuable study or free time.  Nevertheless, the Lost Boys were extremely 
welcoming to me and very generous with their time and stories.   I often found that I 
learned the most by simply attending events with the Lost Boys—fundraisers and Dinka-
language services at St. Phillip and St. James Episcopal Church (or St. P.J.‟s as the Lost 
Boys call it) were particularly helpful. 
Although the Lost Boys have received support from local American volunteers 
and church members, they are still very much on their own.  Not only did the Lost Boys 
trek by themselves, for the most part free of adult supervision, for a good part of their 
childhoods, but they were settled in the U.S. when they were in their late teens and early 
twenties in small groups without any adult supervision other than what was provided by 
the voluntary agencies (VOLAGS) that resettled them.  Consequently, the Lost Boys 
have become autonomous as a group, with decisions that affect the group being made in 
an extremely egalitarian fashion, in some ways similar to the freedom they would have 
been allowed in Dinka cattle camps had they not been separated from their homes and 




Examples of this “group autonomy” as I came to call it will be explored in depth  
in Chapters 6 and 7, especially as I found the strong influence the boys had over each 
other and the respect that they possess for decisions made by the group had much to do 
with their conversion to Christianity in the refugee camps.   
Despite the fact that a Pentecostal church in Montbello (a suburb of Denver) 
initially sponsored a number of the largely Episcopalian Lost Boys resettled here, several 
of the boys quickly gained contacts within St. John‟s Episcopal Cathedral in downtown 
Denver after their arrival.
3
  Church members from St. John‟s who volunteered with the 
African Community Center had heard about the Lost Boys resettled through this agency 
and in a matter of months, the Lost Boys and American members of St. John‟s had 
organized a Dinka/Arabic-language service at the church complete with a Sudanese 
priest.  Nathaniel Garang, Bishop of the Episcopal Church of Sudan (ECS), Diocese of 
Bor—a key figure in the conversion of southern Sudanese—was also integral in 
garnering a Dinka-language service for the Sudanese population of Denver and actually 
came to Denver from Sudan to discuss the service with the bishops at St. John‟s 
Cathedral.  Two of the Lost Boys, including Joseph, a young man who came to be one of 
my key informants, were selected to be in charge of the newly created Sudanese ministry 
at St. John‟s.  Subsequently, after rising tensions between the older Sudanese clergy and 
the Lost Boys, the Lost Boys worked with American volunteers to form yet another 
Dinka-language service of their own at a different congregation, St. P.J.‟s in western 
Denver, near Lakewood.  Here the Lost Boys conduct their own services, open to the 
                                               
3  In fact, the Lost Boy community in Denver was largely Episcopal when they arrived in Colorado, and the 
religious affiliations of their initial sponsors seemed to have little sway over the Lost Boys‟ decisions 
relating to what church to join. 
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entire community but largely attended by Lost Boys and a handful of Sudanese women 
and children, where the boys take turns leading the services in pairs of two, coordinate all 
of their own music, and collect donations for the church. 
Christianity in Sudan 
 
 Although statistics do not exist for the exact percentage of Lost Boys living in 
Denver who are Christian, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is very near one hundred 
percent. In my interviews with the Lost Boys, (all of who were Christian) the boys 
repeatedly stated that they did not know of any Lost Boys in the United States who were 
not Christian.  One young man told me that not only did he not know any Lost Boys who 
were not Christian, but that the Lost Boys who he knew in Denver who did not come to 
church did so because of time constraints, not because they were not Christian.  Another 
Lost Boy told me that he never came across any other Lost Boys in camp who didn‟t 
want to convert, but admitted that “some people were still having the feeling that they 
wanted to follow the traditional gods, and well, maybe they were not telling people…they 
were keeping it in their hearts.”  When asked if any Lost Boys in the U.S. were 
combining the traditional gods of Dinka religion with Christianity, the same informant 
stated that he didn‟t think this was happening in the U.S., but perhaps back in Sudan 
people were doing that.     
Figures for the percentage of southern Sudanese who are Christian today, 
although easier to find than statistics for Lost Boys, vary wildly.  Missionaries and the 
Lost Boys themselves invariably name figures much higher than those provided by 
secular organizations and the government of northern Sudan.  Paul Freston, a secular 
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source, for example, puts the figure of Christians in southern Sudan at somewhere 
between four and a half and seven percent (2001, 115).  On the other hand, several of the 
Lost Boys stated in interviews that they believed these figures were much too low and put 
the percentage, at least in their homeland of Bor, at closer to 90 percent   This figure is 
echoed in the work of Wheeler, an historian and Anglican missionary with the Church 
Mission Society (CMS) in Sudan, who says “by the late 1990s it could well be that 90% 
of the Bor Dinka identified themselves as Christians” (Wheeler 2005, 62). Marc Nikkel, a 
missionary and amateur anthropologist who has worked closely with the Lost Boys and 
in their homeland of Bor, cites a similar surge in Christianity in Bor (1997, 65).   
When I asked another participant what he thought about the figures given by 
secular sources, which put the percentage of Christians in southern Sudan at five percent 
or so, he said maybe this low figure was true in the twentieth century, but not today.  At 
the same time, several Lost Boys admitted that there were many in the South who had not 
converted and were combining traditional religion and cattle sacrifice with Christianity 
(Interviews 2-1 & 3-1).  
Those affiliated with the Episcopal church often state that Sudan has the fastest 
growing church of any country in Africa and more specifically that it has the fastest 
growing population of Episcopalians in the world, though they usually refrain from citing 
an actual percentage of the converted (Wheeler 1997, 11).  As with most other issues in 
Sudan, these figures are politically fraught.  Wheeler himself acknowledges this, saying 
that accurate quantification of Christians in Sudan is imperative as the current figures are 
“open to manipulation in the struggle for scarce resources” (1997, 12).  The North in their 
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quest to Arabize the South and in certain instances, to wipe out as many southerners as 
possible, would like to believe, and to have the outside world believe, that there are fewer 
Christians in the South than there are.  One of the Lost Boys specifically addressed this 
discrepancy in an interview, stating that the reason Christianity is reported at a much 
lower percentage by the northern government is because Muslims are conspiring to make 
people believe that there are fewer Christians in Sudan in an effort aid their attempts of 
making Sudan a Muslim country (Interview1-1).  By the same token, missionaries have 
much to gain by overestimating conversion, especially in terms of gaining the church‟s 
support in their missions and as a way to make conversion appear more appealing to 
southerners.   
We are left to wonder if it is possible to gauge the number of converts in southern 
Sudan at all.  Andrew Wheeler states that “because of the war, the destruction of church 
property, the displacement of many of the people and the isolation of many communities, 
basic information about church life (for example, figures on baptisms, confirmations and 
ordinations) are almost universally lacking, especially amongst the Protestant churches” 
(1997, 12).  Both North and South have motives for misrepresenting conversion figures. 
It is therefore hard to side with the northern government and secular sources that present 
Christian conversion as very limited and equally hard to side with the southern Sudanese 
and the churches that look at Sudan as almost totally converted.  If we believe that very 
few in southern Sudan are converted, how do we account for the Lost Boys being so 
wholly converted?  How could they be that anomalous from the rest of the Sudanese 
population?  Simply put, the Lost Boys, by and large, were not Christian before they got 
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to the refugee camps, but were by the time they got to the U.S.  This means that 
something happened in the refugee camps that convinced them to convert.  What were 
the conditions that made the Lost Boys so ripe for conversion?  Are they really that 
different from the rest of the population and would they just have been swept up in the 
tide of Christianity that apparently has taken over Sudan even if they were not separated 
from their parents?   
 Because of the extreme discrepancy between these numbers, what needs to be 
considered is that even if both estimates for Christianity in southern Sudan are totally off 
base is that both reflect, in varying degrees, the fact that there has not been total 
conversion in Sudan.  If  the figure is somewhere in between the two ends of the 
spectrum, we can see that that percentage is significantly less than the total conversion 
that has happened among the Lost Boys, and it is precisely this difference that this 
research hopes to shed some light on.   
Even if we were to accept, as missionary sources claim, that Bor is 90 percent 
Christian today, the number of Christians when the boys left around 1987 (Nikkel 2001, 
239) was decidedly lower.  In fact, what has been often cited as the major impetus for 
conversion among the Bor Dinka, the raid of their cattle by the neighboring Nuer tribe, 
happened in 1991, around the same time that the Lost Boys found themselves expelled 
from their refugee camp in Ethiopia (Wheeler 2005: 62).  It can be said with almost 
absolute certainty that the Lost Boys were nowhere near their homeland of Bor when 
massive conversion took place there and in fact, as the Lost Boys told me in the 
interviews, many of them had already converted in Ethiopian camps before they left 
12 
 
Ethiopia (Wheeler 2005, 60).  This does not negate the fact that the Bor Dinka as a 
whole, both the Lost Boys in refugee camps and those who remained behind in Bor, 
seemed to be particularly open to conversion.  The factors behind these separate 
conversions will therefore be looked at as two distinct events while keeping an eye 
toward similarities among the Bor Dinka that might have made them more open to 
conversion than other tribes and groups of Dinka in southern Sudan.   
Statement of the Problem/Research Questions 
The Lost Boys are a distinct group even among the rampant displacement and 
horror that has affected even the least traumatized individual from southern Sudan.  
Orphaned or separated from their families, starving, in some cases forced to fight as child 
soldiers for the SPLA, and eventually relegated to refugee camps for years on end with 
little adult supervision, these young men had a unique and compelling experience, one 
that apparently pushed them in the direction of Christianity.  This process, so far 
understood only through the writings of missionaries and clergy, is what this research 
seeks to understand. 
 Several key questions have guided this research, including: 1) why did so many 
Lost Boys decide to convert to Christianity/what social functions/needs has this 
conversion met for the Lost Boys, and 2) what role/functions does Christianity play today 
in their lives in Denver. These questions have led to a somewhat linear approach to this 
research, mainly because three distinct phases in the Lost Boys‟ lives must be understood 
to evaluate the significance of the Lost Boys‟ conversion, namely their animist childhood, 
journey to and time in the camps, and their lives in Denver.  By considering these distinct 
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phases, we can begin to understand the radical differences between traditional Dinka life 
and the lives that Lost Boys are experiencing today as Christians living in the U.S.  
Additionally, by first considering Dinka life prior to the civil war, then looking at how 
the Lost Boys were separated from their parents and their time in refugee camps, and 
finally looking at their lives today, we are able to see the changes and processes that 
brought them to where they are, and through this process, understand their reasons for 
becoming a largely Christian group who accepted a religion once shunned by the Dinka.   
Methods 
 The intent of this thesis is not to generalize the conversion process for the entire 
Lost Boy community; rather it seeks to elucidate the particular path that a group of Bor 
Dinka Lost Boys resettled in Denver took to become Christians.  At the same time, the 
experiences that this group have endured are not unique among Dinka Lost Boys and I 
believe that a larger study of Lost Boys resettled in the U.S. would reveal similar 
processes and factors in conversion.   
 As this is truly a case study of a small, distinct group, the methods that I have 
chosen reflect this.  The main instrument for data collection used was first-person, semi-
structured interviews.  Life histories were not taken and generally, the Lost Boys‟ 
Ethiopia/Sudan/Kenya trek was not delved into unless brought up by those being 
interviewed.  In part this was because little conversion apparently happened on this trek, 
but also because this seems to be the only aspect of the Lost Boys‟ lives that has been 
researched in any depth thus far.  More importantly, the Lost Boys‟ separation from their 
families and their traumatic journey to the refugee camps is a topic that they have, many 
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times capriciously, been called upon by media outlets, VOLAGs, and members of the 
public to recount in all of its gory details, often with little regard to feelings that these 
memories may conjure up in the person who has experienced them.  The intention of this 
thesis, therefore, is not to rehash the details of the Lost Boys‟ separation from their 
homes and families and all of the horrors that surrounded these events, but to shed light 
on the topic of Christianity among the boys, something that many Lost Boys feel helped 
them survive their horrible ordeal. Because of this, interviews centered on early 
childhood, the Lost Boys‟ trek, and the refugee camps they found themselves in, only in 
their relation to Christianity and conversion, and not as a way to illustrate the horrors that 
have befallen the Lost Boys, which I think is a subject that has already been well-
documented.   
 Interviews were organized so that each addressed a specific topic or theme but 
were left open-ended enough that informants could elaborate upon topics on which they 
had more to say.  It was in this way that I often found out the most about certain delicate 
topics, such as the traditional religion of the Dinka, a topic that many Lost Boys 
professed not to know much about when asked directly, but that they often addressed in a 
roundabout way. The first interview with each informant gathered background 
information, such as where they grew up and if their family was Christian when they 
were young.  The second interviews tended to focus more on the actual conversion 
process, where and how they converted, what they could remember of the traditional 
religion of the Dinka, and how and when they were baptized.  The third interviews 
focused on the conversion of the Lost Boys‟ surviving family members, the 
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contemporary state of the Episcopal Church in Bor, and about their involvement with the 
church in the U.S.  Finally, the fourth interviews centered on filling in gaps that the other 
interviews had left.  To maintain the privacy of those I interviewed, I will use 
pseudonyms (Joseph, Deng, Lual, and Peter) rather than real names when referring to the 
Lost Boys.  
 Because the population of Lost Boys in the Denver metro area is fairly dispersed, 
and the regular crowd who attend St. P.J.‟s rarely reached more than twenty young men, 
my sample was necessarily small.  The grueling schedules that most of these young men 
keep, along with problems of access to this tightly-knit community, kept this number low 
as well.  
Integral to this thesis was participant observation, undertaken at St. P.J.‟s on 
numerous Sundays, at the Lost Boy-conducted Dinka-language service.  Possibly more 
important than the service itself was the socializing that happened afterward outside the 
church, where the Lost Boys would form tight circles of young men, talking and laughing 
and often would let me join, graciously switching to English so I could understand.  In 
addition to church services, participant observation was also conducted at many events 
and fundraisers attended by the Lost Boy community, mainly in association with PES.  
Gala dinners, Sudanese art auctions, refugee festivals, school fundraisers, and Dinka 
language classes were all attended on a regular basis and proved to be a good way to give 
back to the particular group of Lost Boys that I was working with.  Additionally, I tutored 
one of the Lost Boys in several subjects in his coursework for an associate degree.  Not 
only did this help me build trust with the community as a whole, but it also allowed me in 
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some small way, to give something back.  In addition, two of the Lost Boys regularly 
taught a group of Americans, myself included, how to speak Dinka. Although these 
classes were short-lived, they proved a good way to learn more about Dinka culture and 
meet with the Lost Boys on a more informal basis.  
Finally, my 2008 trip to Sudan, although not officially part of this thesis, gave the 
kind of context that only being immersed in a culture can. Although I didn‟t formally 
interview anyone in Sudan, the insights I gained into Bor Dinka culture on this trip were 
invaluable and are woven into this thesis.  
 In keeping with the key questions outlined above, the chapters that follow seek to 
do several things.  First of all, the history of Sudan is discussed, particularly in regards to 
its colonization.  The patterns of slavery and northern domination that resulted from this 
process are important to understanding the current conflict and the production of 
orphaned and severely abused children such as those who eventually became Lost Boys.  
The culture of southern Sudan, particularly that of the Dinka, is examined, especially in 
regards to the aspects of it that have been altered due to war and how this has factored 
into conversion to Christianity.  The traditional religion of the Dinka is also discussed at 
length, to show what has been replaced by or integrated into new Christian beliefs.  
Lastly, and most importantly to this thesis, the conversion experiences of a group of Lost 
Boys in Denver is discussed, when they converted, what they give up to do so, what they 
gained, and what changes this conversion has brought to their new life in the U.S.  By 
critically discussing the history of colonization, missions, conversion, and civil war in 
Sudan and using this information in conjunction with data gathered during participant 
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observation and in first-person interviews with the Lost Boys themselves, I hope to paint 
a picture of conversion among the Lost Boys that is situated in the historical and cultural 
context of the country.  Finally, I have examined what the implications of this radical 
shift in worldview has meant for one group of men living in Denver.   
 In the next chapter, I will discuss the literature that has guided this research: 





Chapter 2—Review of the Literature 
 
 The study of refugees is one that has only recently become the province of 
anthropologists.  Although the discipline of anthropology has long claimed the study of 
non-Western cultures as its main area of research, it is only recently that the study of 
those displaced from both Western and non-Western cultures has gained credibility 
within the discipline.  Intertwined with the study of refugees is the study of globalization, 
a process that anthropologists have long been engaged with, particularly in past studies of 
assimilation, acculturation, and syncretism.  Theologists have further added to this body 
of knowledge with their studies of inculturation.  The breaking down of the nation-state, a 
process both contributing to and resultant from globalization, has factored closely into the 
creation of refugees and is a good entrance point into the involvement of anthropologists 
with refugees.  Because of this, I will begin this discussion by first situating the work of 
anthropologists within the discipline of refugee studies, discuss who refugees are, and 
some of the processes such as identity formation, inculturation, and acculturation that 
affect them.  Then, I will discuss the literature of globalization and the nation-state in its 
relevance to creation of refugees, in particular, refugees in Sudan. 
Refugees 
 Harrell-Bond and Voutira, both anthropologists working in the field of refugee 
studies, define refugees as “people who have undergone a violent “rite” of separation and 
unless or until they are “incorporated” as citizens into their host state (or returned to their 
state of origin) find themselves in “transition,” or in a state of “liminality” (1992,7).   In 
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other words, refugees are forced migrants who find themselves in a transitional state, 
whether they have crossed international borders, national borders, or as is the case of 
groups such as the Palestinians, have been confined to refugee camps within their own 
national borders. A more standard, legalistic definition, which emerged out of the 1951 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states that refugees are: 
Any person who [,]…owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of 
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return (Malkki 1995, 501) 
 
 In this sense, the Lost Boys fall squarely into the category of refugees as they have been 
persecuted for both their ethnicity and religion by northern Sudanese, have been violently 
separated from their homes and families, and have had a well-founded fear that they 
would be harmed if they returned to their homelands.  The Lost Boys are unique 
however, in that they have experienced "refugeeness” in numerous countries and 
situations throughout their displacement.  In addition to having been displaced to 
surrounding East African countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Uganda, Lost 
Boys have also had experiences as refugees within Sudan and in the United States.   
This discussion of the experiences of particular groups as refugees, however, 
brings up the oft debated topic within the discipline of refugee studies of whether or not a 
distinct “refugee” experience exists.  One argument is that one should define and 
delineate the stages that refugees pass through, while others decry this practice as 
essentializing an experience that cannot be neatly defined and varies widely from group 
to group and country to country.  Those who agree with the former position suggest that 
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by defining the states through which refugees pass, such as “perception of a threat; 
decision to flee; the period of extreme danger and flight; reaching safety; camp behavior; 
repatriation; settlement, or resettlement; the early and late stages of resettlement; 
adjustment and acculturation,” we can begin to understand refugees as a recurring 
problem that have “definable and often identifiable patterns of behavior and causalities” 
rather than unique and isolated occurrences (Keller quoted by Malkki 1995, 508).  More 
succinct, and perhaps more applicable than Keller‟s very specific stages of refugeeness, is 
Peter Van Arsdale‟s assertion that all refugees, and even internally displaced persons, 
(IDPs) are involved in preflight, flight, and postflight experiences that can be defined and 
discussed (Van Arsdale 2006, xi).  For my own work with the Lost Boys, this three part 
framework has been useful to examine the underlying conditions that forced the Lost 
Boys to flee, such as the breakdown of the post-colonial state in Sudan, long held ethnic 
and religious divides between the North and South, the actual flight experience of the 
Lost Boys, and their experiences of resettlement in both refugee camps and in the United 
States.   
Despite the usefulness of defining universal stages of refugeeness, this concept 
has come under criticism by those, such as Malkki, who say that it “posits a single, 
essential, transhistorical refugee condition” (1995, 511).  By attempting to define a set of 
causal behaviors or circumstances that produce refugees, we can begin to see refugees as 
a group of people without individual histories or circumstances that have led to their 
present situations (Malkki 1995).  On top of essentializing refugees and their experiences, 
viewing the processes that refugees go through as they are displaced in a linear 
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progression presupposes the superiority of the nation-state and assumes that “identity can 
only be whole and well when rooted in a territorial homeland”(Malkki 1995, 511). 
Malkki suggests that the result of the view that the nation-state is the only acceptable 
political form can lead to the negative practices such as the sealing of national borders 
against asylum seekers, and attempting to control refugees by placing them in camps 
(1995, 512).   
For this study, I think it is important to consider both the idea of refugeeness and 
the unique experiences had by people or groups of people who happen to be refugees.  
The preflight, flight, and postflight experiences, as outlined by Van Arsdale, are helpful 
for the reasons discussed above; they paint a vivid picture of cause and effect in terms of 
what causes people to flee and what the effects of flight and resettlement are.  On the 
other hand, and especially because this is a case study, the unique experiences of the Lost 
Boys as refugees will be discussed.  By looking at the Lost Boys as both individuals and 
as refugees, the broad historical and political problems such as colonization that create 
refugees—and processes such as conversion, which help people cope with their 
displacement—can be seen as they play out in distinct, unique group of people who 
happen to have become refugees.   
Refugees and Identity 
 During the process of displacement, refugees are often thrown into conditions 
unlike any they have ever experienced before.  According to Harrell-Bond and Voutira, 
“refugee predicaments involve cultures in violent collision,” which necessitate that 
refugees “adapt to radically new social and material conditions” in order to survive 
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(1992, 7).  In the process of adapting to new environments, refugees often begin to 
question the “utility of beliefs, values, technology, statuses, exchange systems, and all 
other aspects of society” (Harrell-Bond and Voutira 1992, 9).  In the case of the Lost 
Boys, displacement meant having to adapt to life without one‟s parents or immediate 
family, adherence to military-type discipline within the refugee camps, and diminished 
material resources, such as severe lack of access to food and water.  On top of this, the 
Lost Boys, for the most part from insular villages in southern Sudan, were thrown into 
refugee camps where they encountered people from ethnic groups and countries they had 
never encountered before.  As Harrell-Bond and Voutira suggest, situations such as this 
can cause the displaced to question their beliefs, and therefore I will examine what the 
beliefs of the Lost Boys were to begin with, and whether or not these were questioned as 
they fled and were resettled.   
 While Harrell-Bond and Voutira suggest that refugees enter radically different 
social situations upon their displacement, Malkki challenges the assertion that one‟s 
“social universe stops abruptly at the border of their own country or that the lifeworlds 
just across the border could be as axiomatically alien” as some researchers have 
suggested (1995, 509).  Rather, Malkki states that people often decide to leave once their 
“own accustomed society has become „strange and frightening‟ because of wars, 
massacres, political terror, or other forms of violence or uncertainty” (1995, 509).  In 
other words, refugees are essentially “normal,” and often-times well-educated people 
who have been forced to flee from their accustomed homes because war, civil-war, or 
other political upheavals have made their usual homeland “strange” (Malkki 1995, 509).  
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The idea that borders do not necessarily define or confine identity that Malkki raises is an 
important is one which will be discussed in more detail below.  In addition to lending 
itself to identity, the issues raised by Malkki also raises the point that the term “refugee” 
is often used to define a group of people who come from varied political, economic, 
religious, and ethnic groups, but they are rarely treated as individuals with individual 
reasons for fleeing, because of this, we will now turn to how anthropology can contribute 
to the study of refugees.   
 Refugees, far from being the “undifferentiated mass” that Harrell-Bond and 
Voutira say that humanitarian organizations view them as, come from cultures as varied 
as the conflicts that have produced them (1992, 8).  To understand refugees as people, 
ethnography, the main method used by anthropologists in their fieldwork, has much to 
offer the discipline of refugee studies.  Through this case study, which relied on 
ethnographic methods of participant observation and first-person interviews, I have come 
to understand the unique situation that caused the Lost Boys of Sudan to become 
refugees, and also how their unique refugeeness led to eventual conversion to 
Christianity.  Through these methods, the global phenomena of refugees can be 
understood through practices manifested on a local level.   
 In attempting to understand refugees both in terms of global processes and as 
individuals, it is important to discuss identity.  In particular, ethnic identity strongly 
influences refugees‟ (and all people‟s) perceptions of themselves and others‟ perceptions 
about them as a group.  Ethnic identity becomes particularly important when it is 
understood that the majority of conflicts throughout the world in the past 15 years or so 
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have been both internal and ethnic (Eriksen 2002, 2).  While it has long been believed 
that globalization would begin to break down borders both within and between nation-
states and in doing so, make ethnicity more fluid, this has not been the case (Cornell and 
Hartmann 1998, 4).  In Sudan, ethnicity can be seen simultaneously as a very fluid and a 
very fixed identity both historically and regionally (Van Arsdale 2006, 117), and has 
been a major factor in both the civil war and in the current Darfur conflict. Additionally, 
the Lost Boys have formed a particular identity for themselves as a group; an identity that 
I will argue in a later chapter includes Christianity as a main component.   
 Fredrik Barth, an early writer on ethnic groups and boundaries, discusses ethnicity 
in terms of ascription and identification (Barth 1969, 10).  In other words, our identity is 
a dialogic process, made up of both what others think we are, or ascription, and what we 
think of ourselves, or identification.  More concretely, Barth outlines several criteria for 
ethnic groups saying that they must be: biologically perpetuated, share fundamental 
cultural values, make up a field of communication and interaction, and have a 
membership that can identify itself as a group as well as be identified as a group by 
outsiders (Barth 1969, 11).  In other words, ethnic groups must have some common 
ancestry, have a common recognized culture, communicate and interact, and most 
importantly, label themselves and be labeled by others as a group.  It is important to note 
that this final criteria goes back to Barth‟s first point, that identity has both to do with our 
own perception of ourselves and others‟ perceptions of us.   
 Although the most current and widely used theory of identity, the constructionist 
approach, is largely based on both assertion of our identity and assignment of identity by 
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others (Cornell and Hartmann 1998, 77), this has not always been the case.  In the early 
1900s, social scientists began to question past theories of races and ethnicity that were 
rooted in biology (Cornell and Hartmann 1998, 42).  Influenced by the work of Franz 
Boas, sociologists of this time period began to look at ethnicity as both fluid and 
culturally based (Cornell and Hartman 1998).  Arising out of this theoretical base and 
heavily influenced by the influx of immigrants into the U.S. at this time, sociologists 
from the Chicago School of sociology formulated an assimilationist model of identity, 
which stated that immigrant groups went through a series of stages whereby they 
gradually assimilated to American culture and eventually lost their old ethnic identity 
(Cornell and Hartmann 1998).  As the twentieth century progressed, however, the 
assimilationist model fell apart as newly created post-colonial African and Asian nation-
states collapsed because as Cornell and Hartmann state, they “often were at odds with the 
political and civil traditions of the former colonial societies that now tried to put them to 
work” (1998, 44).  In the U.S. as well, ethnic identity made a strong resurgence in the 
1960s with the civil rights movement and counter reclamation of ethnicity by European-
American immigrant groups (Cornell and Hartmann 1998).   
 In reaction to the increasingly inadequate assimilationist model came the 
competing theories of primordialism and circumstantialism.  Primordial theorists argued 
that the assimilation model failed because ethnicity is “fundamental and intractable” 
(Cornell and Hartmann 1998, 48).  In other words, ethnic identity is something we are 
born with and cannot be changed.  Circumstantialists, on the other hand, argued that 
assimilation theory was inadequate and no longer applicable because ethnicity is fluid 
26 
 
and easily affected by circumstances (Cornell and Hartmann 1998, 48).  Proponents of 
this theory asserted a utilitarian theory of ethnicity, which stated that people used their 
ethnicity, or change their ethnicity, when it was the most advantageous for them (Cornell 
and Hartmann 1998, 57).   
 Despite the fact that these arguments seemed to be better models than assimilation 
to describe ethnic identity, both had serious flaws.  Primordialism, in its insistence on 
fixed ethnicity, didn‟t allow for instances such as those where people identify equally 
with more than one ethnicity, people identify more strongly with their religious identity 
than their ethnic identity, and or as Barth suggests has been the case with people of the 
Darfur region of Sudan, where people freely change their ethnicity (Barth 1969, 23 and 
Cornell and Hartmann 1998).  Circumstantialism, alternately, fell short by not 
acknowledging that ethnicity runs deeper than circumstances, as evidenced by the fact 
that some groups retain their ethnicities even when it is not advantageous to do so 
(Cornell and Hartmann 1998, 64).    
 The most recent and widely used theory to tackle issues of identity is 
constructionism, which attempts to incorporate both primordialism and circumstantialism 
into its discourse.  Harkening back to Barth‟s theory of identity, constructionists stress 
the importance of both ascription and assertion in the formation of a group‟s identity 
(Cornell and Hartmann 1998, 77).  Identity is formed by our perception of ourselves and 
others‟ perceptions of us.  In this way, constructionists, like circumstantialists, allow that 
circumstances can shape identity, but unlike circumstantialists, assert that ethnic groups 
play a role in their own identity construction, thereby asserting that ethnic groups have 
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agency (Cornell and Hartmann 1998, 73).  This idea, that both outsiders and insiders 
shape identity, is where primordialism comes into play in this theory in that 
constructionists accept the fact that ethnic identity for groups is often rooted in “blood 
ties or common origins” be they real or imagined (Cornell and Hartmann 1998, 89).  
Finally, constructionists also stress the idea that ethnicity can be “thick” or “thin” in that 
how important ethnicity is changes from group to group, and during different historical 
and political circumstances (Cornell and Hartmann 1998, 82-83).   
 The constructionist approach to identity lends easily lends itself to application in 
the globalizing word in which refugees live, in that it acknowledges that identity can be 
both intertwined with homelands at the same time that it can be continually renegotiated 
and changed.  The idea that identity is both rooted in homelands and mobile also comes 
into play in the work of Appadurai, who uses the term “ethnoscapes” to describe groups 
of people on the move who make up the globalizing world (Appadurai 1992).  As these 
people move throughout the world, they constantly renegotiate their identity while 
retaining ties to both real and imagined homelands, a point which will be touched on in 
more detail below.   
The constructionist approach and the idea of ethnoscapes brings up another 
important point about identity, the notion of boundaries, which for Barth are more 
important than what groups contain (1969, 15).  As Barth says “if a group maintains its 
identity when members interact with others, this entails criteria for determining 
membership and ways of signaling membership and exclusion,” (1969, 15) it then 
becomes important to determine what this criteria is and how group members determine 
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what makes them part of a group.  A much more recent writer on the subject of ethnicity 
and identity, Thomas Eriksen, author of Ethnicity and Nationalism, says that boundaries 
between groups become much more pronounced during times of social upheaval (2002).  
Perception of threat to a group almost always causes them to maintain their boundaries 
such as during “migration, change in demographic situation, industrialisation or other 
economic change, or integration into or encapsulation by a larger political system” 
(Eriksen 2002, 68).   
Identity can also be discussed in terms of another sort of boundary: that of the 
nation, as Eriksen and Stephen Cornell and Douglass Hartman, authors of Ethnicity and 
Race: Making Identities in a Changing World, have done.  According to Eriksen, ethnic 
identity is formed around notions of shared origins, be they real or imagined (2002, 59).  
The notion of shared origins also factors closely into the formation of nation-states, a 
point that will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4.  Cornell and Hartman give 
a similar definition for ethnic identity, based on the Weberian model, which says that 
ethnicity is formed around claims of real or imagined common ancestry and some sort of 
shared, identifiable culture in the present (Cornell and Hartman 1998,19).    
Related to the issue of identity is that of community, also an important variable in 
this study.  Much like identity, community is predicated on the conception of self and of 
the “other.”  According to Anthony Cohen, author of the book the Symbolic Construction 
of Community, communities are groups of people who “(a) have something in common 
with each other, which (b) distinguishes them in a significant way from the members of 
other putative groups” (1985, 12).  Boundaries therefore factor heavily into communities 
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and serve to “encapsulate” the identity of communities as members interact with those 
from different communities (Cohen 1985, 12).  These boundaries can be concrete, such as 
physical divisions of lands for different groups, while others are intangible, such as 
purported ethnic differences (Cohen 1985).  These abstract or constructed boundaries are 
where the “symbolic” nature of communities becomes apparent in that much of what 
makes up a community is based on the common perception of a group, and not on any 
finite reality (Cohen 1985).    
In terms of both identity and community, the Lost Boys provide an interesting 
case study.  In this research, I will examine how they have created their own identity, 
how southern Sudanese people have conceived of an identity, and how Lost Boys factor 
into this larger southern Sudanese identity.  Additionally, I have looked at how attempts 
by northern Sudanese nationalists to foster a national Sudanese identity have contributed 
to the creation of a new, pan-southern identity, and how the war has intensified ethnic 
and religious identities in both northern and southern Sudan.  As far as communities are 
concerned, I have examined how the Lost Boys have come to constitute a community of 
their own, both as they moved together through Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan in the 
refugee camps, and how they have formed a distinct community within the United States.   
Most importantly, though, I will look at how Christianity has factored into the identity of 
the Lost Boys, the identity of the South as a whole, and in the communities constructed 
by the Lost Boys in Africa and America. We will now turn to acculturation, a theory used 
in the past by anthropologists, which incorporates the ideas of identity and community to 





 Although anthropologists have begun recently to incorporate the study of global 
processes on the populations they study, the initial forays of anthropologists into studies 
of cultural contact can be traced back to at least the 1930s to studies of acculturation and 
assimilation.  Acculturation, in its broadest sense, has been defined by the Social Science 
Research Council (SSRC) as “culture change that is initiated by the conjunction of two or 
more autonomous cultural systems” (1953, 974).  Herskovits, citing a definition from 
Lesser, defines acculturation by saying that “acculturation may be taken to refer to ways 
in which some cultural aspect is taken into a culture and adjusted and fitted to it” (1958, 
7).  In other words, acculturation happens when a cultural group adopts the traits of 
another and in the process of doing so, modifies them to fit with their own culture.  A 
much earlier definition of acculturation taken from a collaborative article written by 
Herskovits, Redfield, and Linton more explicitly lays out the criteria for acculturation, 
saying that acculturation constitutes: “those phenomena which result when groups of 
individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with 
subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups” (1935, 145-
156).  This particular definition raises several important points about acculturation, 
namely the idea that contact between two groups must be continuous in order for 
acculturation to take place, and that acculturation is a process that can affect both groups 
involved in this contact.   
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 The two-way nature of acculturation is an oft debated topic, at least in the early 
literature.  Spindler in particular emphasizes the “reciprocal nature” of acculturation, 
something she says that previous studies of forced acculturation at the hands of the 
colonists have largely ignored (1977, 31).  Lesser similarly states that: “acculturation is a 
reciprocal relationship.  Both [cultures] give and take” (Herskovits 1958, 7).  Although 
the general consensus in the literature seems to be that there is at least a small degree of 
reciprocal transmission of cultural practices inherent in the process of acculturation, 
several authors site the largely unequal relations between the groups involved.  Teske and 
Nelson, while stating that acculturation is a “bidirectional” process, say that “it should be 
acknowledged, though, that this two-way process is not necessarily egalitarian” (1974, 
354). 
 The idea of the two-way exchange of culture inherent to acculturation is necessary 
to understand the difference between assimilation and acculturation.  There is a general 
consensus in the literature that assimilation implies acceptance of the assimilating group 
by the group that people are being assimilated into.  Assimilation can also be 
differentiated from acculturation in that the transmission of culture largely flows in the 
direction of the group that is attempting to assimilate and rarely in the direction of the 
“out-group” or group that people are assimilating to.  These differences are perhaps most 
clearly defined by Teske and Nelson who say that assimilation requires both out-group 
acceptance of the group attempting to assimilate as well as a positive “orientation” of the 
assimilating groups toward the out-group (1974, 359).  In other words, the dominant 
group must want to allow the groups attempting to assimilate to do so, and the 
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assimilating group must value the culture of the dominant group and accept it.  In 
acculturation, it is not necessary for the two groups to value the culture they are 
acculturating to, nor is it necessary that either group wants the other to acculturate.  In 
this way, acculturation is a more autonomous process than assimilation.  A further 
difference between assimilation and acculturation is that assimilation requires a change in 
values, whereas acculturation does not (Teske and Nelson 1974, 361).  During 
acculturation it is possible for a culture to take on the cultural practices of another group 
without taking on or even fully understanding the values behind these practices.  
Additionally, acculturation is always part of the process of assimilation, but the opposite 
is not always true; people do not have to assimilate in order to acculturate (Teske and 
Nelson 1974, 365).  Spindler also points out that although anthropologists presumed in 
the past that acculturation was basically a stop along the way to assimilation, the natural 
end result, many no longer believe this to be the case the case.  She says that 
acculturation is seen as “adaptive strategies used by people who have to cope with 
economic, social, and political disadvantages of their position as minorities” (Spindler 
1977, 33).     
Conversion 
 Going hand-in-hand with the processes of acculturation and globalization, which 
will be discussed below, is the process of conversion.  As might be expected, conversion 
has been looked at differently by the numerous stakeholders involved in its study.  While 
anthropologists often discuss conversion in terms of syncretism, theologists do so using 
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the theory of inculturation.  The term inculturation came into use in the late 1970s, 
particularly among Catholic churches and missionaries, and has been defined as: 
[t]he incarnation of Christian life and of the Christian message in a particular cultural context, in 
such a way that this experience not only finds expression through elements proper to the culture 
in question but becomes a principle that animates, directs, and unifies the culture, transforming it 
and remaking it so to bring about a >>new creation<<  (Appiah 2000, 20).   
 
In other words, inculturation refers to the process whereby Christianity is understood 
through the particular culture into which it is introduced.  Francis Bowie, an 
anthropologist and author of the article “The Inculturation Debate in Africa,” says that 
inculturation can be defined as the “insertion of Christianity into a culture, generally 
outside the Western Judaeo-Christian context, and that culture‟s response to the Christian 
message” (1999, 70).  Additionally, Bowie suggests that inculturation is similar to both 
acculturation and what she calls “indigenization,” but says that inculturation differs in 
that it is strictly theological in nature (1999, 70).  Like acculturation, it is possible for 
inculturation to be a two-way process in that both the culture that is converting and the 
Christian faith will undergo change during the process of inculturation (Bowie 1999, 71).   
 Edward P. Antonio, in an article entitled “Inculturation and Postcolonial 
Discourse,” describes inculturation in Africa as a much more self-aware process than 
Bowie by imbuing it with a strong sense of agency on the part of African Christians. 
According to Antonio, inculturation in Africa is a conscious reclamation of African 
identity expressed through Christianity and is therefore a critique of colonial hegemony 
(2006).  For Antonio, inculturation in Africa is inseparable from post-colonial discourse 
in that they both attempt to deal with similar issues such as “culture, the interface 
between indigenous knowledge systems and western systems of thought, the relation of 
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the past to the present, liberation, difference and otherness” (2006, 1).  In this way, 
inculturation is not just the distinctly African way in which Christianity is understood as 
Bowie has suggested, but it is an “ „anti-colonial‟ recuperation of their [African] varied 
cultural traditions”(Antonio 2006, 8).   
 While anthropologists have “reclaimed” the term “syncretism” and now use it 
almost synonymously with “inculturation” churches, in particular the Catholic church, 
views these processes as opposites, associating inculturation with the “legitimate take-up 
of selected aspects of indigenous culture into Christian practice,” and syncretism with 
“nativism or apostasy” (Bowie 1999, 68).  Syncretism has commonly been viewed by the 
church as simply combining what it views to be the binary opposites of indigenous 
religions and Western religions, and has ignored the fact that even the Christian church 
has incorporated pagan practices into its discourse (Bowie 1999, 69).   
 Inculturation and syncretism are important concepts to consider when discussing 
the Lost Boys, particularly in understanding how the abstract notion of Christianity 
became accepted and fitted to Dinka culture.  As such, both the traditional animist 
religion of the Dinka, and the particular brand of Christianity that was being proffered to 
the Lost Boys will be examined in subsequent chapters in order to understand how 
Christianity fit into Dinka culture and what had to be adapted to do so.  We will now turn 
to yet another process that has affected the conversion of the Lost Boys: globalization 
situated in the context of the nation-state.   
 Although the theory of acculturation was used by early anthropologists to explain 
the effects of culture contact between two or more groups, and inculturation has been 
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used by theologists, they have become increasingly inadequate to explain the interaction 
of cultures in today‟s globalizing world as well as the complexities of religious 
conversion.  Whereas in the past people may have only been influenced by people who 
they physically came into contact with, this can no longer be assumed to be true.  People 
in even the most remote places in the world, such as southern Sudan, are influenced by 
people all over the world, be it through trade, in refugee camps, or through mass media.  
It has therefore become much more useful, particularly in the last twenty years or so, to 
use globalization as a framework to study refugees.  As such, we will now discuss the 
study of globalization and refugees situated within the context of the nation-state.   
The Nation-State and Globalization 
The study of refugees is intimately tied to the study of globalization as 
globalization is directly tied to the breaking-down of borders that for so long have 
defined nation-states.   Both the creation of the nation-state and its subsequent break-
down in many Third World countries has been integral in the production of refugees. As 
Phillip Marfleet says in his book, Refugees in a Global Era, all aspects of the refugee 
experience, from initial displacement, to flight, to exile, are shaped by the nation-state 
and its institutions (2006, 38).  This is true in the country that refugees originate from, the 
country or countries they are hosted in, and in their final place of exile.  Also bound up 
with the nation-state, are processes such as “decolonization and superpower conflict,” 
which have contributed to many of the current flows of refugees around the world 
(Maalki 1995, 503).  Adding to this observation, Marfleet states that while superpower 
conflict that emerged from the Cold War played a hand in refugee movements in the 
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1970s and ‟80s, this assertion “understates the extent to which such movements were 
associated with the legacy of colonialism, with crises of the world economy, and with 
policies of dominant states towards other that were weaker and more vulnerable” (2006, 
39).  Furthermore, Marfleet suggests that the majority of refugee flows in Africa, 
especially those that began decades ago, often were contingent upon decolonization 
(2006:40).   
Although the processes of colonization and decolonization that have contributed 
so greatly to the creation of refugees have been studied for some time by anthropologists, 
the refugees that result from these processes have only recently begun to be studied.  As 
Malkki suggests, the pullout of colonizing forces has lead to reshuffling of borders and 
creation of new nation states, ones that are not always in the best interest of the people 
living in these areas (1995, 503).  With national borders being changed and becoming, at 
least in most cases, less permeable, people throughout the world have become displaced 
on a scale that has never before been seen.  To this day, southern Sudan is still dealing 
with the repercussions of attempts by both their former colonizers, namely the British and 
Egyptians, and the northern Sudanese, to unite the North and South under the rubric of a 
unified state.  Years of civil war have been the result with the majority of destruction and 
casualties occurring in the South.  While the breakdown of the attempted Sudanese 
nation-state has caused this destruction, the refugees that result, such as the Lost Boys, 
have had to deal with the global problem of less permeable borders among old and 
emerging nation states that border Sudan and in countries such as the United States and 
Australia that have taken them in. In order to better understand the problems facing the 
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Lost Boys and the country of Sudan, it is important to understand what exactly a nation 
state is and how the differing identities of North and Sudan fit into this definition.   
The Breakdown of the Post-Colonial African Nation-State  
 Issues surrounding the creation and the break-down of the state have plagued 
Sudan and other decolonized countries for years.  According to Max Weber, in order for 
a nation-state to be formed and remain stable, several factors need to be in place, namely 
a common national language, a common cultural heritage and “political power which is 
endowed with sufficient military power” (Mommsen 1974, 38).  Weber points out that 
common cultural heritage is not necessarily predicated on ethnic homogeneity, but at the 
very least people need to share real or imagined “notions of common descent” (Gerth and 
Mills 1958, 173).  In order to legitimate themselves, states and the people who make 
them up must believe, prima facie, that their culture is superior to others (Mommsen 
1974, 38).  As Weber, (quoted by Mommsen) says, “the significance of a „nation‟ is 
usually anchored in the superiority, or at least the irreplaceability, of the culture values 
that are to be preserved and developed only through the cultivation of the peculiarity of a 
group” (Mommsen 1974,  39).   
 Before discussing the nation-state in the context of Africa, it is important to note 
that the terms “nation,” “state,” and “nation-state” should not be used interchangeably, 
and in fact the difference between the term “nation” and the term “state” factor into the 
current political situation in Sudan.  A state can be defined broadly as a geographically-
defined entity.  As such, the notion of a state lends itself to quantitative measure, such as 
miles or kilometers or longitudes and latitudes (Connor 1994, 36).  Nations, on the other 
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hand, lend themselves to qualitative data, such as languages spoken, religions practiced, 
or ethnicities claimed.  Even more intangibly, the nation has to do with what people 
“believe they are,” instead of what they actually are or do (Connor 1994, 37).  Joseph 
Stalin, also speaking to the imagined, intangible nature of nations, says that although 
people making up a nation may share ethnicity, or language, what really matters is that 
people share a “historically constituted community” (1994, 18).  It is not just a real or 
imagined shared past that makes up a nation though, but also stability, or the belief that 
the nation is permanent, and believed to be so because of a shared language, a shared 
economy, a common territory, and some kind of overarching “psychological make-up” or 
a “national character” that lends itself to a shared culture (Stalin 1994, 20).  For Stalin, all 
of these factors must be in place in order for a nation to exist.  In other words, a nation is 
always—at least using Stalin‟s definition, which includes a shared territory—a state, but 
a state is not always a nation.   
 Adding to the discourse on nation-states, and speaking specifically about Sudan, 
Sharkey discusses several other elements which are integral to the formation of states.  
According to Sharkey, a nation is formed around people sharing a “common cause” and 
is focused around claims to a particular land, claims to autonomy, and claims to a 
common past that “legitimate the present and offers signposts for the future” (2003, 124).  
Much like Weber and Stalin, Sharkey suggests that elements such as ethnicity, religious 
practices and shared language also aid in formation of nations (2003, 124).   
 Benyamin Neuberger adds more generally to the discussion of the post-colonial 
African state in his piece “State and Nation in African Thought.”  According to 
39 
 
Neuberger, the African experience of nation-state building has been entirely different 
from that of the Europeans (1994, 233).  Whereas in Europe, states and nations evolved 
together, and “states established nations and nations established states” (Neuberger 1994, 
233), post-colonial Africa was, for the most part, left with states established by colonial 
powers, but little in the way of nations.  In fact, many European states, such as Britain 
and France, formed for reasons other than a strict desire for nationhood (Neuberger 
1994).  Rulers of post-colonial African states, on the other hand, have consciously 
attempted to build nations among the populations confined to the borders of the imposed 
state (Neuberger 1994).  Because the borders for African states have so often been 
imposed with little regard for the populations that live within them, and often cut across 
ethnic, religious and linguistic divides, nations, especially as Weber has defined them, 
they have been hard to build.  Despite these difficulties, attempts have, and continue to be 
made throughout Africa, to build nation-states.  Neuberger explains that there are really 
only two options open to African states attempting to build nations: either to break away 
from a larger nation-state in order for a smaller group with a shared identity to become a 
nation, or, for nationalist leaders to “give the external shell of the state an internal 
national content” (Neuberger 1994, 234).  In other words, a nation would need to be 
imposed on an area that constitutes a state.   In Sudan, clearly the latter option is the one 
that has been pursued by the northerners and will be discussed in more detail later on.   
The Global and the Local 
Despite the fact that global processes such as decolonization, the building-up and 
the breaking-down of the nation-state, and the extreme impoverishment of the developing 
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world are the main factors contributing to the creation of refugees, it is in the “local” or 
on a small-scale, that these processes are most noticeable.  Marfleet states that forced 
migration is most importantly caused by “failures of basic survival systems and the 
weakening or collapse of social and political structures, often structures of the local state” 
adding that these processes undoubtedly have a “global dimension” (2006, 21).   It is also 
at this “local” level that anthropologists are most accustomed to working. According to 
Appadurai, anthropologists need to add the global to their studies of specific localities 
(1992, 199).  In this research, the global phenomenon of Christianity is examined through 
its role in the lives of a group of young men now living in Denver.  
 Another way in which the global is brought to the local in the study of refugees is 
in the “imagination” of people in the Third World (Appadurai 1992).  As the world 
becomes increasingly deterritorialized, more and more people have begun to make up 
what Appadurai refers to as “ethnoscapes,” which as we have previously discussed are 
groups of people on the move across national boundaries, such as refugees, guest 
workers, and tourists (1992, 192).  The people making up these ethnoscapes, through 
their own movement and through the globalized media, are being exposed to ideas and 
practices that they heretofore have not been and through this exposure the “imagination” 
of these people has expanded” (Appadurai 1992, 198-199 & 2000, 625).  Although this 
may seem positive in that people are offered more choices in their lives, Appadurai points 
out that what people in the Third World see in the media and can imagine is often not 
attainable in real life (1992, 198).  Some examples of “disjunctures” between what people 
can imagine and what they can actually attain include images in the media “which cannot 
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be satisfied by national standards of living and consumer capabilities” and “flows of 
discourses of human rights that generate demands from workforces that are repressed by 
state violence which is itself backed by global arms flows” (Appadurai 2000, 625).    
While it may seem overly abstract for an ethnographer to attempt to “imagine” the 
“imagination” of others, what Appadurai is suggesting is that to understand the social 
imagination of a particular social group and how this factors into the identity that they 
construct for themselves, is to begin to understand the effects of globalization on specific 
groups of people (1992, 199).  In this way, the “undifferentiated mass” that constitutes 
refugees to the general public can begin to be illuminated.  For this research, beginning to 
understand how Christianity factored into the imagination of the Lost Boys is important.  
What did they know of Christianity before they converted?  How and by what means did 
Christianity reach southern Sudan?  How did living in refugee camps change what the 
Lost Boys imagined the larger world to be and how did Christianity factor into this new 
worldview?  Did Christianity accompany other processes such as Western-style 
education?  By answering some of these questions, we can begin to understand some of 
the global forces acting on a particular to a group of Lost Boys and also begin to 
understand how Christianity fit into to their larger imagination of their social reality.   
 To better understand the imagination of the Lost Boys, it is also important to 
factor in the global phenomena of the refugee camp.  Refugee camps, because of their 
function of grouping people together, often become sites of collective narratives (Harrell-
Bond and Voutira 1992, 8).  Some of the Lost Boys spent nearly fifteen years in refugee 
camps, for many the majority of their lives to that point.  As such, it is important to look 
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at the collective social imagination and group narratives that formed in these camps.  
What were the Lost Boys exposed to in these camps that they would not have been 
exposed to had they remained in Sudan—people from other countries, religions, new 
technology?  How did these factors change what they could imagine for their lives and 
how did Christianity factor into this new social imagination?  These issues will be further 
explored in Chapters 6 and 7.  
In the next chapter, I will discuss Dinka life in Sudan as it was before the arrival 
of colonizers, the Egyptian/Turkish and British/ Egyptian colonization of Sudan, the pull-
out of these forces after World War II and the effects that this had, leaving the South to 
fend for itself in the midst of northern domination and the devolution of the country into 











Chapter 3—Historical Background 
 
Dinka Culture Prior to 1955 
 
 As little literature specifically pertaining to Bor Dinka exists other than that 
produced by missionaries who have worked in the area, the history of the Dinka tribe will 
be presented as that of the Dinka tribe as a whole, and will not just be confined to the 
narrow literature of Bor ethnography.  Although some variations in culture are 
recognized between different groups of Dinka (of which Bixler says there are about 25 
(2005, 36) and the area in which the Dinka live is vast, Lienhardt calls the cultural and 
linguistic homogeneity among different groups of Dinka “striking” saying that “despite 
regional variations in dialect, custom, and some aspects of social structure” the Dinka 
may be treated as “a single people” (Lienhardt 1961, 1).  Several of the Lost Boys 
confirmed this relative similarity as well.  Additionally, by looking at the history of the 
entire Dinka tribe, I was able to include a body of literature that has major contributions 
from Sudanese anthropologists such as Francis Mading Deng and Jok Madut Jok, which 
help paint a more emic picture of life in Sudan.  
 The ethnographic literature that exists for the Dinka is made up largely of three 
sources: 1) missionary literature, in this case, largely that of Marc Nikkel, an Episcopal 
missionary and amateur ethnographer who worked closely with the Bor Dinka, 2) native 
southern Sudanese anthropologists such as Jok Madut Jok and Francis Mading Deng and, 
3) British and American anthropologists such as Godfrey Lienhardt, who worked with the 
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Dinka, and E.E. Evans-Pritchard, who dealt with the closely-related Nuer tribes of Sudan.  
Although it would seem that this varied body of contributors would provide differing 
accounts of Dinka culture, they often reach similar conclusions, largely because many of 
these authors have relied on the early accounts of Pritchard and Lienhardt to fill in gaps 
in their research.  
Origins of the Dinka 
 The Dinka, at least prior to widespread Christianity, traced their origins through 
the creation myth of the traditional religion which in many ways is similar to Christian 
creation stories.  According to Lienhardt, this myth states that earth and sky were 
originally one; connected together by a rope that man could easily climb to reach Nhialic.  
As in the biblical myth, there was one man and one woman, who were given the food that 
they needed by Nhialic, but were forbidden from grinding or planting any more grain 
than what they were supplied with.  The woman however decided to plant (or pound) 
more grain, because she was “greedy.”  Nhialic was struck by her mallet and decided to 
sever the rope that connected the earth with the sky.  People now knew hunger, death, 
and sickness and were permanently separated from Nhialic (Lienhardt 1961, 34).   
 Other aspects of the traditional Dinka religion, such as the supreme being, 
Nhialic, who is considered to be the creator and worshiped above all other divinities, 
have caused many to speculate that the Dinka have had contact with or that their religion 
was influenced by “Near Eastern” thought (Nikkel 2001, 39).  The similarities between 
aspects of Dinka religion and the bible, specifically the Old Testament, have been traced 
by some to possible contact between the southern Sudanese and the Hebrews, or to an 
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origin of the Dinka people in either northeastern Africa or the Middle East (Nikkel 2001, 
43).  Nuer religion similarly has been compared to the Old Testament, something that 
was observed by Evans-Prichard who says: 
Only the religion of the Dinka can be said to have strongly marked affinities with it, [Nuer 
religion] and it can be further said that in some respects the religions of these two peoples 
resemble less other Negro religions than some of the historic religions (1956, vii). 
 
Others however, believe that the idea that the Dinka are relatively recent inhabitants of 
southern Sudan is simply a ploy by the North to construct a discourse that southerners 
have no claim to Sudanese land (Nikkel 2001, 40).  More recent evidence based on 
linguistics seems to suggest that the Upper Nile area (in which Bor, where many of the 
Lost Boys are from, is located) has been continuously occupied for several millennia 
(Nikkel 2001, 41).  Going still further, some have proposed that southerners actually 
originated as far north as Khartoum, and that even the name is taken from the Dinka word 
Kiertoum which means “the meeting of rivers,” a theory which  Dinka oral tradition 
seems to support (Nikkel 2001, 41-42). 
When the “World Was Spoiled”: Turko-Egyptian and British-Egyptian Invaders 
Come to Dinkaland 
How does the spoiling of the world come about? 
Our land is closed in a prison cell 
The Arabs have spoiled our land 
Spoiled our land with bearded guns 
Guns which thunder and then even sound beautiful 
Like the ancient drums with which buffaloes were charmed 
Until their horns were caught 
Is the black color of the skin such a thing 
That the Government should draw its guns?4 
 
Regardless of which group inhabited Sudan first, it seems that both the North and 
the South have tried to manipulate history in order to paint a favorable picture of Sudan‟s 
                                               
4 Taken from a Dinka song (Deng 1972, 150). 
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early habitation.  The focus of this chapter will therefore deal with recorded history, 
which reaches a stronger consensus than oral history, in particular beginning in the 
1800s.  The ramifications of the Turko-Egyptian and British-Egyptian colonization of 
Sudan and the slavery that accompanied this process is especially relevant as it laid the 
groundwork for much of the conflict that created the Lost Boys and continues in Sudan to 
this day.  The lasting legacy of enslavement of southern Sudanese by northern Sudanese 
has figured closely into current events.  As Bixler says “slavery and its history in Sudan 
is critical in understanding the forces that led to civil war and, ultimately, to the refugee 
crisis that separated so many boys from their parents in southern Sudan in 1987 and ‟88” 
(2005, 45). 
Contact between northern Sudan and the Middle East has occurred for thousands 
of years mainly in the form of trade (Deng 1995, 9).  Sudanese in the North gradually 
began to identify with Arab culture, in particular because of the promise of wealth and 
prosperity that it brought with it, a process that intensified with the Islam‟s beginnings in 
the seventh century A.D. (Deng 1995, 26, Jok 2001, 75).  Further aiding the Islamization 
of the North were invasions in the seventh and ninth centuries A.D. by Egyptian colonial 
forces (and slave raiders), who defeated the Beja and Nubian kingdoms of northern 
Sudan, which were largely Christian at the time (Deng 1995, 10, Jok 2001,75). 
Enslavement of Sudanese by Arabs became legal, and entrenched (Jok 2001, 75).   By the 
16
th
 century, the identity of northern Sudan was almost totally an Arab one (Wai 1981, 
26).   
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Concurrent to the developments in the North, little was changing in southern 
Sudan.  The Sudd, a massive swamp that physically separates the North and South of 
Sudan played a hand in keeping Arabs out and the few that dared cross it were further 
deterred from remaining in the South by “the difficulties of living conditions, including 
the harshness of the tropical climate for a people accustomed to the desert, and the 
resistance of the warrior Nilotic tribes” (Deng 1995, 10).  There was also little incentive 
for the Arabs to attempt conversion among southern populations because to do so would 
be to take away the potential to enslave southern people as Islamic law prohibits the 
enslavement of Muslims by other Muslims, but not of people of different religions (Deng 
1995, 10, Bixler 2005, 40).   
It was not until 1820 that forces were put into motion that would vastly alter the 
course of southern Sudan. In this year, northern Sudan was invaded by Turkish and 
Egyptian forces that planned to make northern Sudan their base from which to make 
slave-raiding expeditions into the South.  They were led by Muhammad Ali, a 
representative of the Ottoman Empire and viceroy of Egypt (Deng 1995, 10, Bixler 2005, 
39-40).  In part, Ali wanted slaves to help strengthen his army, but there were other 
objectives as well, namely the acquisition of gold and ivory and control of the vast swath 
of land that was Sudan (Bixler 2005, 40, Wai 1981, 26).  In his thirst for slaves, riches 
and land (with help from others from many areas of the world including Europe and 
northern Sudan, which rushed in to pillage human cargo for themselves), Ali “spoiled the 
world” of those in southern Sudan (Bixler 2005, 40).  In many ways similar to what 
happened during the civil war, and what is currently happening in Darfur, a scorched 
48 
 
earth policy was pursued by the Arabs: women and children were kidnapped by armed 
horsemen and men were killed, whatever was left was burned (Wai 1981, 28).  Ali‟s 
incursion into the South not only led to these “rapacious slave raids,” but also was the 
beginning of “clashes between the differing [southern] societies and their respective 
cultures” (Wai 1981, 27).  This “exploitation of tribal hostilities” in the South as Wai 
suggests, was the beginning of inter-ethnic violence that would manifest itself once again 
in the twentieth century civil war in Sudan (Wai 1981, 28).   
By the 1860s, a new viceroy had come to power in Egypt, the grandson of 
Muhammad Ali, named Ismail Pasha (Bixler 2005, 41).  Unlike his grandfather, Ismail 
had plans to modernize Egypt, something that would require funds from Britain and 
France, which were both opposed to the slavery that was taking place in Sudan.  
According to Bixler, Pasha not only “opened Cairo‟s first opera and built the Suez Canal 
with backing from European countries,” but he also “responded to their [Britain and 
France] abolitionist pressures” (Bixler 2005, 41).  Although the British themselves had a 
murky past in the Sudanese slave trade, they procured Sir Samuel Baker, an explorer who 
was commissioned by the Egyptians to secure the Upper Nile for Pasha‟s empire and to 
abolish slavery (Wai 1981, 28, Bixler 2005, 41).  In reality, Baker was heavily 
outnumbered by the slave traders and their armies made up of Arabs and southern slaves.  
Baker‟s work had little effect and the slave trade continued unabated; the British, 
however, were placated by Baker‟s attempts (Wai 1981, 29, Bixler 2005, 41-42).  Charles 
Gordon was eventually sent in by Britain to replace Baker, but met with similar troubles, 
including the fact that the Sudanese and Egyptian soldiers assigned to him seemed to find 
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nothing wrong with slavery.  On top of this, the South had been so decimated by the slave 
trade that there was little hope for those slaves who he was able to free who would often 
starve to death or simply be recaptured by slave traders (Bixler 2005, 42).   
Although the seeds of distrust had been sown in the southern tribes by the 
devastating slave raids of the North, the two areas found some common ground in 1881 
with the coming of the Mahdi, a northern Sudanese man who “wanted to defeat the 
enemies of Islam,” among them the Turko-Egyptian colonizing forces (Bixler 2005, 43).  
As Deng says “reaction to the Turks and the Egyptians came from both North and South 
and had a unifying effect on the country as they pulled together to resist foreign 
domination” (Deng 1995, 10-11).  The Mahdi forces managed to largely drive out the 
Turko-Egyptians forces by 1885, sometimes with armies made up of joint North and 
South forces (Wai 1981, 30).  Despite the fact that the South assisted the North in their 
victory, enslavement of southerners by the North continued.  Jok says that the slave trade 
actually increased during this period and “drove millions of African Sudanese from their 
villages and made them die of hunger and war-related deaths” (Jok 2001, 75).  In 1882, 
the British attempted to intervene and extricate their Egyptian interests in Sudan.  They 
succeeded only in getting General Gordon, who they once again sent into Khartoum, 
killed (Bixler 2005, 43).  The British did not attempt an invasion again until 1896,  not so 
much an effort to avenge Gordon‟s death (as it was touted to the British public), but as an 
attempt to stave off France‟s interest in gaining control of the Nile River (Bixler 2005, 
45-46).  The British succeeded in 1898, declared slavery illegal and then embarked on 
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their own colonization of Sudan (called the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium), which 
would last until 1955 (Jok 2001, 75-76). 
Sudan Under British Control 
The colonization of Sudan by the British and Egyptians led to a host of new 
problems for the country, not least of which was the fact that the British (who held the 
real power in Sudan) administered the two radically different halves of Sudan as separate 
entities (Bixler 2005, 46, Wai 1981, 34, Deng 1995, 11).  Deng says that part of the 
reason, beyond the noticeable differences between the regions, was that the British 
wanted to keep the possibility of annexation of southern Sudan to neighboring East 
African colonies open”(1995, 11).  Wai, in his explanation of the so-called  British 
“Southern Policy,” which laid out the different style of government to be used for the 
South, similarly states that this policy was based on the premises:  
(1) that the Negroid Africans of the South are culturally and, to some extent, racially distinct 
from the Northern Arab Sudanese; and (2) that the Southern provinces would either develop 
eventually as a separate territorial and political entity or be integrated into what was then British 
East Africa (1981, 35).    
 
In many ways, the British belief that southern Sudan was fundamentally different 
than the North led to a hands off-approach to their governing of the South.  The Southern 
Policy, by separating the two halves of Sudan, allowed the British to divide and make 
Sudan easier to rule (1972, 137).  In particular, because of the perceived “pride and 
ethnocentrism, the Dinka were a potential threat to the [British] ruler; and the more they 
stayed in the abyss of backwardness the better” (Deng 1972, 137-138).  The British did 
little to modernize southern Sudan, a decision which was based, at least in part, on the 
wishes of southerners who were not initially keen on education, as it was thought to 
51 
 
interfere with traditional practices of cattle-keeping and pastoralism.  Additionally, Deng 
says, there was the perception by the British of southerners as “noble savages” 
underdeveloped but harmless, and likely to stay that way if no attempts were made to 
change them (1972, 138). The lack of modernization in the South left it a “huge fertile 
ground for anthropologists,” according to Wai and it is true that much of the notable work 
on southern tribes, such as that of E.E. Evans-Pritchard and Godfrey Lienhardt, came out 
of this period.   
What modernizing elements that did come into the South were largely those 
brought in by the missionaries that the British government allowed into southern Sudan 
(Bixler, 2005).   During British rule, Anglican, Presbyterian, and Catholic missionaries 
all came to southern Sudan and began to set up schools and churches (Bixler 2005, 47).  
While British interference in the South was on a small scale and did little to change the 
lifestyle most Dinka were used to, the British poured time and energy into modernizing 
the North.  Wai says of the disparity between northern and southern development:  
“whereas education and social services were left in the hands of the missionaries in the 
South, the colonial regime was actively engaged in expanding education and economic 
development and modernization in the North” (1981, 52).  Deng, also discussing the 
relative lack of involvement on the part of the British in southern Sudan says: “the 
principal objective of colonial rule in the region was the establishment and maintenance 
of law and order” (1995, 11).   
While the British did little to interfere with the culture of the southern tribes, and 
in many ways sought to maintain them, they did actively seek to eliminate all Arab 
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influence from the South (Wai, 1981).  This was achieved by deposing all Arabs from 
positions of power in the South and through the resurrection of African laws and tribal 
languages (Wai, 1981).  Additionally, English replaced Arabic in the newly constructed 
mission schools and in the workplace (Wai, 1981).   
In many ways, the “Southern Policy” allowed southerners freedom of a kind that 
they had not experienced for centuries.  The British were in some ways surprisingly 
attuned to the culture of the Southern tribes and according to Wai, “British colonial 
administrators were required to be fully informed of the social structures, beliefs, customs 
and psychological predispositions of the people [of the South]” (1981, 35-36).  The 
Dinka and other tribes, although they would have much preferred to have been left alone 
both by the North and the British-Egyptian forces, came to “trust” the British (Bixler 
2005, 47).  This is not to say that there was no opposition to the British invasion.  Despite 
the somewhat “benevolent” presence of the British, the separate and unequal 
administration of southern Sudan was part of their overall strategy to use the South as a 
pawn in their game to control much of northeastern Africa and the Suez Canal.   
The Departure of the British: “Independence” for Sudan 
 In light of the end of World War II, which radically changed Britain‟s position 
from an empire to be reckoned with to a “nation that had yielded military supremacy to 
new superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union,” (Bixler 2005, 49) and also 
due to shifting international sentiments about colonialism, the British were ready by the 
mid-1940s to withdraw from Sudan.  In 1946, discussion began among the British about 
how best to extricate themselves from the country.  Although the British had long 
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governed the North and South as two separate and unequal entities, the idea of uniting the 
North and South as one upon the pullout of the British became popular, especially under 
increasing pressure from Egypt and northern Sudan who both had designs on the South.  
In the same year, the Sudan Administration Conference was held in Khartoum and while 
participants acknowledged the unequal development in the North and South, it was 
decided that the two halves must become one (Wai 1981, 39).  Not surprisingly, the 
South was not represented at this conference.  Although another conference was held at 
the behest of British governors who feared for the South in the southern town of Juba, the 
decision had already been made and the fears of British governors and southern chiefs 
were disregarded (Wai 1981, 42).  In 1947, the British reversed the Southern Policy and 
contact between the North and South was intensified as the British and mainly northern 
Sudanese continued discussions about the country‟s future (Deng 1972, 138, Bixler 2005, 
49).     
 Not only was the fate of southerners decided with limited input from that half of 
the country, but little attempt was made to put into place safeguards that would have 
protected the South from northern domination.  Deng says the British had “neither the 
time nor the political will to put in place constitutional arrangements that would ensure 
protection for the South in a united Sudan” (1995, 11).  Wai says that although the 
government eventually passed several measures that allowed for some representation of 
the South in legislative matters, they were continually attacked by northerners who said 
the British were once again aiming to separate the two halves of the country (1981, 44-
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45).  In the legislating bodies that were eventually formed, the South was woefully 
underrepresented, despite these safeguards (Bixler 2005, 51, Wai 1981, 45). 
Many British in positions of power in the South had strong objections to this 
policy, which they realized would effectively lead to the destruction of the South.  The 
British governor of the southern Bahr el Ghazal province lamented the fact that no 
southerners were present when the decision to lump the two halves of the country 
together was made and said that the “Conference gave us the uneasy feeling that the 
South‟s fate is not to be decided principally on grounds of morality or expediency for the 
Southerners but as a pawn in the power politics game” (Wai 1981, 39).  Another British 
governor stationed in the South, calling up the horrific enslavement of southerners by 
northerners in pre-colonial times, stated that to unite the North and South would lead to 
northerners treating southerners as “their fathers did” (Wai 1981, 40).   
Why would the British continue with a policy that was so unpopular among their 
own ranks and leave the South to a fate that the British had initially sought to stop? In 
short, to keep the Egyptians and northern Sudanese happy.  The northern Sudanese had 
long been pressuring the British to make the country one, ostensibly to unite the country, 
but really as Wai points because the northerners were “entertaining cultural imperial 
interests in the South” (1981, 51).  The “jubilation” that the northerners expressed at the 
eventual pullout of the British was as much about the “coming of freedom as it was about 
the prospect of finally and effectively bringing the South under northern control” (Jok 
2001, 76).  The British relationship to Egypt, which was, at least in name, part of the 
British Condominium government, factored heavily into the decision to leave the South 
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and North as one.  The Egyptians, who originally colonized Sudan a thousand years 
before, were looking to add Sudan to their provinces once the British left (Wai 1981, 51).  
The British, who were looking to their strategic interests in the Middle East and their 
interest in the Suez Canal, did not want to “antagonize Egypt in the Sudanese affair” and 
so, the “southern Sudan was to be sacrificed to appease Egypt” (Wai 1981, 51-52).  By 
the time of the British pullout in 1956, the two halves of the country had already reached 
the breaking point.   
The Anyanya War 
 By the time the British withdrew from Sudan in January 1956, civil war had 
begun.  Southern troops who were to be transferred to the North mutinied amid fears that 
they would be underrepresented in the army and subsequently killed when they reached 
the North (Deng 1972, 138, Bixler 2005, 50).  The southern troops killed many, both 
northern troops and civilians, and the North quickly retaliated (Bixler 2005, 50). The 
South‟s worst nightmares had been realized.  In many ways, war had been imminent 
since the British decision that the country must be one and so for months before the 
official pullout of the British, southerners rebelled “against what they perceived as 
northern dominance in forging the first government of an independent Sudan” (Bixler 
2005, 51).  The North immediately sought to “unify” the halves of the country, with 
Islamization and Arabization being their methods of choice, which to the South was 
“tantamount to replacing British colonialism with Arab hegemony” (Deng 1995, 12).   
  The average civilian was slow to join the fight and for years the battle languished 
as a low-level conflict between southern liberation/succession movements and the 
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northern government (Deng 1995, 11-12, Bixler 2005, 50).  In the late 1950s, the 
northern government began targeting educated southerners in the South as possible 
opposition to northern domination, but it was not until the 1960s that large numbers of 
Dinka began to take up arms after further intensification of the Islamization process by 
northerners in the South (Deng 1995, 12, Bixler 2005, 50).  The northern government 
tried to interfere in almost every aspect of the daily life of southerners, replacing English 
with Arabic in mission schools, making the official day of rest Friday, the Muslim holy 
day, and eventually, in 1964, expelling all Christian missionaries from the South (Bixler 
2005, 50).   
 After years of fighting, the socialist Nimeiri government came to power in the 
North after a military coup in 1969 (Wai 1981, 145, Bixler 2005, 52).  Nimeiri, who 
himself had worked in the South, recognized the South‟s right to autonomy and the 
integral differences between the two regions (Wai 1981, 145, Bixler: 2005, 52).  In 1972, 
Nimieri and the southern rebels signed the Addis Ababa Agreement, which effectively 
ended the civil war, at least for the time being (Bixler 2005, 52, Wai 1981, 157).   
Return to War 1983-2005 
 The peace, however, was short-lived.  Nimieri, “under pressure from the 
conservative and radical fundamentalist elements” in his regime and who himself became 
a born-again Muslim during his tenure, soon began appointing conservative Muslims to 
government positions and began to impose Islamization policies on the whole country 
(Deng 1995, 12).  In 1983, the civil war began again when Nimieri, in an attempt to 
“foster factionalism” along tribal lines in the southern half of the country, split it into 
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three separate regions (Branch and Mampilly 2005, 5).  This, coupled with his imposition 
of sharia, or Islamic religious law, in the whole of Sudan was a “major force in returning 
the nation to civil war” (Bixler 2005, 53).   
On top of North/South hostilities were the ongoing problems between tribes 
within the South.  Nimieri‟s decision to split up the South brought to the surface long-
simmering tensions between the largest and most dominant tribe, the Dinka, and the 
smaller Nuer and Equatorian populations in southern Sudan.  The Dinka-dominated rebel 
army, the Sudan People‟s Liberation Army (SPLA), treated Equatorians badly and moved 
Dinka populations onto Equatorian land where they would have “better access to relief 
aid and avoid the worst fighting further north” (Branch and Mampilly 2005, 5).  In 1991, 
a further rift within the South began.  Three commanders, led by Riek Machar, split from 
SPLA leader John Garang over whether the SPLA should seek autonomy from the North 
or whether it should try to remain united and secular (Bixler 2005, 66).  Machar‟s faction, 
known both as the SPLA-Nasir and the SPLA-United, wanted a separate southern 
Sudanese state.  Garang‟s faction, known alternately as the SPLA-Mainstream and the 
SPLA-Torit, wanted a united, but secular Sudan (HRW/Africa 1994, 6).  Machar also 
believed that Garang was using child soldiers (although later in the war many, including 
the Red Cross, would claim that Machar was doing the same thing), a claim that was 
eventually backed up by Human Rights Watch/Africa.  What started out as an ideological 
rift soon turned ethnic, as Machar was Nuer and Garang, Dinka.  Fighting between the 
Nuer and Dinka ensued and many were killed.   The so-called South-South civil war 
reached its pinnacle in October and November of 1991 when the Nuer orchestrated a 
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massive raid of Bor Dinka cattle and massacre of the area‟s inhabitants.  The implications 
that this raid had on conversion will be further explored in Chapter 5.   
With the reigniting of the civil war, according to Bixler, the government began 
bombing civilian targets, stealing grain from southerners, and arming Arab militias 
(2005, 56).  Before turning our attention to how this situation created groups of refugees 
like the Lost Boys, I will first delve further into the issue of the nation-state and how 
attempts to build a nation-state made clear and reinforced the separate identities of 
southern and northern Sudan, highlighting how Christianity began to become part of the 





Chapter 4—The Sudanese Nation-State and its Breakdown 
 
 To begin to understand the refugee experience of the Lost Boys and their 
subsequent conversion to Christianity, it is important to understand how the Sudanese 
nation-state came to be, and how its breakdown has created the largest number of 
refugees and IDPs in recent history, including the Lost Boys.  To begin, I will discuss 
how after the departure of British and Egyptian colonial forces, Sudan as a whole was 
consistent with a state, but not a nation.  I will then discuss the tactics that northern 
nationalists attempted to use to foster a unified Sudanese nation-state rooted in Islamic 
and Arabic identity and the response of people in the South to these attempts.  Finally, I 
will discuss the emergent pan-southern identity of the South and how the “new 
nationalism” of the South relies heavily on Christianity.   
Colonial Bureaucracy and the Northern Nationalists 
Having discussed the criteria for a nation-state in Chapter 2, which generally 
includes a shared language, culture, and a real or imagined shared past, it could easily be 
argued that northern Sudan possessed all of the qualities necessary for its formation both 
at and before independence from Britain.  Arabic was the dominant language, 
identification with the surrounding Arab countries was widespread, and the North 
possessed a standing army to carry out the will of those in power.   
Northern Sudan did not always identify itself as a nation-state, however, but 
began to conceive of itself as such through the emerging nationalism of the young 
northern Sudanese men working for the British colonial government (Sharkey 2003).  
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These young men, who were often hand-selected by the British to be educated and work 
within the bureaucracy that kept the colony going, began to circulate nationalist beliefs 
through new technologies of the colony, such as the printing press (Sharkey 2003).  
Although in the other colonies British colonies the British usually relied on missionary-
run Christian schools to groom native men for colonial work, they were faced with a 
unique situation in Muslim-dominated northern Sudan, and therefore had to create their 
own school to educate young men (Sharkey 2003).  In northern Sudan, one school in 
particular supplied much of the support staff for the colony; the Gordon Memorial 
College,
5
 founded by the British for the sole purpose of turning out low-level Sudanese 
bureaucrats (Sharkey 2003, 7).  Gordon College opened in 1902, and according to 
Sharkey, “served as both a training ground for bureaucracy and a crucible for 
nationalism” (2003, 7).  The college, which mostly admitted young men from Arabic-
speaking, high status families from varied tribes in the North, trained them for 
bureaucracy by providing them with a “strong literary education in both Arabic and 
English, and introduced new communications technologies such as typing and printing” 
(Sharkey 2003, 8).  According to Deng, Gordon College and a similar institution, the 
Khartoum Military School
6
 fostered nationalism in several ways.  To begin with, they 
taught their students to read and write, and by doing so “broadened their perspectives” 
(1995, 102).  In addition to allowing their graduates access to literature, these schools 
also brought the bureaucrats that they graduated into contact with their colonial masters, 
                                               
5 Named for Charles Gordon, the British general who was killed by Mahdi forces in the 1880s.   
6 It should be noted that the Khartoum Military School also turned out graduates from southern Sudan who 
eventually participated in the South‟s fight for independence against the North.  One such graduate was 
Joseph Lagu, the founder of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) (Deng 1995).   
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the British and the Egyptians and gave them a chance to see their “contrasting attitudes 
toward rule” (Deng 1995, 102).  Furthermore, these schools allowed their graduates 
employment opportunities that not only “raised their expectations,” but also showed them 
how limited they were within the colonial bureaucracy (Deng 1995, 102).  Finally and 
most importantly according to Deng, Gordon College and the Khartoum School “enabled 
the young Sudanese of varied ethnic, tribal, and social backgrounds to become 
acquainted, to develop common grounds, and to act together in solidarity” (1995, 102).  
While selecting students based on their ethnicity and training them in new technology 
made for a strong workforce for the colony, these same qualities also contributed to an 
emerging nationalist movement as Gordon College graduates began to see how restricted 
they were within the colonial system and also provided them with an opportunity to come 
into contact with northern Sudanese from many different tribes and begin to explore a 
common identity. 
The realization by Gordon College-educated northerners that their potential was 
limited under the British led them to become more and more disillusioned with the 
colonial state.  According to Sharkey, “as government employees, the new educated 
classes were an intrinsic part of the colonial system, but they bristled at their restriction to 
the bureaucratic underclass and saw themselves as extrinsic to the regime” (2003, 10).  
For these young men, Arabic literature became the outlet for these frustrations and a way 
to understand their identity, and the printing press, brought in with the British, their 
means by which to disseminate it (Sharkey 2003, 10).  By the late 1910s, what Sharkey 
calls a “vigorous Arabic print culture” had emerged that used poetry, short stories and 
62 
 
prose, to give voice to the educated northerners and sow the seeds for a new, nationalist 
movement among the northern Sudanese (2003, 10).   
Egyptian Influence 
 As Gordon College graduates became exposed to the outside world through print 
media and began to explore their shared frustration with the colonial system, they were 
encouraged by the Egyptian nationalist movement that was occurring concurrently in the 
early 1900s (Deng 1995, 102).  At this point, Egypt was hoping to incorporate Sudan into 
its territory when it became independent from Britain, a hope that soon became a point of 
contention among northern Sudanese nationalists.  The debate centered around whether 
they would they be their own nation or whether they would be unified with neighboring 
Egypt, which although Muslim, was Sudan‟s former colonizer.  Although this is a point 
which would continue to be debated until Sudan‟s independence in 1956, the Egyptian 
independence movement nevertheless became an inspiration for Sudanese nationalists.  
In 1924, the British governor-general of Sudan who was also the commander of the 
Egyptian army was assassinated by Egyptian nationalists in Cairo (Deng 1995, 106).  As 
British officials, chary of an attack, raced to get all Egyptian units out of Sudan, northern 
Sudanese troops refused to assist or obey orders from their British masters (Deng 1995, 
106).  Many Egyptians were killed as the British forced them out of Sudan and back over 
the border.  When this was done, the British were the sole colonizers of Sudan
7
 (Deng 
1995, 106).   
                                               
7 Despite being forced out of Sudan in 1924, the Egyptians reentered the condominium government of 
Sudan through a treaty with the British in 1936 (Deng 1995, 117).   
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 One of the direct consequences of the 1924 uprising for the northerners was a 
growing distrust by the British of the northern bureaucrats that they themselves had 
trained (Deng 1995, 109).  Whereas before the uprising they had enjoyed at least a 
cordial relationship with their colonial masters, the British attitude toward the “educated 
class, the engine of modernization, was [now] openly hostile” (Deng 1995, 109).  The 
northern Sudanese responded to this hostility by beginning to more clearly define and 
discuss their identity as Sudanese.  As northerners began to delineate what it meant to be 
Sudanese, they began to articulate an identity that was “both introspective within the 
northern context and expansive to the outside world in identification with Arabism and 
Islam,” the result of which was “the gradual evolution of a modern northern identity that 
was at once nationalistically Sudanese and pan-Arab-Islamic” (Deng 1995, 114).   
“Sudanese” Versus “Tribal” 
One of the ways in which northern Sudanese bureaucrats began to assert this new 
pan-Arab identity and foster solidarity among northern Sudanese was through their 
rejection of the tribal labels that the British often tried to place on them.  In some cases, 
these labels were intended to differentiate between Arabs, blacks, Nubians, and 
Sudanese-born men with Egyptian parents (Sharkey 2003, 30).  Until the late 1920s, the 
term “Sudanese” or sudani, had mainly been used to denote black southerners (or their 
descendents) who had previously been enslaved by northerners and were living in the 
North, (Sharkey 2003, 31), although the term was most likely first employed by the 
British and later became an attempt to distinguish the colonized people of Sudan from 
other British colonies such as Egypt, particularly after Egyptians uprisings against British 
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rule in their own country in the 1920s (Sharkey 2003).  The term could also be used to 
refer to southerners and people from the Nuba Mountain area in general (Sharkey 2003, 
36).   The nationalists, however, began to adopt the word “Sudanese” as their own, 
sometimes defying their British masters by employing it on job applications and forms 
instead of disclosing what tribes they were from (Sharkey 2003, 31).  According to 
Sharkey, the use of this word by northern nationalists conveyed their “belief in the 
integrity of the Sudan as a political and cultural unit” (2003, 31).   
Rejection of tribal labels was also a way for northerners to distance themselves 
from southerners and assert what they perceived to be the more civilized, modern identity 
of the North.  According to Deng, “next to non-Arab African identity, the educated 
northern Sudanese loathed tribal identity, which they considered primitive, disdainful, 
and obstructive to the forward march of progress” (1995, 116).  By rejecting tribal labels, 
Northerners were aligning themselves with the rest of the modern, Arab, world and 
distancing themselves from southerners whose identities were often strongly tied to their 
tribe.  
Although northern Sudanese bureaucrats asserted their own identity in small ways 
such as their rejection of tribal labels, direct opposition to their British colonizers was 
rare (Sharkey 2003).  Instead, Sharkey says, the coexistence of Sudanese colony 
employees and the British was one of “cautious coexistence” rather than outright 
aggression (2003, 102).  In part this was because many of the Sudanese bureaucrats were 
able to maintain a fairly comfortable lifestyle through their government jobs and did not 
want to jeopardize this relative security (Sharkey 2003, 102).   
65 
 
Rejection of tribal labels by northern nationalists in the 1920s was a very tangible 
rejection of their mixed African-Arab roots and a strong claim to a universal Sudanese 
identity rooted in Arabism and Islam, but it was not the first time northerners tried to 
distance themselves from their tribal roots: Northerners had been slowly shedding tribal 
identities for years in favor of a more universal Arab identity.  As far back as the seventh 
century when the North began to Arabize, northern Sudanese have adopted, or been 
forced, to adopt an Islamic identity (Wai 1981).  Even though northerners are made up of 
a handful of tribes, they have been unified by “the predominance of Islamic religion, 
culture, and institutions; the racial and ideological identification with the Arabs of North 
Africa and the Middle East; and the widespread use of the Arab language” (Wai 1981, 
23).  Although some of the groups absorbed into the encompassing Muslim and Arab 
identity of the North have real hereditary ties to the Arabs, many do not, or are of mixed 
ancestry between the black South and Arab North (Wai 1981).  Tribes such as the Fur 
and the Masalit, who have been encompassed into the North but were originally 
considered to be ethnically African, have gone so far as to claim ancestry from “esteemed 
Arab tribes” in order to identify as northerners (Wai 1981, 22).   
One of the main reasons for the Arab North‟s insistence on a unified, Arab 
identity for the whole of the country and their rejection of the obvious differences 
between North and South was because they felt that their Arabic and Islamic culture was 
superior to what they perceived to be a “cultural vacuum” in the South (Wai 1981, 24).  
This belief is in keeping with Weber‟s assertion, articulated in Chapter 2, that in order to 
legitimate states, the people who attempt to enforce them must believe that they are 
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culturally superior and that the nation can be formed only out of the “cultivation of the 
peculiarity of a group” deemed to be superior (Mommsen 1974, 39).  In Sudan, this group 
was clearly the Arab, Islamic Sudanese.  Another reason for the dogged insistence by the 
northern Sudanese on a unified, Arab Sudan was their belief that “the strong tie between 
their Islamism and their Arabism [was] is the spearhead leading them toward the future 
and should be the basis on which to build a Sudanese nation” (Wai 1981:24).  The idea 
that an Islamic and Arabic identity was what was driving Sudan in the direction of 
progress and the most pure source of identity from which to build a state is also 
consistent with Sharkey‟s comments on the nation, discussed in the last chapter, which 
state that nations are formed around claims to a common past which “legitimate the 
present and offers signposts for the future” (2003, 124).   
Other aspects of northerners‟ attempts to create a shared identity are also 
consistent with theories of the nation.  Attempts such as trying to do away with 
historically based tribal identities by northern nationalists, and ethnically African tribes 
creating “imagined shared pasts” in an attempt to create a broad, pan-Sudanese identity 
fit into Weber‟s ideas about nations needing real or imagined “notions of common 
descent” (Gerth and Mills 1958, 173) and Stalin‟s ideas about a “historically constituted 
community” (1994, 18).  By doing away with labels based on tribal affiliations, 
northerners were rejecting claims that there were discernable differences between tribes 
and by doing so, began to assert a shared past and identity for themselves.  Claims by 
groups made up of African or mixed African-Arab peoples of Arab ancestry further 
demonstrates the lengths that people go to create shared history and identity.   
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Additionally, northerners were beginning to assert their identity around a “common 
cause”—independence from the British—which, as Sharkey points out, is how nations 
are formed (2003, 124).   
Another important piece of the nation-state, which both Weber and Stalin have 
discussed, is the necessity of a shared language.  This piece was also in place for the 
northerners well before independence from the British as Arabic was widely spoken in 
the North and put into writing in 1949 when it was declared by northern nationalists that 
all schools, including those in the South, would use Arabic as their language of 
instruction (Sharkey 2003, 131-132).   
Southern Identity 
Although the North at independence had a strong sense of nationalism, it is much 
harder to argue that the same was true for the South or for the country as a whole.  The 
South, since the time of the first incursions of the Egyptians and northern Sudanese into 
southern Sudan, was based on a tribal structure, which emphasized small clans as the 
most important unit of division within society (Hirschberg 1965, 53, Bixler 2005, 36).  
Far from having an overarching southern Sudanese identity, (although this would emerge 
during the civil war) the South was made up of Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, and numerous other 
tribes, each with its own language and customs.  Allegiance within these groupings were 
first to immediate family, then to clan, and then to tribe.  
 Despite the disparity and autonomy of tribes in the South, there are many 
similarities among them, specifically those of the Nilotic group, which include the Dinka, 
Nuer, and Shilluk, who speak related languages and recognize common geographical 
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origins (Evans-Pritchard 1940:3-4).  Despite this, and at least until well into the war, 
southerners had rarely discussed a common southern identity.  They continued to speak 
tribally distinct languages, articulated separate, tribally-based creation myths, and had no 
pan-southern army to speak of, at least not until the creation of the SPLA in the second 
half of the civil war.   
While northern Sudan, even prior to independence from Britain, seemed to 
possess many of the characteristics needed to form a state, and the South, very few, it is 
equally evident that under the rubric outlined by Weber, Sharkey, and Stalin, that the 
country as a whole did not have enough of a shared identity to constitute a nation-state.  
There was no common language, (although the North did manage to impose Arabic on 
the South for a time, and the missionaries, English) no shared cultural heritage or past, 
and no common army.  In fact, attempts by the British to form a unified Sudanese army 
failed miserably: when southerners were sent north to join the northern army, they 
mutinied, starting the first phase of the civil war in 1955 (Deng 1972, 138, Bixler 2005,  
50).   
Forcing the “Nation” 
The beginning of the civil war in Sudan in 1955 marked the culmination of years 
of forcible attempts by the North to incorporate the South into northern Arab and Islamic 
culture.  According to Sharkey, the nationalist movement in the North articulated that if 
“Arab or Arabic identity did not exist in certain regions, then their [government] policies 
should help to create it” (2003, 132).  As mentioned in Chapter 2, and in accordance with 
the principles of the state outlined by Weber, one of the ways this was done was by 
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declaring Arabic the official national language in schools in both the North and South 
(Sharkey 2003, 132).  In 1960, the northern government declared that the official day of 
rest, traditionally Sunday under the British, would be changed to Friday in accordance 
with Islamic tradition (Deng 1995, 138).  To further create continuity between North and 
South, northern politicians expelled all Christian missionaries in the South in 1964, who 
had thus far been the main source of education for southerners, and gave educational and 
charitable opportunities they vacated  to Muslims instead (Sharkey 2003, 132).  The 
government justified the missionaries‟ expulsion by saying that the missionaries were 
purposely driving the two halves of the country apart by deliberately trying to encourage 
the “set-up of a separate political status for the southern provinces thus endangering the 
integrity and unity of the country” (Deng 1995, 139).   
In addition to attempting to foster religious and linguistic unity among the North 
and South of Sudan, northern nationalists also attempted to create a shared “history” for 
the two halves of the country, albeit one that favored those of Arabic descent, through the 
writing of northern Sudanese nationalists (Sharkey 2003,  131).  In particular, nationalist 
writers attempted to assert that the “people of Sudan were the historical product of a 
„mixing‟ or „commingling‟ of immigrants and „Arabs‟ with an original population of 
„Blacks,‟ but in doing so, attributed “cultural superiority, acquired through reason, 
intelligence, and courage, to the „Arabs‟” (Sharkey 2003, 133).   
Despite attempts by the North to impose a unified identity on the country as a 
whole, these attempts have largely failed as demonstrated by the devastation of the 50-
plus year Sudanese civil war.  As Deng says, although the measures taken by the 
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government “were aimed at cultural integration as a means of attaining the goal of 
national unity, their effect was to antagonize the South and to widen the cleavage 
between the two parts of the country” (1995, 139).  Rather than adopting the Arab and 
Muslim identity of the North, the South, especially in the second half of the war, began to 
foster a unified southern identity, partially under the rubric of Christianity in an effort to 
avoid being forcibly assimilated into the Arab and Muslim culture of the North.   
Emergence of a Pan-Southern Identity: the SSLM 
 Under extreme pressure from the North to assimilate or be annihilated, 
southerners, beginning in the 1960s, began to foster their own pan-southern identity.  
According to Deng, it was the belief that southerners had “no coherent culture or system 
of spiritual and moral values worth recognition and respect” that had led to their 
mistreatment by foreigners and northerners, and also resulted in the rush of missionaries 
into southern Sudan at colonization (1995:185).  Despite this long-standing belief, 
predicated on the fact that southerners came from numerous tribes, spoke various 
languages and in many cases had no sense of a shared past, they did have several things 
in common.  Most importantly, they were facing a common battle against the North and 
the Arab and Muslim identity that northerners were trying to impose on them.  Even if 
they did not have an identity yet as southerners, they began to coalesce around their 
opposition to northern domination.  The tribes of the South also shared much more with 
each other in terms of culture than they did with the North as their languages and customs 
were often very similar.  Religion was another shared value in the South as the vast 
71 
 
majority of southerners shared similar animist or Christian beliefs.  In addition, very few 
southerners were Muslim.   
 The first overt signs of an emergent southern identity began in the 1960s with the 
formation of liberation movements among exiled southerners (Deng 1995).  Out of this 
group the Anya-Nya or “snake venom” fighters were organized and became the military 
might behind the movement (Deng 1995).  Even after the formation of the Anya-Nya, 
however, those involved continued to work with the tribal differences in the South rather 
than attempting to assert a uniform southern identity.  According to Deng, the Anya-Nya 
“used existing social structures, including tribal structures,” to carry out its attacks on 
northern government stations in the southern provinces, a method that sometimes led to 
conflict among leaders from different southern tribes (1995, 140).  After several years of 
in-fighting among the varied southern liberation movements, the Southern Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SSLM) was formed in 1970 by Joseph Lagu (Deng 1995).  
Several years later all of the remaining political parties in the South joined the SSLM 
(Deng 1995). 
  In a manifesto put forth by the SSLM in the mid-seventies, the emergent identity 
of the South as a pan-southern, African-identified nation was made clear.  The manifesto 
proclaimed the South‟s right to either remain unified with, but autonomous from the 
North, or “having nothing whatsoever to do with the North and tie our future with that of 
our African brothers in their states on our Southern borders” (Deng 1995, 141).  
Furthermore, it stated that the war that was being waged by the South was “in defense of 
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southern Sudanese identity and its African values,” values that were distinct from the 
Arab Sudanese of the North (Deng 1995, 141).   
 Despite assertions of mutually exclusive North and South identities in the sixties 
and seventies, Arab and African values, and even a mutually constructed Afro-Arab 
nation did briefly flourish in Sudan after a military coup in 1969 brought Jaafar 
Muhammad Nimeiri to power and the Addis Ababa Accord was signed between the 
South and the North in 1972.  The Addis Ababa Accord gave the South many measures 
of autonomy, including their own governing body and president, the freedom to travel, 
and the resurrection of tribal law in the South (Deng 1995).  According to Deng, Nimeiri 
himself did much to foster unity between North and South through his socialist values 
that stressed equality and by acknowledging the distinct African character of the South 
and its place within the Sudanese nation (Deng 1995).  Unfortunately, the national unity 
brought by Nimeiri was short lived: By the early 1980s, under the influence of his 
advisors, Nimeiri returned to the sort of nationalist, northern-centric views that had led to 
the civil war in 1955.  By 1983, Nimeiri had attempted to re-impose shari‟a on the 
southern half of the country and the North and South were again at war.   
Christianity and Southern Identity 
 Even before the creation of the SSLM, southerners educated in the mission 
schools were beginning to come together over their shared beliefs.  As discussed in 
previous chapters, Christianity was slow to take hold in Sudan because as Deng suggests, 
it was viewed as detrimental to the traditional mentality of young men as cattle keepers 
and warriors and it was in direct conflict to Dinka culture, which preached that 
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“knowledge was presumed to accumulate with age and proximity to the ancestors” (1995, 
206).  This view began to change, however, as the Dinka realized the contact with the 
outside world was inevitable and the youth educated in the mission schools were the 
people who possessed the knowledge and skills to mediate this contact (Deng 1995, 207).   
 From the ranks of these newly educated and missionized southerners a new 
political identity began to emerge, an identity that according to Deng “transcended tribal 
loyalties and created a southern nationalist sentiment that was both intrinsic and anti-
North” (1995, 210).  Education and Christianity acted as a shared source of identity, and 
allowed southerners to come together, regardless of tribe, to combat northern domination 
(Deng 1995).  The government quickly took note of the role that educated and 
missionized southerners were playing in the southern liberation movement and often 
made the educated the first targets of attacks on southern villages (Nikkel 2001, 223).   
 Another way exposure to the outside world began to push southern identity 
toward something of a nation-state, was through the discovery by the southern Sudanese 
that black peoples had been disadvantaged throughout history (Deng 1995).  By 
recognizing that their subordination by the North was not a unique situation, southerners 
began to see themselves as part of a larger group. Through this recognition, they began to 
“see the plight of the individual as part and parcel of a collective identity that is intrinsic 
to their race and ethnic group” (Deng 1995, 216).  Wai similarly states that exploitation 
of southerners by Europeans and Arabs “served to deepen a consciousness of African 
identity among them and has brought about a general consensus of accepting and of 
treating their territory of habitation as a distinctly and exclusively African entity” (1981, 
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19).  Much like the northerners, who asserted a shared past and looked at Islam as a 
“signpost” for the future, southerners were beginning to see the past that they shared with 
other southern Sudanese, and more broadly, with other colonized African peoples and 
begin to recognize this identity as a method for imagining their future.  As the war 
progressed, and particularly in present day Sudan, Christianity has become integral to this 
southern Sudanese vision for the future.   
 One of the reasons that Christianity became integral to southern identity is that it 
was believed that something more than the local gods, or jak, of the past were needed to 
combat the hegemony of Arab and Islamic identity.  In an interview Nikkel conducted 
with a young SPLA member from the Bor area of southern Sudan, he was told that 
people were converting to Christianity because: 
The jak were known to possess power in local disputes between neighboring clans, but the 
present war was national in scope and here the jak were impotent. In combat with the „Arabs‟ 
only the supreme power of Nihalic [God] is adequate” (2001, 253).   
 
In addition, Nikkel states that beyond being able to combat the ideology of the Arabs, 
Nihalic was presumably also able to unite the Dinka with “their southern neighbors in 
battle against a common enemy” (2001, 253).  Deng gives a similar analysis of the 
unifying power of the church and says that conversion filled the southerner‟s need for a 
“coherent competing modern religious identity with which to oppose the Arab-Islamic 
identity” (1995, 217).  Wheeler also touches on the void that southerners began to feel, 
particularly after the departure of the British, saying that Christianity not only filled the 
void left in southern identity and political expression, but much like Deng and Nikkel, 
states that Christianity was a way for southerners to challenge the “Northern Sudanese 
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claim to total superiority” (2005, 55).  In essence, Christianity became a way for 
southerners to level the playing field with the North.   
 The beginning of the war again in 1983 increased the southern Sudanese people‟s 
contact with the outside world exponentially as hundreds of thousands were displaced 
into refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia.
8
  In these camps southerners were grouped 
together, regardless of tribe, an experience that was new to many of them. Being thrown 
together with so many other people of varying tribes and religions, southerners were not 
only given many Christian denominations from which to choose, but also were given a 
route to overcome the insecurities they felt in being displaced and placed among 
strangers (Nikkel 2001).  People in the camps, as Harrell-Bond and Voutira have 
suggested, often began to question the utility of their beliefs and look for ways to adapt to 
their “radically new social and material conditions” (1992, 9).  As more and more joined 
the churches, southerners achieved what Nikkel calls an “unprecedented level of 
ecumenical co-operation” (2001, 238).   It was also in these camps where a real southern 
identity, based on Christianity began to solidify.  This phenomenon was not unique to the 
early refugees of the war, but is one that also aided in the Lost Boy‟s adoption of a 
Christian identity, a point that will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7.   
 Although the beginning of the civil war in southern Sudan pitted a unified North 
against a loosely-affiliated South, by the end of the war the emergent southern liberation 
movement and Christianity had radically changed the identity of the South to a united 
one.  While southern Sudanese may never share as close ethnic and linguistic ties as the 
                                               
8 Later in the war, southerners were sent to nearly all of countries that border Sudan including Uganda, 
Central African Republic (CAR), and Egypt.    
76 
 
northerners do (or perceive they do) they have achieved many of the markers of a nation-
state that Weber, Stalin, and Sharkey have discussed.  One of these markers, outlined by 
Sharkey, is a common cause that is focused around claims to a particular land and 
autonomy.  This marker was clearly present for the southerners and was focused around 
their right to self-governance and autonomy on their own land in the South.  The southern 
Sudanese have also begun to become to recognize and articulate a shared past among 
southerners as a whole and with neighboring East African countries, and through this 
recognition, have begun to articulate the kind of visions for a shared future that Sharkey 
has discussed.  For southerners, this shared future includes retaining the culture and 
traditions of southern Sudan along with tying their fortunes to that of the global Christian 
community.  Other factors that point to the emergence of a nation-state in southern Sudan 
is the resurgence of a lingua franca, English, and the continued presence of an armed 
wing of the liberation movement, the SPLA.   
Another indication that southern Sudanese are attempting to build a nation-state is 
evident in the self-awareness of those trying to build the state.  For a nation to be formed, 
those attempting to build it must be aware of what they are trying to do and believe in the 
superiority of their group and land.  This sort of agency in southern Sudan became very 
clear to me as I looked over the new curriculum of the southern Sudanese school system 
aimed at illiterate adults, which I came across while working at my internship at Project 
Education Sudan.  On page one of the manual, under the heading of  “Goals and Guiding 
Principles of Education for Southern Sudan” the third goal reads: Education shall foster 
nation building through integration, peace, self-reliance, patriotism and promoting respect 
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and tolerance for other cultures, traditions, opinions and beliefs”.
9
  Although this is a 
broad-minded and much more encompassing statement than has been made by northern 
nationalists, who have generally sought to build a nation by forcible and violent 
assimilationist policies, it is nevertheless an acknowledgement that southerners are 
consciously cultivating a nation-state.   
By looking at the breakdown of the Sudanese “nation-state,” we can start to 
understand the situation that began to lead southerners toward an identity that has become 
focused around Christianity.  While northern Sudanese have had a unified identity and 
many of the qualities that are necessary to form a functioning nation-state for quite some 
time, the South has only recently begun to qualify as something similar to a nation-state.  
According to both Sharkey, and Jeffrey Haynes, author of the book Religion and 
Politics in Africa, the breakdown of the so-called Sudanese state should not come as a 
surprise, as this is a process that has happened to countless colonized countries upon their 
independence from colonial powers.  Haynes says that the inheritors of  post-colonial 
power in African states often rely on the same authoritarian, hegemonic rule that 
colonizers used to rule because they often have difficulty forging national unity (1996:79-
80).  Sharkey similarly states that there are several weaknesses which all post-colonial 
states inherit including: the imposed geographic borders that colonialists created, borders 
which often cut across linguistic and cultural lines, cultural plurality, which was 
encouraged by colonial authorities in order to “divide and rule,” the autocracy of colonial 
states, which rarely employed “local parliaments to keep them in check,” and the fact that 
                                               
9 Taken from the Broad Curriculum Framework for Basic Adult Literacy Program (BALP) handbook.  
Provided by the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS).   
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colonists tended to favor certain ethnic and class groups who would eventually become 
the new nationalists at independence (Sharkey 2003, 125-126).  In the case of Sudan, 
these weaknesses became apparent upon the pullout of the British.  The emerging 
“monocultural elite” of northern Sudan, which Sharkey calls “Arabic-speaking Muslim 
males from the riverain North” were essentially handed power by the British and began to 
push their nationalist, northern-centered agenda (2003, 123).  Instead of allowing the 
relative “plurality” of the North and South as the British had done, the North immediately 
sought to quash the identity of the South in favor of a unified Sudanese identity.  This 
was done by employing what could be called an autocratic government based in the 
North, with very little input from southerners in the newly formed national parliament.   
  In the next chapter I will continue to discuss life in Sudan prior to the Lost Boys‟ 
separation from their parents, highlighting the importance of cattle in daily life, the role 
of the traditional religion, and the hard-fought battle early missionaries undertook to try 
to win early Christian converts. Finally, I will discuss in more detail the major impetus 
for conversion among non-Lost Boy Sudanese: a raid of Dinka cattle of historic 





Chapter 5—Religion, Conversion, and Cattle in Southern Sudan 
 
 In this chapter, I will discuss the traditional religion of the Dinka, including the 
mediating forces of the divinities that rule everyday life, the role of the supreme god, 
Nhialic, and cattle sacrifice to explain the state of religion in Sudan leading up to the time 
when the Lost Boys were separated from their parents. I will then move will move to the 
role of cattle in Dinka life. Finally, I will discuss the attempts at Christian conversion by 
western missionaries, explaining the years of missionary endeavors and the dramatic, 
cattle-related events in the 1990s that finally pushed the Dinka to convert in large 
numbers.   
The Religion of the Dinka: Jak and Nhialic—Flexible Monotheism 
The connectivity of men with cattle and other aspects of the natural world that 
surrounds them is highly evident in Dinka religion, however, the traditional religion of 
the Dinka is different than many other so-called animist religions in that Dinka religion 
has often been called flexible monotheism.  The term flexible monotheism refers to the 
Dinka belief in both Nhialic, the “supreme being” who is believed to live above, much 
like the God of western religions, and the jak
10
 and yieth, or the lesser gods that are 
present in everyday life (Nikkel 1995, 31).  In the traditional religion, Dinka believe that 
the gods of all major religions are the same, saying that Nhialic ee tok, or Nhialic is one 
(Lienhardt 1961, 56) a belief that also speaks to their monotheistic beliefs. Deng also 
comments on this flexible monotheism, saying that “their belief in complex system of 
                                               
10 Jak is the plural form of the word jok 
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supra-natural divinities tends to blur the monotheistic picture of Dinka religion,” but 
nevertheless, “the Dinka believe that God is One and cannot conceive of Him as a 
plurality” (Deng 1972, 122).   
As mentioned in the first chapter, the Dinka creation myth
11
 is somewhat similar 
to the biblical one: There were originally two people on earth, a man named Garang and a 
woman named Abuk. They lived in a world where the earth was connected to the sky by 
a rope and they could reach Nhialic whenever they wanted by climbing the rope. There 
was no death at this time, and the people lived easily, grinding only the grain that Nhialic 
gave them, which was enough to satisfy their needs. One day, the woman, being greedy, 
ground more than the allotted amount and swung her hoe too high, striking Nhialic. 
Nhialic, angered by her actions, sent a bird named atoc to cut the rope, thus separating 
the earth from the sky and “spoiling the word” by bringing death and forcing people to 
work hard for their food and know hunger (Lienhardt 1961, 34).  
Lienhardt interprets the Dinka creation myth to explain physical realities in Dinka 
life—the separation of the earth from the sky, the distance that Dinka feel from the 
creator Nhialic and the reasons for sickness and death (1961, 36-37). This distance from 
Nhialic accounts for the importance and daily presence of the jak and yieth, and is 
explained in the paragraphs below.  
The three key elements of Dinka religion are Nhialic, the jak, and the yieth, but 
despite this seeming trinity, the Dinka do not view Nhialic as a plurality (Deng 1972, 
122); on a daily basis, the Dinka are most concerned with the jak and to a lesser extent, 
                                               
11 This version is adapted from Lienhardt‟s retelling of the story in Divinity and Experience: The Religion 
of the Dinka.  
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the yieth. The lesser importance of Nhialic (on a daily basis, at least) is because as Deng 
says, “religion is not an affair of the soul in a world yet to come; it is rooted in Dinka 
demands for a secure life in this world and continued participation after death” (1972, 
122). Further illuminating the role of traditional religion in Dinka daily life,  Lienhardt 
notes that while the Dinka divide the world into that which is of men and that which is of 
the jak (or Powers, as he calls them), they believe that these forces reside in this “single 
world of human experience” (1961, 28). The jak, called “free divinities” by Lienhardt and 
“independent spirits” by Deng, are those that are not associated with any specific descent 
group (Lienhardt 1961, 31, Deng 1972, 122) and according to Seligman and Seligman   
(married anthropologists who lived among the Dinka) are appealed to “in the ordinary 
affairs of life” much more often than Nhialic (1932). Similarly, the jak are much more 
commonly a topic of discussion than the yieth (explained in more detail below), which in 
my experience with the Lost Boys, were rarely, if ever, mentioned.   
Unlike the jak, the yieth are associated with specific clans and descent groups 
(Lienhard 1961, 30). The yieth are sometimes thought to represent ancestors as well 
(Deng 1972, 122), which explains why they are associated with a particular clan or 
descent group. Within the yieth, the Dinka distinguish between two types of yieth, the 
first are the “clan-divinities” that often manifest themselves in material form, many times 
as animals (Lienhardt 1961, 30). According to Lienhardt, the manifestation of this class 
of yieth is what has often led them to be classified as totems in anthropological literature, 
something he does not believe to be entirely accurate (Lienhardt 1961, 30). The other 
class of yieth, which Lienhardt calls “free-divinities,” tend to form relationships with 
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individuals rather than clans, although they may then form relationships with families 
through these individuals (1961, 30).  
Deng describes an even higher order to the relationship between the jak and yieth, 
saying that the two represent the balance of good and evil. The yieth, or spirits of the 
ancestors, represent a “protective force,” while the jak represent a more “destructive” 
presence (Deng 1972, 122). This is not to say that jak are intrinsically bad, as they can be 
a “necessary evil to enforce, reinforce, or sanction a virtue,” or enact a punishment for a 
clan-divinity that has been wronged (Deng 1972, 122). Despite the everyday presence of 
the jak in the lives of adult Dinka, and to a lesser extent the yieth, children do not have 
the same type of interactions, or even awareness of these forces.  
Although often mentioned only in passing in the anthropological body of 
literature, children often were not involved in the traditional religion of the Dinka. I asked 
the Lost Boys how they could give up the traditional religion they had presumably spent 
their whole life practicing.  Several told me, rather offhandedly, that it was easy as 
children weren‟t allowed to participate in the traditional religion. At first I thought this 
was a glib response, maybe even purposely misleading or trying to cover up how intense 
the process their conversion had been, but after hearing this from several interviewees, I 
took a closer look at the literature. Seligman and Seligman mention it briefly, saying: 
“The jok know when a child is born, and protect it from the beginning, though a man 
does not tell his child about the jok until it is well grown, perhaps not until the age of ten” 
(1932, 185). Nikkel, who arguably has written more about the conversion of the Dinka 
than any other author, talks about the exclusion of children from the traditional religion 
83 
 
only in relation to the unique role that youth displaced to Khartoum in the 1960s 
(discussed in more detail below) had in the Episcopal church, but goes into little detail in 
regards to their absence in the traditional religion (Nikkel 2001, 230). The unique 
opportunities that the Lost Boys were given to participate in Christianity in the refugee 
camps were central to their conversion and will be explored in more depth Chapters 6 and 
7. 
Cattle Sacrifice 
Up until the last twenty years or so, cattle sacrifice was considered the central 
religious ceremony of the Dinka (Nikkel 1995, 26, Lienhardt 1961, 10), a fact that should 
not be surprising considering the interconnectedness of humans and cattle in Dinka 
culture that will be described throughout this chapter. According to Lienhardt, the use of 
cattle as a substitute for men, be it in sacrifice, as a marriage payment, or as a way to 
make amends for a murder, was a way to ensure the continuity of “the human generation 
which has been broken by the loss of a member to the lineage” (Lienhardt 1961, 26).  
Seligman and Seligman, who lived among a handful of tribes in Sudan, call the 
Dinka and Nuer “intensely religious, in our experience by far the most religious peoples 
in Sudan,” also saying that “…it is no exaggeration to say that there is no happening or 
event …that is not regarded as of religious significance and as an occasion for sacrifice” 
(1932, 178).  
Because of the significance of cattle for sacrifice, cows in the past were never 
killed strictly for their meat, although after they had been sacrificed for a particular cause, 
they were eaten, with the meat divided according to custom and the choicest parts given 
84 
 
to the elders, and then divided among the family members of the sacrificer. A portion 
would also be left out for the clan divinity (Lienhardt 1961, 24).
12
  
Cattle in Dinka Life 
As evidenced by the impact of cattle on Dinka religious beliefs, cattle form the 
basis for life in southern Sudan. For generations, the lives of the Dinka and other Nilotic 
tribes in southern Sudan have been inextricably linked to their cattle.  Not only have 
cattle and cattle sacrifice been the basis for the traditional religion of the Nuer and Dinka, 
but they have relied on them in all facets of their lives.  E.E. Evans-Pritchard, who 
worked with the Nuer in the 1930s, writes that cattle and their byproducts are evident in 
nearly every aspect of Nuer life: 
Nuer wash their hands and faces in the urine of the cattle…drink their milk and blood, and sleep 
on their hides by the side of their smoldering dung.  They cover their bodies, dress their hair, and 
clean their teeth with the ashes of cattle dung, and eat their food with spoons made from the 
skins of their horns (1940, 37). 
 
According to Deng, cattle are equally important to the Dinka and he says “their dried 
dung provides the Dinka with fuel and fertilizer, their urine with disinfectant, their hides 
with bedding skins, and their horns with snuffboxes, trumpets, and spoons” (1972, 3).  
Speaking to broader issues of Dinka culture, Nikkel states that “cattle are integral to the 
                                               
12 In all three of the villages I visited in Sudan, goats were slaughtered upon our arrival, with little 
ceremony. However, in the first village we visited, where one of the Lost Boys I interviewed was reunited 
with his father after 20 years apart, we were “given” a cow as a welcome gift. Unlike the goats, when it was 
time for the cow to be killed, our group, along with many people from the village, gathered in a field to 
watch the cow being killed, which was done with much ceremony (and a little trouble too—the cow took so 
long to die that the village elders, who were embarrassed by this, eventually distracted our group with a 
dance). Afterwards, the cow‟s head was hung in the tree while the rest of the body was chopped up and 
prepared for cooking. The cow‟s head remained in the tree for the entire day, and my questions to the Lost 
Boys in our group as to why the head was placed in the tree went mostly unanswered, but there were some 
similarities to a cattle sacrifice Lienhardt witness that involved propping the head of the sacrificed sow on 
tree boughs (1961, 267). It is my guess that the cow I saw was also being offered to a clan divinity, but that 
this was not openly discussed in the now largely Christian village. 
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economic, social and religious life of the Dinka, and provide the basic metaphors of self-
understanding” (Nikkel 2001, 24).   
 Because of the interconnectedness of men and cattle in daily life, is should come 
as no surprise that the ideals of beauty for men in Nilotic society are connected and 
similar to the ideals of beauty for their cattle.   Beauty for both men and cattle are bound 
up in the notion of dheeng.   Francis Deng, a Sudanese anthropologist, discussing this 
central concept of beauty to the Nilotes says the word dheeng can be translated as 
“nobility, beauty, handsomeness, elegance, charm, grace,” etc. (1972, 14). Although this 
definition makes it sound like dheeng is only associated with physical beauty, this is not 
the case: Deng says, “a remarkable feature of Dinka culture is that it gives everybody 
some avenue to dignity, honor, and pride…any demonstration of aesthetic value, is 
considered dheeng” (1972,14-15).   Activities or actions such as decorating one‟s body, 
initiation and wedding ceremonies and display of one‟s “personality” or “song” oxen are 
ways that people and activities are imbued with dheeng and are a way for those not born 
with physical beauty to achieve it (Deng 1972, 14).   
Body ornamentation in particular is a way for people to gain dheeng and has 
many parallels to cattle and the way they are ornamented by the Dinka.  According to 
Deng, it is not physical ugliness that is considered ugly, but rather not taking care of 
oneself that is (1972, 15).  To enhance or create beauty, Dinka men and women wear 
beads and shells on the wrist, neck, and the forehead, ivory bangles worn on the upper 
arm or the wrist, and long metallic bracelet coils worn on the arms of both men and 
women and on the legs of women (1972, 16).  These coiled bracelets are particularly 
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interesting in that they are sometimes used to simulate the horns of oxen.  This is done by 
tightly coiling one‟s arms so that it has the same appearance as the trained horns of a 
display ox. (Deng 1972,17).   
Beyond ornamentation, people can also be considered dheeng through their 
actions and the ways in which they treat others.  Treating others with respect or acquiring 
wealth through hard work can also contribute to one‟s dheeng (Deng 1972,15).  Engaging 
in song or dance and especially being creative in composing songs can also allow a 
person to have dheeng.  Young men who can compose the most intricate and interesting 
songs about their cattle are often considered to be the most intelligent and subsequently 
they are perceived to be more attractive (Deng 1972).  Songs about oxen typically refer to 
what is most aesthetically pleasing about them, such as how the horns are shaped, their 
size, or the color-configuration of a man‟s ox (Deng 1972, 81).  Sometimes while singing 
ox-songs a man will imitate cattle by holding his hands up to simulate horns and if no ox 
is present, another man will jingle a bell and simulate the noises an ox would make (Deng 
1972, 83).   
I frequently saw what I would consider to be dheeng on display at social events 
with the Lost Boys in Denver. Nearly every graduation ceremony, wedding reception, 
birthday party and even fundraisers, featured group dancing. These dances would start 
with the young men, who had usually changed into some combination of fake animal 
skins, feathers or some other brightly colored clothes, dancing in a circle and singing 
loudly. Oftentimes each group member would have a pot or pan to bang on, or sometimes 
a cooking utensil or other long object that could stand in for a club or a spear. While the 
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men were in a group, and performing as one, they would also try to stand out, singing 
loudly or dancing more creatively than others.  The pride the Lost Boys took while 
dancing in both their appearance and in the way they moved, continually trying to be 
more creative and distinct in their movements, embody a kind of dheeng, one which is 
removed from cattle, but nevertheless demonstrates some of the aspects of what is 
considered attractive in cattle and men: unique colors and markings and a way to catch 
the attention of the opposite sex. It should be noted that women also participated in these 
dances, usually as supporting characters, doing a dance that mostly consisted of jumping 
up and down. At other times, however, women were the ones to start the dance and 
would show off with much more creative dances.  
The interrelatedness of men and cattle in regard to the concept of beauty is further 
illustrated in this quote from Deng: 
When singing over his „personality oxen,‟
13
 a man strolls with grace and revealed inner pride, 
his body covered and loaded with objects of beautification, a bundle of decorated and polished 
spears in his left hand, his left arm hanging from an angle formed by the large bangle bracelet on 
his upper arm…and his ox ahead of him waving the bushy tassels, ringing the bell, and echoing 
with bellows of accompaniment (1972, 17).   
 
 This passage is evocative of the fact that the beauty of one‟s ox can enhance the beauty 
of that person. According to Lienhardt, association with one‟s cattle is so strong that men 
looking for a girl to court will often parade their oxen in front of the girls while the girls 
are milking the cows, in the hopes that the girl will be attracted to the man and his cow 
(1961, 17).  According to Lienhardt, the attractiveness of one‟s ox was so important that 
girls were reportedly known to prefer a “somewhat ugly young man with a fine ox to a 
handsome man with an indifferent ox” (Lienhardt 1961, 18).  Nikkel similarly states that 
                                               
13 Ox is the word typically used to refer to a castrated bull.   
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“social standing and self-esteem are, for the Dinka, intimately related to the ownership of 
cattle” (2001, 25).   
 While cattle aesthetics define the attractiveness of men in Dinka and Nuer culture, 
the human values of dheeng define what is aesthetically pleasing in cattle.  This 
interconnectivity in aesthetics begins to make more sense when we understand that 
Nilotics view cattle on some levels as having the same qualities as men, and because 
cattle are seen as surrogates for men in sacrifice.  (Evans-Pritchard 1940, 36).  To better 
understand the attributes of Nilotic cattle that are valued and add to one‟s dheeng, the 
cattle aesthetics of the Nilotes will now be discussed.   
Arguably, Dinka and Nuer aesthetics are most evident in the vast and intricate 
vocabulary that they employ to describe the color-configurations of their cattle.  Dinka 
color-configurations, which include different words for color and pattern, number in the 
thousands (Coote 1992, 285).  Far from simply being a way for the Nilotes to speak about 
their cattle with “precision in situations of practical husbandry,” color-configurations also 
help to enrich the “language of poetry” (Evans-Pritchard 1940, 41).  Lienhardt similarly 
calls the names which the Dinka give to their cattle “poetic” and gives examples of color-
configurations that are particularly so, such as ke dhiau tiki kok, literally “what makes 
women‟s elbows crack,” or a reddish cow whose color resembles the beer that women 
grind grain to make (1961, 14).  Another configuration indicative of the intricacy used in 
naming the colors of cattle is  ajing or majing, which alludes to a cow with maker 
configuration, one of the many black and white color configurations, and means “soldier 
89 
 
ant” referring to “black ants carrying white particles, grain, ants‟ eggs or termites” (1961, 
14).   
 Not only are cattle color-configurations vast, but they are often the basis through 
which the Dinka and other Nilotic tribes understand the colors of other objects that they 
encounter.  Lienhardt describes how children often learn to apply the name for cattle 
patterns to the world around them before they ever have seen a cow with that particular 
configuration (1961, 12).  Further demonstrating that the importance of color-
configurations in understanding the world is the fact that new patterns or items 
introduced to the Dinka are also often understood through the cattle-configuration that 
they most resemble (Lienhardt 1961, 12).   
 The intricacy and vastness of the Nilotic cattle-color vocabulary obviously goes 
beyond what is strictly necessary to describe cattle for everyday purposes.  As Lienhardt 
says, cattle color names “represent a deliberate effort to link cattle with features of the 
natural and social environment,” but also display the aesthetic ideals of the Dinka (1961, 
15).  Certain color configurations, such as majok, a black and white marking that loosely 
resembles the marking of American dairy cows, are revered above all color 
configurations.  Although bold markings such as majok stand out among the usual 
grayish white of Dinka cows, this configuration is in no way connected to the health or 
other practical qualities of an ox (Coote 1992, 286).  Well-marked cattle generally are not 
healthier or better meat producers than ordinary oxen and in fact the best-marked oxen 
are usually castrated and therefore excluded from contributing to the gene pool (Coote 
1992, 286).  Although well-marked cows do not symbolize health, they often do become 
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healthier and larger after they are castrated because castration encourages them to grow 
and they are doted upon and given the best food by their owners (Coote 1992, 288).  
 The cattle that the Nilotes choose to castrate because of attractive markings then 
become “song” or “display” oxen (Evans-Pritchard 1940, 37, Lienhardt 1961, 15).  Song 
oxen, called this because the Dinka often make up songs about their beauty, are decorated 
with tassels on their horns and beads and bells around their neck to enhance their beauty 
and call attention to them (Evans-Pritchard 1940, 37).  Young men who do not have a 
display ox of their own were said to have walked around the village with a bell to 
simulate the sound an ox would make in order to enhance their own attractiveness 
(Lienhardt 1961, 17).  
Display oxen are also physically altered to enhance their beauty.   Soon after an 
animal is born and is deemed to be of superior marking, its horns are cut so as to make 
them grow asymmetrically and be more aesthetically pleasing.  Much like cattle-coloring 
though, there is a practical element to horn-shaping, as those cattle with the most unusual 
horns are easy to pick out from among a large herd.  At the same time, Coote points out, 
“the curving shapes of Nilotic cattle horns have great visual appeal, especially when they 
are seen moving through space as the cattle move their heads, and when the arcs the 
horns make in the air are exaggerated by the swinging movement of the tassels,” that one 
would see on a display ox (1992, 288).   
 Aspects, such as the horns of oxen, that are considered particularly visually 
appealing are often those displayed in other forms of visual and auditory art in Dinka 
culture, such as dance and song, and even in the games of children.  Particularly well 
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known in the anthropological literature is a dance done by both men and women, which 
involves throwing ones‟ hands above the head in a simulation of cattle horns.  While 
doing this dance, men sometimes lower their left arm to simulate the “artificially 
deformed and trained horns of the display-oxen” (Lienhardt 1961, 17).  Another dance, 
involving both men and women, simulates cows (women) running among a herd of bulls 
(men) (Lienhardt 1961, 17).  The men advance and retreat, steering their female partners 
as bulls do to cows that have mixed with the herd (Lienhardt 1961, 17).  In this dance, 
men cry out “e-yi, e-yi,” not in an attempt to actually recreate the sound of oxen, but to 
represent and “express the whole rhythm of the beasts” with their powerful ambling gait 
and swaying heads” (Lienhardt 1961, 17).   
In both of these dances, things that are found aesthetically pleasing about the bulls 
are what the dance attempts to recreate.  In the first dance, the horns of the bull are 
celebrated, with hand movements modified so as to show the most aesthetically pleasing, 
asymmetrical horns of a display ox.  In the second dance, the power and paradoxical 
grace of the bulls is recreated and contrasted with the docility of the cows, simulated by 
the herding of women and their passive role in the dance.  This dance also could be 
understood to display gender roles among the Nilotics in general, wherein women are 
expected to submit to their husbands and maintain a quieter, more refined disposition 
than their male counterparts.   
 The aesthetics of the bull‟s horns are not just limited to dance, but are recreated 
both in body ornamentation and ceremonial objects among humans.  In both Dinka and 
Nuer culture, young men (and occasionally women) receive scars on their foreheads as 
92 
 
part of the initiation process.  While some receive concentric lines that run the length of 
their forehead, others (including several of the Denver Lost Boys) have either one or a 
series of stacked v-shaped scars in the middle of their forehead.  According to Coote, 
these marks are sometimes thought to symbolize the horns of the cattle (1992, 291).  The 
pain that young men incur in this process is often compared to the pain that cattle feel 
when their horns are cut prior to their castration and further links cattle and human 
aesthetics (Evans-Pritchard 1940, 38).   
 Beyond bodily modifications through scarification and dance, the Nilotes also 
create physical representations of cattle horns in their tim ke jak, literally poles of the 
spirits or gods, which are poles driven into the ground in villages and cattle camps as 
shrines to the traditional gods (Nikkel 1995, 90).  These poles bear a strong resemblance 
to the trained horns of Nilotic cattle with their curved and pointed shape, and in recent 
years, have begun to be painted with acrylic paint, sometimes in the distinctive black and 
white of the coveted marial and majok cattle color-configuration patterns (Coote 1992, 
290).  The existence and form of these poles will be discussed in greater detail later on in 
their relation to the current form of Dinka crosses.   
 Perhaps most useful in synthesizing important aesthetic concepts of the Dinka and 
other Nilotic tribes can be seen in the mud cattle figurines given to and made by children.  
These figures exaggerate all that is considered attractive about cattle to the Nilotes, 
leaving out only color-configurations, which are hard to render in mud.  According to 
Evans-Pritchard, the games of Nuer children center around making miniature cattle byres 
and filling them with these mud figures of cows and oxen (1940, 38-39).  In these 
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models, the horns, the hump found on the back of cattle, and what Coote calls the 
“overall bigness or fatness” of the cattle are exaggerated and other less important parts 
such as the head, legs, and hooves are either left off the model or downplayed (1992, 
293).  Some of the cattle figurines also have decoration added to the horns to simulate the 
decoration that would be given to the horns of a display ox (Evans-Pritchard 1940, 39, 
Coote 1992, 293).  Not only are these teaching aids that help children learn the desirable 
aesthetic qualities of cattle, but they are also highly informative to the outsider in terms of 




Early Christianity  
By the mid-1800s, missionaries began to see the cattle-based culture of the Dinka 
as a possible sphere for missionizing. In even their very early interaction with 
Westerners, the Dinka revealed the depth of their existing religious beliefs.  According to 
Nikkel, during a voyage of discovery into the Upper Nile region by missionaries in 1839, 
the missionaries were welcomed as “manifestations of Creator” (2001, 61). Despite the 
reverential treatment they originally received, it was to be over one hundred years before 
the missionaries made any significant progress, and the conversion that eventually 
happened was due in large part to the work of indigenous missionaries, not westerners.  
Some of the earliest missionaries in Sudan were Catholics (Nikkel 2001, 62). The 
approach of these first missionaries was drastically different than the later, more 
                                               
14 When I was in southern Sudan in 2008, the children of the village of Maar quickly learned that 
Americans were very interested in the mud figurines. Before we left the village, the children had filled 
every available space in our eating huts with figurines, mostly of cattle, but with a few people, dogs and an 
elephant too. The figures looked exactly as Evans-Pritchard describes, with exaggerated horns, humps and 
genitals.   
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indigenous movements among the Dinka, although they were similar to tactics used by 
missionaries around the world at the time.  In northern Sudan, Austrian Catholic 
missionaries set about to find marginalized southern Sudanese slaves, buying according 
to Father Camboni, an early Roman Catholic missionary in Sudan, “youths who looked 
intelligent” (Nikkel 2001, 67).  Although there was much hesitancy about converting on 
the part of the slaves and escaped slaves who found their way there, more and more 
slaves and orphaned children began to seek out the mission (Nikkel 2001, 67).  In the 
missionary tradition, these earliest missionaries began to study the culture and language 
of their students (Nikkel 2001, 68).  The missionaries taught their students a variety of 
topics and skills that they hoped they would eventually bring back with them to the 
South.  They also began admitting girls and eventually, by 1873, had so many students 
that they had to expand their building to house them all (Nikkel 2001, 69).  Despite the 
appearance of success, the missionaries were unable to get any of the students to return to 
the South to spread their newfound religion or skills, prompting the Austrian counsel to 
note “not one of the Africans who completed remained a Christian or earned an honest 
living,” once they finished their education (Nikkel 2001, 69).  
At the same time that missionaries had set up shop in Khartoum, they also 
continued pursing their ultimate goal of gaining access to southern Sudan.  In 1848 they 
succeeded in gaining the supposed blessing of the Pasha to enter southern Sudan by way 
of the White Nile (Nikkel 2001, 70).  In reality, the Pasha did everything in his power to 
stir tensions among the missionaries and the southern populations, enlisting Turkish 
guides that were sent along with the missionaries to ensure that the southern tribes would 
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fear the missionaries, and vice versa (Nikkel 2001, 71). For the southern tribes, this 
chicanery initially worked, as they could not distinguish the missionaries from their 
Turkish guides, a group that had long mistreated southerners (Nikkel 2001: 72). Soon, 
however, the southerners began to realize that the missionaries had different aims; 
according and early missionary, one Nuer chief told him at the end of the visit “I will 
consider you a traitor if you do not pay me another visit on your return, provided, of 
course, that you are not accompanied by Turks, with whom I want no dealing” (Nikkel 
2001, 72).  
The missionaries left their initial voyage to the South with great hope for the 
future of the church in southern Sudan (Nikkel 2001, 73).  In 1852, within several years 
of this voyage, the first permanent mission was established in the territory of the Bari in 
the Upper Nile area of southern Sudan; two years later, the first mission was established 
in Dinka territory, close to Bor (Nikkel 2001, 73).  
In the early years of these southern missions, many of the missionaries died of 
fever and other illnesses (Nikkel 2001, 74).  Despite illness and deaths of so many, much 
progress was made as the missionaries began to learn and catalogue the religion and 
culture of the Dinka (Nikkel 2001, 76). Like many missionaries before them, they were 
quick to label the Dinka as savages, citing their aversion to wearing clothing, greediness 
(something that many missionaries blamed on the contact that the Dinka and other 
southern tribes had had with merchants and traders), and preoccupation with and refusal 
to slaughter their cattle except during ritual sacrifice, even during times of famine, as 
evidence of their inferiority (Nikkel 2001, 77, 82). The missionaries were further troubled 
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by the fact that the Dinka did not appear to believe in an afterlife (Nikkel 2001, 80). 
According to Nikkel, the Catholic missionaries took this as a particularly bad sign as “the 
greatest benefit of the Catholic faith was assurance of eternal life,” and because of this, 
foresaw that “evangelization would be an arduous process” (2001, 80).  
The Dinka, for their part, often felt that the missionaries themselves were savages, 
and were particularly shocked at their willingness to slaughter cattle for food (Nikkel 
2001, 81). The lack of understanding between the missionaries and the Dinka certainly 
did not help to win over the Dinka, and this lack of understanding, coupled with the 
countless deaths of Catholic missionaries due to illness, convinced them to pull out of the 
South within just a few years (Nikkel 2001, 82).  The missionaries‟ faith in the ability to 
convert was flagging, leading one of the missionaries to say that: 
While we cannot say that we achieved much we can no longer say that it is impossible to civilise 
these peoples. But the supreme graces is not yet visibly spread among the Africans, which is 
urgently required if they are to change from pagans to good Christians (Nikkel 2001, 82).  
 
While the missionaries felt that they had accomplished little, the Dinka were still 
sad to see them go, saying that the missionaries had helped protect them from armed 
tribes and helped cure illnesses (Nikkel 2001, 83).  By 1874, only one mission in 
Khartoum remained, nearly all of the priests (19 out of 21) had died, and only a dozen or 
so southern Sudanese had been baptized (Nikkel 2001, 85). Little progress had been 
made, but the seeds had been sown for further missionary endeavors.  
A new Anglican mission was built south of Bor in 1906, modeled after the 
Church Missionary Society (CMS mission) in Uganda (Nikkel 2001, 104). The 
missionaries were again met with much difficulty in trying to convert the Dinka. 
According to Nikkel, the British missionaries were baffled at how the Dinka could 
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possess desirable qualities such as having “well-defined morals which kept them from 
promiscuity,” while at the same time they were “quarrelsome” and prone to begging and 
stealing (2001, 107-108). Attempts to draw the Dinka closer by offering employment also 
proved disappointing to the missionaries as the Dinka seemed to have little interest in the 
material goods such as cloth and beads that the missionaries offered in return for work 
(Nikkel 2001, 107). 
 Eventually, the missionaries were able to set up a nightly service, inviting four 
local men to gather around a fire where they would recite prayers that had been translated 
using the missionaries‟ faltering Dinka (Nikkel 2001, 109). Small successes such as 
these, however, were short lived and the mutual suspicion that existed between the 
missionaries and the Dinka persisted. The Dinka still seemed to associate the 
missionaries with the rest of the colonizing forces and were not at all convinced of the 
usefulness of Christianity, and the missionaries for their part still believed the Dinka to be 
lazy, demanding, and incapable of understanding the value of western religion (Nikkel 
2001, 111).  
 After only two years at the new mission, nearly all of the missionaries had fallen 
ill or had requested permission to take leave.  The mission was shut down for a time and 
when it reopened, this time at a new site in Malek, Archibald Shaw was the only 
missionary from the initial group to return (Nikkel 2001, 115).  Unlike the other CMS 
missionaries, Shaw set about learning the Dinka language and began to make lasting 
friendships among the Dinka, sometimes even participating in the famed wrestling 
matches of the young men (Nikkel 2001, 116).  Possibly most important to Shaw‟s 
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acceptance, however, was the fact that he tended to a herd of cattle owned by the mission 
and was able to pay boys and young men in the village in cattle in exchange for their 
assistance with small jobs around the mission (Nikkel 2001, 117). Shaw was also given 
the cattle name Macour, which Nikkel translates as “gray vulture” (Nikkel 2001, 117).
15
 
 Realizing that the young boys whom he hired to do odd jobs around the mission 
never stayed around long enough to learn much about Christianity, Shaw began to offer a 
sort of contract to prospective converts by offering them food, clothing, and a calf in 
exchange for several years‟ service and for attending school (Nikkel 2001, 121).  It was 
from this group that the missionaries gained their first documented convert in 1914 
(Nikkel 2001, 122). Over the next few years several more converts were drawn from the 
ranks of “Shaw‟s boys,” but their conversion was far from complete as many were drawn 
back toward polygynous marriages and the jak (traditional gods), two things that the 
missionaries would not tolerate (Nikkel 2001, 123).  
It should noted that at this point, converts tended to be drawn largely from the 
ranks of those on the fringes of society. As Nikkel says, it was the “impoverished, 
orphaned, wayward, or the last sons of inferior wives” who made up the groups of boys 
who attended the mission schools, and as such, the new converts had little power to sway 
other members of their communities to convert (2001, 131).  As the few converts that 
came out of this era were all from the mission schools, they came to me known by the 
Dinka in the area as Nhialic Thakool, or “God of the school” (Nikkel 2001, 132), or as 
                                               
15 Conferring a cattle name on a foreigner is often a sign of affection or respect. In my experience, it is 
often based on some physical characteristic, such as hair or skin color that is similar to a bull. I was given 
the cattle name of Amour on my trip to Sudan and found it to be a cream and brown colored cow that 
roughly matched the color of my hair. Other members of my group who had blonde or gray hair were given 
names such as Mathiong, which are given to all white cattle.  
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the “children of the missionaries,” (Deng 1995, 2006) further setting them apart from 
mainstream Dinka, and reinforcing the belief that religion was intrinsically tied to the 
colonizing forces.  
Conversion picked up in 1940s as some of the first converts began to preach on 
their own and as mission schools became more popular among boys from wealthy 
families (Nikkel 2001, 140).  Deng says that in part this increase in conversion had to do 
with increasing feeling among the Dinka that reading and writing “represented a 
revolution in knowledge…knowledge that would inevitably lead to power” (1995, 206). 
Although the knowledge gained in school was in some ways held in high esteem, 
particularly by the younger Dinka, it left many elders feeling bereft of their rightful place 
in Dinka society in which “knowledge was presumed to accumulate with age and the 
proximity to the ancestors” (Deng 1995, 2006). Despite the disruptions that Christianity 
brought to the traditional order of Dinka society, the Dinka, both the young and elders 
alike, were beginning to acknowledge that there was value in young men who were able 
to engage with the outside world, particularly as the civil war began to bring the Dinka 
into more frequent contact with the north (Deng 1995).  Indeed in 1972, when the Addis 
Ababa Accord was signed, bringing peace to Sudan, it was the mission-educated 
southerners who were given positions in the local and national government (Nikkel 2001, 
224). One thousand or so Dinka had converted to Christianity by 1951, but as Nikkel 
says, “the ancestral jak would soon reassert their authority” as the majority of these 
converts returned to the traditional religion (2001, 143).  
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In many ways, this early conversion, even as it became more of an indigenous 
movement, seemed likely to fail because of the perceived conflicts between Christianity 
and traditional Dinka life.  According to Nikkel, the need to have a shrine for one‟s jak 
and the custom of polygamous marriage were two such conflicting beliefs that manifested 
themselves, particularly for the boys who had converted as children in the mission 
schools (Nikkel 2001, 151).  As they grew older, boys came under increasing pressure to 
engage in polygamy both to increase their family‟s status and/or wealth, and in order to 
ensure that levirate marriages could be performed in the instance of a brother‟s death 
(Nikkel 2001, 151). Francis Mading Deng, the Sudanese anthropologist, was himself the 
son of a chief who was educated in the mission schools in the late 1940s.  He recalls how 
elders in his village objected to his and his brother‟s mission education and repudiat ion of 
traditional beliefs, saying that they could not fathom how he and his brother, “being sons 
of the Chief, could be monogamous” (1972, 157).  Nikkel also notes that “a husband and 
father was expected to install a shrine in his homestead where he could offer sacrifices to 
his ancestral jok for the protection of the family.  If as a Christian he refused and mishap 
occurred, he came under severe censure” from his relatives (Nikkel 2001, 151).  Deng, 
adding to this discourse and quoting anthropologists Lilian and Neville Sanderson says 
that: 
There was no indigenous role that it [religion] could improve his capacity to fulfill; on the 
contrary, by restricting his opportunities to learn, by observation and experience, the skills of a 
highly speacialised transhumant pastoralist and of a warrior, it diseducated him from the 
fundamental roles of an adult male (1995, 206).  
 
Despite the ways in which Christianity was often at odds with the social norms 
and values of Dinka culture, one method was used with schoolboys to instill the lessons 
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of the bible in a culturally relevant way: songs.  These songs, which Deng says were sung 
“by the pupils collectively with all the social, cultural, and aesthetic gratification that the 
society traditionally associated with singing and dancing,” were much like the 
gratification a boy would normally feel from displaying his song oxen or decorating his 
body (1995: 205).   
Young schoolboys further understood their life at school through the Dinka lens 
of a cattle camp, with Deng saying that they “viewed themselves in traditional terms as 
an age-set of warriors with pens for the spear and the school as a cattle camp” (1995, 
205).  Furthermore, Deng says, the way in which the young men displayed their “newly 
acquired skills, wisdom, and status” was with an “exhibitionist self-esteem, alternately 
referring to themselves as I or we, all characteristic of the individual-communal dynamics 
of traditional society” (1995, 206). This interesting dynamic, which I came to call “group 
autonomy” during my work with the Lost Boys in Denver, is one that is observable in 
almost every ceremony and group event I attended with the Lost Boys, and during my 
trips to Sudan, and as Deng describes, was one of the most effective ways that conversion 
took place among early converts.   
Despite the beginnings of a Christianity that appealed to cultural practices of the 
Dinka, many converts who were won as children could not reconcile their familial duties 
with their newfound religion, and as a result, would often turn back to the traditional 
religion. To use the words the Lost Boys often used when discussing Christianity, this 
new religion was simply not “working” for these early converts. The old way of jok and 
Nhialic still had relevance, and in a sense, were “working,” at least for the moment. One 
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did not need to read to understand this religion, families were still largely intact and 
adhering to their traditional structure, and chief and tiet, the diviners of the traditional 
religion, still held the power.  
The missionary era all but came to an end in the 1960s. In 1962, the Missionary 
Societies act was passed by the Sudanese government, effectively ending proselytization 
and severely limiting the activities of missionaries in the South (Nikkel 2001, 221). Two 
years later, all missionaries were expelled, with the North claiming that missionaries were 
purposely “encouraging the setting up of a separate political status for the southern 
provinces thus endangering the integrity and unity of the country” (Deng 1972, 139). 
Although the missionaries were dismayed to be forced out, this process was not as 
detrimental to the CMS mission as it was to other missionary groups such as the 
Catholics, as the Anglican had established a more indigenous church than other groups, 
and they were already well into a process of handing over power to Sudanese priests and 
lay people (Nikkel 2001, 222).  
Conversion in the North—The Khartoum Clubs 
As the war began to ramp up in southern Sudan in the 1960s, increasing numbers 
of Dinka (primarily men and boys) began to flee to Khartoum (Nikkel 2001, 226). It was 
here, among the displaced that a separate conversion began to take place in the so-called 
“Khartoum Clubs.”  Since the 1950s, Dinka had been heading to Khartoum for 
employment and education and Nikkel says that by the mid-1950s, “Sunday mornings 
found Khartoum‟s Anglican cathedral „filled to the doors‟ with southern Christians” 
(2001, 225).  In the 1960s, two displaced lay leaders, both Dinka, began to open “clubs” 
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for the displaced southerners that provided both education and bible instruction (Nikkel 
2001, 226).  These clubs offered something that the Dinka living in the North could not 
find anywhere else in Khartoum: “oases where cultural identity could be affirmed and 
status improved” in the midst of discrimination and abuse the Dinka were met with by 
northerners (Nikkel 2001, 227).  Out of an estimated 15,000 Dinka living in the North, 
approximately 500 to 800 Dinka attended each of the two worship services held each 
weekend (Nikkel 2001, 229).  
Although club numbers were small, in many ways, parallels can be drawn 
between those converting in the clubs of Khartoum and the situation in which the Lost 
Boys converted.  In both situations, converts, separated from their families, were 
surrounded by people of all age groups, instead of being combined into the traditional 
age-sets to which they were accustomed, and bereft of the cattle on which they had based 
so much of their lives in the South (Nikkel 2001).  Of the Khartoum groups, Nikkel 
writes “Divested of cattle and the social and religious framework of which they were a 
part, the spiritual inclinations of the Dinka found release in a new, youthful community of 
faith” (2001, 229) and led to a period of conversion that was distinct, and much more 
effective than the conversion that had taken place in the South.  In the Chapters 6 and 7 
of this thesis, the precise social conditions that surrounded the Lost Boys as they fled the 
South and their conversion will be discussed further.  
Conversion: 1983-Present 
 After the peace agreement in 1972, many of the young Dinka trained in the clubs 
of Khartoum returned to the South, ready to evangelize (Nikkel 2001, 242). As these 
104 
 
indigenous missionaries began to spread the word, one of the most powerful and well-
known figures in the conversion of southerners (as well as in the conversion of the Lost 
Boys), Nathaniel Garang, who had been ordained in Nairobi, returned to southern Sudan 
(Nikkel 2001, 242).
16
 Garang, who is now the Bishop of the Diocese of Bor, and one of 
the longest-serving Episcopal bishops in Sudan, is something of a folk hero to both the 
Lost Boys in Denver and people in southern Sudan because he remained inside Sudan, 
with his people, for the entirety of the war, when so many others who held the sort of 
power he did fled the country (Wheeler 1997, 23). Like others who rose in the ranks of 
the church in Sudan, Garang came from a family that was extremely powerful within the 
traditional religion of the Dinka. According to Nikkel, not only did he posses the last 
name “Garang,” which is one of the free divinities of the traditional religion, but his 
mother came from the family who had “long maintained the respected cult of Lirpiou, the 
jok of the „cool heart‟ ” (Nikkel 2001, 244). Although Garang was now a confirmed 
Christian, his lineage helped to bring legitimacy to his preaching, which Nikkel says 




                                               
16 On my trip to Sudan in 2008, I had the pleasure of meeting Nathaniel Garang in Bor town, southern 
Sudan. (I and several other representatives from Project Education Sudan had come to talk to him about 
school-building projects in southern Sudan.) Garang was in his late seventies or early eighties and had a 
round pot belly (very rare in Sudan) and an extraordinarily calm, kind air to him. He received us at his 
modest home in town, just a few hundred feet from the banks of the White Nile. This brief encounter 
helped me to understand the reverential tones the Lost Boys, and really all Sudanese people, used when 
talking about him.  
17 Macour was the name given to Gordon Shaw by the Dinka. This new saying is understood to mean that 
Dinka began to believe that the God they (or their ancestors) had been introduced to fifty or so years before 
was really the Nhialic they had believed in all along.  
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Cattle Raids of 1991—“The gods have gone with the cows to Nuer country” 
The cattle raids of 1991 represent yet another unique and intense period of 
conversion for the Dinka, one that can also be used to briefly explain the conversion of 
the Lost Boys. As fighting between the Dinka and Nuer increased during the second half 
of the civil war, cattle raiding, which for generations has been a common occurrence 
between Dinka and Nuer, intensified. Whereas in the past, when cattle raids were 
generally nonviolent, or at least confined violence to the men raiding and those being 
raided, cattle raiding took a violent turn during the war that involved the killing, raping, 
and burning more commonly associated with attacks from Muslim raiders from the 
North. These raids were to have to have a violent and dramatic effect on the lives of 
southern Sudanese and were also the impetus behind conversion on a scale that had never 
been seen before.  
Although much of the civil war in Sudan pitted northern Sudan against southern 
Sudan, fighting broke out among the Nuer and Dinka tribes in the South in 1991.  The 
Nuer orchestrated a series of raids of Dinka cattle in the Bor region of the South and 
massacred the area‟s inhabitants.  While cattle-raiding between the Dinka and Nuer is a 
practice that has gone on for hundreds of years, it had rarely been pursued with the kind 
of ferocity that was shown in this raid.  Far from being just a raid to garner resources 
made scarce by the war, Nikkel calls these raids “an attempt to annihilate the Jieng 
[Dinka] Bor as an ethnic identity” (Nikkel 1997, 68).  According to Wheeler, tens of 
thousands of people were killed and a million cattle taken, leaving 250,000 Dinka to flee 
their land under attack from the Nuer (2005, 61).   
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Also singled out for and killed in these raids were the diviners or tiit of the 
traditional religions who were guarding the shrines of the jak and sacrificing “countless 
bulls in a fruitless attempt to turn back the enemy” (Wheeler 2005, 62).  The events of the 
1991 raid had far reaching consequences and are often cited as a major impetus for 
Christian conversion among the Bor Dinka, particularly as much faith was lost in the 
traditional gods‟ ability to protect the people and because virtually all cattle, necessary to 
appease the traditional gods in sacrifice, were taken.  It has been estimated that after these 
raids, Christianity among Dinka living in the Bor area where the raids occurred may have 
soared to as high as 90 percent (Wheeler 2005, 62).  
Along with Christianity came destruction of many of the objects associated with 
the traditional religion, which were burned en masse at the construction of a massive 
shrine in the shape of the cross (Wheeler 2005, 62-63).
18
  The event, which happened in 
1994, was inspired by Paul Kon, a prophet who emerged around the time of the cattle 
raids, who was reportedly inspired by the Isaiah passage about Kush, a passage often 
cited by the Lost Boys as integral to their conversion as well (Wheeler 1997, 22). 
According to Wheeler, the passage describes “both suffering and eventual redemption 
and a turning to the God of „Zion‟” (1997, 23). Kon, who is related to Nathaniel Garang, 
had maintained his own local divinity until he was baptized, at which point he renounced 
his jak and began having prophesies (Nikkel 1997, 71). The mass burning was held at a 
site that Kon, who had been killed by the SPLA in 1992, had prescribed, a cross-shaped 
                                               
18 In Sudan there are now many churches shaped like crosses. They are made out of mud that is wetted and 
shaped into the cruciform shape and then thatched with dry reeds. One church that I visited in the village of 
Pagok was not only laid out in the shape of the cross, but also had an altar that was made from mud and 
formed into the shape of the cross as well.  
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building built on a former cattle camp called Pakeo and site of a previous burning of jak 
that was ordered by British colonial forces 40 years earlier (Nikkel 1997, 72, Wheeler 
1997, 22).  
The major episodes of conversion in Sudan, such as that which followed the cattle 
raids and the massive conversion of the Lost Boys illustrate that over 100 years of 
attempting to convert the Dinka, nearly all of the conversion that has taken place has 
happened in the last 25 years and has been largely an indigenous movement, spearheaded 
by Dinka priests and evangelists trained in the Khartoum clubs or in surrounding east 
African countries. The seeds that were sown by the missionaries had come to fruition, but 
it took events such as the cattle raids of the 1990s for Christianity to become relevant to 
the lives of the Dinka in southern Sudan. As the Lost Boys would say, in world where 
cattle were no longer available for sacrifice, and where the jak were no longer relevant, 
Christianity was now “working” for the Dinka. It should be noted that the Lost Boys 
themselves were not part of this large-scale conversion that happened in Bor in the 1990s. 
All of those considered to be a part of the Lost Boys group had been gone from the Bor 
area for some time at this point, and were already converted in the Ethiopian camps, or 
would soon convert in the camps of Kenya.  
The Lessening Importance of Cattle 
 Despite the continued importance of cattle to the life of the Nilotes, the civil war 
and subsequent conversion to Christianity in southern Sudan has begun to erode the 
traditional role of the cow.  Many Nilotes have been separated from their cattle, 
particularly in the second half of the civil war (1983-2005) when many Dinka and Nuer 
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were in refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda. As well, the Christian conversion that took 
place among the Dinka, and to a lesser extent the Nuer, in the 1990s has changed many of 
the traditional practices of their cattle-based culture. 
As mentioned above, the mass destruction in 1994 of traditional religious objects 
included sacred spears, shields and the tim ke jak, or jak poles that resembled the horns of 
oxen and were used to practice the traditional religion and to differentiate the shrines of 
different divinities.  In place of these objects, Christian crosses began to “supplant 
artifacts of traditional culture” (Nikkel 1997, 87).  In some cases, jak poles literally were 
pulled from the ground and hastily constructed crosses have been put into the holes that 
they left as a sign of conversion and protection from the jak (Nikkel 1997, 108).  As 
“reliance upon two elements integral to indigenous identity and world view—cattle and 
the jak—has been profoundly altered,” the attention of the Dinka to their cattle began to 
shift to the cross (Nikkel 1997, 89).  Nikkel says that, the “aesthetic energies once given 
to grooming and adorning their oxen, or in personal body decoration, have recently been 
invested in new designs for the cruciform shape” (1997, 89).   
 The replacement of jak poles with crosses is particularly interesting in that both in 
form and use, they were linked to cattle.  These forked poles, as described earlier, are 
shrines to the traditional gods where offerings and libations were placed (Nikkel 1997, 
90).  Their appearance, with curved, shaped points jutting out like trained cattle horns and 
painted in what Coote says are colors possibly related to cattle patterns, took what was 
aesthetically pleasing about cattle and put it on display (1992, 290).  While replacing jak 
poles with crosses is a direct attempt to show that the old religions were being replaced 
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by Christianity, it should be noted that this practice does display continuity in that both 
jak poles and crosses are symbolic of sacrifice.  While the jak poles are places to give 
offerings to the spirits who often demand cattle sacrifice, the cross is a symbol of human 
sacrifice (Nikkel 1997, 93-93).  As Nikkel says, “it is in this intimate identification with 
Christ that the cross derives its power.  Virtually all Jieng [Dinka] of this generation have 
witnessed the drama of [cattle] blood sacrifice and are aware of the indigenous meanings 
of blood shed for individual or communal guilt”(1995, 93).   
 Dinka crosses are made from a variety of materials, sometimes from those that 
have gained a special significance for the person carrying it, such as wood from boats 
used to travel the Nile by evangelists (Nikkel 1995, 91).  In terms of monetary value, 
however, Nikkel says crosses made of ebony are considered the most valuable, but in 
terms of theological significance, those made from the wood of the jak poles are the most 
significant because they show a break with the traditional religion (1995, 91).  The 
reconfiguration of a jak pole which originally had visual ties to cattle, into something that 
looks like a cross, could also signal the lessening importance of cattle as people turn to 
Christianity.   
   Although some traditional items are being replaced by the emergent Dinka 
crosses, this is not to say that the aesthetic form and energy that was previously put into 
cattle-based objects is not being integrated into this aesthetic innovation.  As Nikkel says 
“much of the psychic energy that once flowed towards efforts to possess, nurture and 
groom cattle, with all their aesthetic, social, economic, and religious meanings, has, in 
part, been transferred to the “tree on which Christ was crucified”(1995, 89).   
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One example of how aesthetic properties of cattle have been translated to the 
cross is in the dheeng one gains from carrying a cross.  The carrying of crosses, much 
like displaying and decorating one‟s oxen or one‟s body, carry with them the marks of 
beauty and sophistication (Nikkel 1995, 91).  Acquiring dheeng from carrying a cross can 
be seen in the shape and form of crosses, which is derivative of two types of walking 
sticks (and the aforementioned jak poles), the thiec and yuai commonly used among the 
Dinka (Nikkel 1995, 89). The thiec are spears that young men receive upon their 
initiation.  Meant to be used as weapons against enemies and animals, these clubs are 
long and heavy and made of ebony.  They are meant to display virility and power (Nikkel 
1995, 89). Yuai are longer, more slender poles which are used by men and women alike.  
According to Nikkel, yuai are sometimes decorated with bands of brass or surface 
carving and as a “thing of beauty, it denotes prestige, sophistication, and maturity” (1995, 
90).   
Like their predecessors, the yuai and thiec, which call attention to a person and 
enhance their personal appearance, crosses are a way to set oneself apart and to “make 
special”.   In this way it could be said that within the traditional framework of dheeng, to 
ornament oneself with a cross is a way to add to personal beauty and dignity.  In their 
initial incarnation among the Bor Dinka in the 1970s, Dinka crosses were a way for 
evangelists to identify with their “stick-bearing kinfolk while distinguishing themselves 
as a unique minority,” and also to serve as an entry point for conversations with those 
still practicing the traditional religion (Nikkel 1995, 91).  In this way, the carrying of a 
cross in much like the decoration of oxen, it is used to call attention to something, in this 
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case Christianity, perceived as beautiful.  In a more literal sense, the increasing presence 
of crosses among the Dinka and other Nilotic tribes calls attention to the fact that a 
radical shift is taking place among a people formally dedicated in all aspects of life, 
including religion, to their cattle.  
When I was in Sudan, Dinka crosses had become ubiquitous. We were greeted in 
the many of the villages we entered by choirs of women (usually members of the 
mothers‟ union) wearing identical white dresses and headscarves and all carrying the 
long, slender Dinka cross, usually holding it aloft as they sang hymns and welcoming 
songs. At Dinka services at St. P.J‟s in Denver, the older members of the congregation 
generally brought Dinka crosses with them to services and used them in much the same 
way they were used in Sudan. I never saw any of the Lost Boys (with the exception of 
Lost Boys who were repatriated back into Sudan after the war whom I met there) in 
Denver carry a Dinka cross, a possible testament to the fact that because they were not 
exposed to the traditional religion or jak poles, and would not have been old enough to 
carry a thiec or yuai when they left their families, they never found a need to find a 
replacement for these objects.  
As jak poles are metaphorically ripped from the ground to be replaced by crosses, 
the Dinka are accepting a new religion that, on a surface-level, at least, seems to be 
threatening to erode thousands of years of cattle-based religion, culture and aesthetics. 
Despite this, Dinka culture is still so intimately connected to cattle, and the Dinka who 
have been repatriated to southern Sudan have begun to increase the size of their herds to 
sizes that rival the beginning of the war, that it is hard to gauge if their cattle-based 
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culture will ever be fully discarded even in the face of increased Christian conversion.  
As Lienhardt points out, even those Nilotic people who have been long separated from 
their cattle seem to retain the cattle color vocabulary (1961, 13). And in my own 
experience working with Christian Lost Boy refugees from southern Sudan, I have 
witnessed the strong connection to cattle that has survived amidst the separation of the 
Lost Boys from their cattle, in many cases for close to 20 years.  Cattle are still used as a 
means of gaining access to wealth, and many of the Lost Boys in Denver regularly send 
money to family members in Sudan so that they can maintain a herd either to be used as a 
bride price should they want to marry and bring their bride to the U.S., or as insurance 
and as a means to have wealth should they eventually return to Sudan.  Cattle names 
based on recognized color configurations adopted in childhood are still the preferred 
method of address among the Lost Boys, and are still considered a source of pride, 
particularly if one is named after a prized configuration.  Despite this, Christian names 
taken at baptism are often used in work and school settings, mainly for ease of 
understanding among American coworkers and friends.   
In the next chapter, I will explore how the Lost Boys became refugees, 
highlighting the radical shift between the cattle-based life they would have had in Sudan 





Chapter 6—The Lost Boys as Refugees 
Flight from Sudan 
Unlike the tradition-heavy, cattle-centered existence the Lost Boys would have 
likely been immersed in if not for the civil war, they instead found themselves as victims 
of a failed nation-state. Like many other decolonized African countries, which have 
attempted to force nations on preexisting state borders, Sudan‟s attempts have resulted in 
civil war and a massive refugee crisis.  The Lost Boys as a group represent the worst 
possible outcome of a failed nation-state.  Adding to the misery that the Lost Boys have 
endured as refugees is the fact many were so young when they became separated from 
their parents that the stories of their journey have become at once muddled, hard to recall 
and discern from one another, and yet at the same time, so fresh in their memories that at 
times vivid details come rushing back in conversations and in dreams. Unfortunately, the 
media has latched on to certain elements of the Lost Boys‟ stories, the walking, the mud, 
the lion attacks, and forgotten that these were individuals, young boys, whose lives they 
were describing.  The Lost Boys for their part have not always corrected the inaccuracies 
and misconceptions about their stories, sometimes because they feel that people would 
not care to hear their own version of the truth, more interested instead in the stories they 
have heard than to learn the harsh and very individual horrors that each of the Lost Boys 
experienced.   
What I learned about the Lost Boys‟ experience as refugees came to me slowly.  
Because I did not design my interviews to ask directly about the Lost Boys‟ journey, 
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what I learned from them was generally in snippets of conversation I overheard, or in 
passing remarks they made about their trek.  The Lost Boys rarely outlined their entire 
journey for me or others, but would sometimes make an offhand remark such as “yeah, 
when we crossed the Gilo [River], that is when the crocodiles attacked.”  Other times, 
jokes they made would convey the dire circumstances that they had been in during their 
months-long trek.  One of these jokes alluded to the extreme lack of food that the Lost 
Boys faced as they walked to Kenya and Ethiopia and were forced to eat things such as 
leaves and grass.  Because of this, many Lost Boys call all green vegetables and salads 
they encounter “grass” and regard them as undesirable to eat.  A typical example would 
be for one of the Lost Boys to say: “John doesn‟t want to eat those noodles, they have too 
much grass in them,” and then John would respond by saying “Nah, man, you‟re the one 
who likes grass, you eat it!” Occurrences such as these often corroborated details given in 
many of the books about the Lost Boys and gave me some sense of the similar 
experiences all had gone through. 
Mark Bixler, a journalist who followed a group of Lost Boys living in Atlanta for 
several years and wrote the book The Lost Boys of Sudan: An American Story of the 
Refugee Experience also found many similarities among the Lost Boys‟ stories about 
their refugee experience.  He speculates that these similarities are indicative of the fact 
that “people who are being written about often have an interest in how their story is told, 
and the writer must consider a person‟s motivation for portraying events in a certain 
light” (2005, xiii).  I found this adage helpful in my own work with the Lost Boys and in 
the literature that exists about their flight from Sudan to Ethiopia to Kenya.  Because of 
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uniformity of this literature, I would like to first discuss what the typical explanation has 
been, both by the Lost Boys and in the media, for the separation and flight of the Lost 
Boys.  I will also discuss the literature generated by some of the humanitarian 
organizations that were on the ground in southern Sudan and in the refugee camps at the 
time of the Lost Boys displacement, which help to fill in the details sometimes left out by 
the Lost Boys and the media.   
Numerous writers, from journalists, to missionaries, to anthropologists, to best-
selling fiction writers such as Dave Eggers, have recounted the story of the Lost Boys.  
My own understanding of the Lost Boys‟ collective flight is therefore a compilation of all 
of these sources, in addition to what the Lost Boy community has told me, in bits and 
pieces, about their journey.  As I have stated previously, I did not ask specific questions 
about the Lost Boys‟ flight during my interviews with them nor did I ever ask them to 
recount from beginning to end the story of their journey to the refugee camps or to the 
U.S.  In the two years since I first met the Lost Boys of Denver, these stories slowly 
emerged and have been supplemented by popular literature, journal articles, and film 
accounts of their journey.  Rather than telling the story of any particular Lost Boy, I 
would instead like to give something of a composite sketch compiled from all of these 
resources.  The story of the Lost Boys, as I understand it is as follows. 
Southern Sudan is not a densely populated area.  Although the entire country of 
Sudan, including North and South is the largest country in terms of land mass in Africa at 
one million square miles and had an overall population of somewhere around 25
19
 million 
                                               
19 Currently, the population of Sudan as a whole is estimated at about 28 million and southern Sudan, 
between six and eight million (Wheeler 2005:54 and 77). 
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people at the time the Lost Boys became separated from their families, the South, in the 
late 1980s was home to only about 4.3 million of these people (Human Rights 
Watch/Africa 1994, 5).  Villages in the South are spread over this vast landscape, with 
concentrations of people around some of the larger towns such as Juba (the current 
capital of the South), Bor, and Nasir.  Generally, each family, made up of a husband, his 
wife or wives and all of their children, has a plot of land that houses the family‟s huts, 
and a barn (Deng 1995, 187).  Outside of the village, sometimes a distance of only 
several hundred feet and other times up to a few days walk away, are the cattle camps.  
Cattle camps, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, are seasonal 
grazing grounds for the cattle, and also the place where young men are said to become 
men, to learn to live on their own.  They are the only place where young men milk their 
own cows, something which is never done in the presence of women.  It is not 
uncommon for young men to be away at these camps for months at a time, returning only 
for village ceremonies or at the end of the dry season.  It is in the cattle camps that most 
Lost Boys say they were when the Arabs began to attack.  
Losing Sudan’s Boys 
 In 1983 with the reimposition of shar‟ia law by the northern government, political 
parties were abolished, the press was censored, suspected dissidents were arrested and 
tortured, and public floggings and amputations were reinstated as punishment for crimes 
(Human Rights Watch/Africa 1994, 5-6, Bixler 2005, 53).   In addition, all non-Muslims 
were barred from serving in top government positions, tipping the political balance in the 
favor of the already privileged North (Bixler 2005, 53).  In response to these actions, 
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southern rebels formed the Sudan People‟s Liberation Army (SPLA) and  “took to the 
bush” in anticipation of war (Bixler 2005, 53, Wheeler 2005, 56) while the North and its 
allied miltias, such as the Baggara, a nomadic Arab group made up of many tribes who 
have “warred with their Dinka neighbors off and on for a hundred years or more”(Bixler 
2005, 63) began attacking villages in southern Sudan (Bixler 2005, 56-57).  A “scorched 
earth” policy was pursued by the raiders who often attacked villages just after 
government planes finished bombing. Huts were burned, crops and cattle stolen, and 
villagers were either shot or kidnapped, sometimes to be sold into the slave markets of 
northern Sudan . Those who were able to escape took to the surrounding forests to hide.   
Caught up in the horror of the war, which was waged almost entirely on southern 
soil, numerous young men were separated from their parents, particularly in the late 
1980s (Bixler 2005, 60).  Bixler accurately sums up a common explanation given by the 
Lost Boys for their separation from their families:  
Most said they were six, seven, eight, or nine and were tending cattle away from home as 
is the custom for boys that age in Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups of southern Sudan, when 
government soldiers or militias aligned with the government attacked their villages.  
They said assailants killed and kidnapped relatives, stole cattle, and burned huts and grain 
before vanishing towards the horizon from which they had come.  Sometimes the 
attackers were turbaned Arab horseman.  In other places, they carried AK-47 assault 
rifles.  Most of the boys said they saw the attack from a distance or learned of it as they 
walked home [from cattle camp]… Inevitably, they said, an adult in the group of 
survivors asserted himself and led them on a treacherous, barefoot, weeks-long march 
east, toward the promise of safety in refugee camps across the border in Ethiopia (2005, 
60).   
 
This passage from Bixler is evocative of much of the literature and testimonials by the 
Lost Boys that asserts that they became separated from their homes and families because 
they were away at cattle camps and were able to escape the attacks, which usually 
targeted the villages, eventually trekking to Ethiopia in groups of boys, sometimes led by 
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an older boy or man.  Despite this uniformity in stories, there are other reasons that the 
Lost Boys of Sudan are mostly male.  
 Humanitarian organizations such as Human Rights Watch/Africa, which was on 
the ground at the time of the civil war, have documented some of the other reasons that so 
many young men from southern Sudan walked on their own to refugee camps in Ethiopia 
and Kenya: namely to be educated and to be trained as child soldiers.  Although the 
media and the Lost Boys themselves have portrayed their story as a uniform one; that the 
Lost Boys‟ villages were attacked, and that they were told to head toward Ethiopia to 
safety and to receive “education,” this was not always the case (Human Rights 
Watch/Africa1994).  According to Human Rights Watch/Africa, boys left their villages 
and headed to Ethiopia under varied circumstances including; after their villages had 
been attacked, with their parents, and simply because the SPLA told young men to go to 
Ethiopia to get education (HRW/Africa, 1994, 6).  Human Rights Watch further asserts 
that going through SPLA networks was the safest way for boys to get to Ethiopia, and 
that by 1988 “large networks of boys were being marched to Ethiopia, and in 1990 were 
observed by outsiders being transported by vehicle with adult supervisors” (1994, 9).  
According to Wheeler, in the southern Sudanese province of Bahr el Ghazal alone, 
30,000 boys were recruited by the SPLA after a famine and militia attacks in 1987-1988 
decimated the area (2005, 58).  The boys became part of the “Jiec Amar,” or the Red 
Army as it was known by the SPLA (Wheeler 2005, 58).  The Jiec Amar was to be an 
“elite force of educated and ideologically sound young people, cut off from their roots, to 
build the „New Sudan‟” (Wheeler 2005, 58).  HRW/Africa, who interviewed a former 
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SPLA officer about the Jiec Amar, was told the Red Army was usually made up of the 
older boys who were between 14 and 16 years of age.  At first, the boys were used on the 
front lines of combat, but when they proved “too young” to handle the fighting as they 
were often “massacred,” they were reassigned to more menial duties and eventually 
allowed to go to school (HRW/Africa 1994, 14).   
Another reason for the mass migration of young men to Ethiopia is that village 
chiefs were asked by the SPLA to send boys, with the permission of their parents, to 
Ethiopia to be schooled (HRW/Africa 1994, 9, Jok 2005, 154).  On top of this, the SPLA 
administered the refugee camps in Ethiopia and “according to SPLA officers and the 
children themselves, they [the boys] were given military training as well as education,” 
(HRW/Africa:6) and in fact “some form of military training was admittedly given to all 
unaccompanied boys, regardless of age” (HRW/Africa, 1994, 14).   
Military recruitment of young men and boys by the SPLA also helps to explain 
why so few girls trekked to Ethiopia in the 1980s and early ‟90s, and why there are few 
southern Sudanese girls who are considered to be “lost” in the same sense as the boys.  
According to Bixler, “the rebel army [the SPLA] did not use many female fighters,” and: 
Perhaps more importantly, few families in southern Sudan would have willingly sent girls away 
from home.  Girls are too valuable.  They grow into young women who fetch dowries of 
valuable cattle when they marry (2005, 61). 
 
In Dinka culture, girls are also kept much closer to the home and family than boys, who 
spend much of their time in cattle camps.  Other sources have suggested that there were 
small numbers of girls, probably less than 2,000, who were essentially “lost” just as the 
Lost Boys were, but once in the refugee camps, were often placed with families for 
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whom they would perform domestic duties in exchange for shelter and food—they rarely 
lived alone as the Lost Boys did (Deng, Deng, Ajak and Bernstein 2005, 31).   
 Despite the varied ways in which Lost Boys ended up in the refugee camps, their 
stories have not betrayed this.  Human Rights Watch, alluding to the similarity of the 
boys‟ stories says that “the SPLA instructed the boys in the camps what to tell expatriate 
relief workers and other outsiders about their relations to the SPLA” (1994, 12).  Not 
only could admitting to military service bring shame to a boy and conjure unpleasant 
memories, but according to one of the Lost Boys living in Denver, they could also be 
barred from gaining passage to another country as an asylee or refugee if they discussed 
soldiering during an INS interview.  Bixler, however says that that INS and State 
Department officials were “well-aware” that many Lost Boys had served as child soldiers 
in Ethiopia and had been told that many were being coached by other Lost Boys to cover 
this information up in interviews with the INS (2005, 89).  According to the State 
Department, although service as a soldier did not make the Lost Boys any less eligible for 
resettlement, there was still a “perception in Kakuma [refugee camp] that it might” 
(Bixler 2005, 89).  The Lost Boys, therefore, felt they had a strong incentive to keep their 
military status during the war to themselves, and thus it has often gone unspoken.   
 Although the story most often told about the Lost Boys‟ journey leaves out many 
important details in regards to their service as child soldiers, there are still elements of it 
that have been well-documented and which help to paint a clear picture of the hardships 
all endured, regardless of their military status.  As I have previously stated, what has been 
called the “Journey of a 1,000 miles” (Wheat 2004, 1) began a few years after the civil 
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war started up again in 1983, as the SPLA carried out guerilla attacks on northern targets 
and the North retaliated (Werner, Anderson, and Wheeler 2000, 523).  Between 1987 and 
1988, suffering reached an “appalling climax” as these attacks began to intensify 
(Werner, Anderson, and Wheeler 2000, 525).  Around this time, the Sudanese 
government started to more formally arm Baggara militias and some non-Arab tribes to 
attack the Dinka (Werner, Anderson, and Wheeler 2000, 525).  Between 1987 and 1988, 
humanitarian workers documented the arrival of some 17,000 unaccompanied young men 
and boys into the Ethiopian refugee camps of Dimma, Itang, and Panyido, just over the 
Ethiopian  border with Sudan  (Bixler 2005, 59-60).  According to Wheeler, the boys 
entered Ethiopia “exhausted, sick and starving, traumatized by their experience on the 
trek,” (2005, 58) which was said to have included lion and hyena attacks, dehydration, 
the death of brothers and friends, and the consumption of things such as mud, animal 
skins, rats, and urine.  Many boys apparently told humanitarian workers that they found 
their way to Ethiopia, a trek that took six to 10 weeks to complete, by following “the 
bones” of those that had attempted and failed the journey before them (Werner, 
Anderson, and Wheeler 2000, 528).  In all, diplomats stationed in Ethiopia at the time 
estimated that 8,000 boys died on the trek from Sudan to Ethiopia (Wheeler 2005, 57).   
 Life in the Ethiopian camps was bleak.  The boys who had entered the camps 
without family and found that they had family in the camps once they got there were not 
allowed to live together with them.  All were kept separately in their own barracks even 
though surveys conducted in the Ethiopian camps suggested that up to one-fifth of the 
boys had relatives living in the camps (HRW/Africa 1994, 12).  For the most part, the 
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boys were on their own; they built their own huts and made their own food with only 
minimal assistance from teachers, caretakers, and clergy (HRW/Africa 1994, 13).   
Although they had been promised education in Ethiopia, most of the 
unaccompanied boys received little until their later years in the camps and according to a 
1989 HRW/Africa survey, 90 percent of the unaccompanied minor population in the 
Ethiopian camps were either illiterate or in the first grade at the time of the survey 
(HRW/Africa 1994, 13).  Despite this, Wheeler says that 12,000 boys were in schools run 
jointly by the SPLA and the churches that were in the camps (2005, 58).  The Lost Boys‟ 
accounts of their time in Ethiopia also suggest that they received at least minimal 
education, although many discussed the fact that they were still not able to read or write 
in Dinka at the time they converted to Christianity in the Ethiopian camps in their 
interviews with me.   While is hard to say exactly how much education the Lost Boys 
received in the camps, their exposure to Christianity is well-documented.   According to 
Wheeler, the opposing forces of the military and the clergy were the most influential on 
the Lost Boys in the Ethiopian camps, with the clergy “struggling to keep them alive and 
to provide a gentler environment alongside the military discipline of the SPLA”(2005, 
58).     
Ethiopia and Conversion—“In my heart I had a feeling of doing it” 
In my interviews with the Lost Boys, I discovered that many of the Lost Boys had 
had some exposure to Christianity before coming to Ethiopia, although they largely had 
not converted prior to their journey.  Joseph said that when he was born “my mom and 





  Despite his family‟s traditional values, one of his older sisters converted to 
Christianity after learning about it from an aunt.  She was the first in their village to 
convert and would sometimes sing Christian songs to her little brother, of which Joseph 
said: 
I was so little, but I can see her everyday she will pick up a bible and try to sing some songs in 
the bible.  I feel really that I like those songs but I don‟t know what they were talking about until 
the war broke in Sudan and I had to leave and go to Ethiopia in 1987.  In 1988, that‟s when I 
became a Christian  (Interview 1-1). 
 
One of my other informants, Deng, also grew up in a family that practiced the 
traditional Dinka religion.  Although his family was animist, he rarely saw much of the 
traditional religion being practiced because he was in the cattle camp where cattle 
sacrifice did not happen, and more importantly, because the traditional Dinka religion 
was not “concerned with the kids” (Interview 2-1).  He sometimes saw his parents bring 
cattle into the village to be sacrificed, but by his own account, didn‟t know what was 
going on.  Once, at Christmas time, Deng heard some Christians marching and beating 
drums and asked his father who they were.  His father explained and when Deng asked 
him if he could join, his father expressed the view that many Dinka held toward the 
traditional religion, saying Christianity was “„not for the kids,‟ that‟s what he told me, 
„when you grow up later on, I‟m gonna let you go, but it‟s not good for you now.‟”  
(Interview 2-1) 
My third informant, Lual, similarly said that when he was growing up, his family 
was not Christian “at all, they were still believing in those small gods [jak] that they 
know” (Interview 3-1).  He said that the first time he learned about Christianity was not 
                                               
20 Local gods are generally known as jok, or jak (plural).   
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until 1989, two years after he arrived in the refugee camps.  Confirming what Deng 
stated, Lual told me that children did not participate in the traditional religion and that 
sacrifices were practiced in the main village, so if you were away at cattle camp or 
elsewhere, you would not see the sacrifices. (Interview 3-1).   
Unlike the majority of Lost Boys that I interviewed and met, who had not 
converted before they arrived in the Ethiopian camps, Peter had.  His mother was the first 
in their village to convert (Interview 4-1).  Despite his mother‟s early conversion, Peter‟s 
father was reluctant to convert because in Peter‟s words, he was “angry” that women 
were allowed to participate in Christianity, something that was not usually allowed in the 
traditional Dinka religion. According to Peter, women were often present at cattle 
sacrifices more to “share, and make guys feel motivated” by “making singing and all of 
this stuff” than to actually participate in the ceremonies themselves (Interview 4-1).  
Eventually, however, his father converted after Peter had already left for the refugee 
camps and the rest of the family had already converted, after seeing: 
What chapters of the bible being taught to him by my mom and the rest of the people around, 
and he saw them, they are happening, like war in Sudan, and drought, animal are dying, 
everybody is dying.  And after he learned all of this, I believe that what make him converted to 
be a Christian after I already left (Interview 4-1).   
 
Despite his father‟s reluctance, Peter‟s mother still had him baptized when he was 
very young and chose a Christian name for him.
21
  In order for him to be baptized, Peter‟s 
mother had to agree to teach him the bible as he could not yet read.  Like Deng and Lual, 
Peter stated that children had little interaction with the traditional religion and therefore 
said it was “not too hard for me to change to Christianity, because the gods of my parents 
                                               
21 For a women to have her child baptized against the wishes of her husband is unusual, but it is likely that 
Peter‟s mother was helped by the fact that her brother, Peter‟s uncle, is a higher up in the Sudanese 
Episcopal church, and the fact that maternal uncles often play a strong role in the lives of their nephews.  
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used to have was [were] not the gods for the kids.” Parents did not want their kids around 
the jak because they believed them to be jealous and sometimes harmful to children, and 
therefore the kids rarely witnessed animal sacrifices and other aspects of the Dinka 
religion.   Because he knew so little about these gods, Peter was open to Christianity, 
saying that he was “still green,” like a “brand new car which was ready for [a] road test” 
(Interview 4-1).   
Once in the Ethiopian refugee camps, separated from their parents, the Lost Boys 
who had not converted, which made up the majority of their numbers, came into the 
church in different ways.  Joseph, who was in Panyido camp, said that he became 
Christian in 1988, when he was eight years old.  At this point, he said, “I was not even 
knowing how to write my name” (Interview 1-2).  Searching for “something to believe 
in” in the absence of his family and his cattle, and knowing nothing about the traditional 
religion, Joseph said: 
I was not even able maybe to repair to my traditional beliefs. I was a kid, I couldn‟t even know 
what do you do for your local god to protect you, I‟d rather join the majority. I didn‟t have a clue 
what Christianity is about, but in my heart I had a feeling that there is only one God, and that one 
God, I have to join this majority of people that are following the one God (Interview 1-3).  
 
Before he was Christian, Joseph had an older friend in the camp who had already 
converted.  Every evening, before they went to bed, his friend would call all the young 
boys to one place and sing songs for them and teach them to pray.  From his friend‟s 
teaching, Joseph became “acquainted” with Christianity, but didn‟t really “know what 
was going on” (Interview 1-2).  In October of 1988, that changed. Joseph was sitting by 
himself near the church, listening to the group inside. He said: 
There was really a very nice sound coming out of it [the church], and people, you can tell they 
that are so happy, and the worshipping was so wonderful, you can tell that!  I thought to myself, 
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why I am I here lonely and who is protecting me now?  I better join this group.  And that‟s when 
I became Christian” (Interview 1-2).   
 
Joseph went to the church then, and was baptized along with 500
22
 or so other Lost 
Boys by an Episcopal priest named Mayol Ajak
23
 who is well-known and regarded 
among the Lost Boys.  According to Joseph, Ajak was the one “baptizing all the Lost 
Boys, most of them” (Interview 2-1).  He was told to choose a name from the bible, and 
then he was given a Dinka bible.  He couldn‟t read yet, but some of the older Lost Boys 
would read the bible to him.  After being baptized, Joseph became as active as he could 
with the church, but was often limited by all of the chores that the Lost Boys needed to 
do to care for themselves, of which he said:  
From that day that I was baptized, I developed a habit of going to church every night, if I can, as 
soon as possible, if I can.  But, we were responsible of our own life and all this kind [of stuff], so 
you have to be cooking sometime, be given a duty to cook, or you will be given something to do, 
so it will restrict our time to follow church activities.  But in my heart I had a feeling of doing it.  
And before I go to bed, I pray, wake up in the morning, I pray. From that day up till now I do 
that (Interview 1-2). 
 
Despite his conversion in Ethiopia, and his new habit of praying, Joseph didn‟t 
immediately become immersed in the church. Because the Lost Boys were so busy caring 
for themselves in Ethiopia, it was not until Joseph “came to Kenya, that‟s where I was 
really very much involved with church activities”(Interview 1-2).   
Deng stressed his autonomy in his decision to become Christian.  He said that 
“nobody came to me and said come go to church now, it was my feeling by myself” 
(Interview 2-1).  Deng then went down to the church, but he didn‟t want to be baptized at 
                                               
22 The large conversion ceremonies described by the Lost Boys have been well documented.  According to 
Werner, Anderson, and Wheeler, large baptisms of thousands of boys were especially common in the 
Presbyterian and Episcopal churches (2000, 529).   
23 Mayol (or Mayul) Ajak, also known by his Christian name, Andrew Mayul, was the Episcopal pastor of 
Panyido, the “children‟s camp,” in Ethiopia where all of the Lost Boys whom I interviewed lived in the late 
1980s and early ‟90s (Werner, Anderson, and Wheeler 2000, 529).   
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first.  He just went and listened.  People at the church were teaching how to write in 
Dinka and he wanted to learn too, so he said “I‟ll try it” (Interview 2-1).  The Sudanese 
preachers who were teaching Dinka also taught him about the bible and how to read it.  
Eventually, he decided he wanted to be baptized.  Deng went to one of the priests and 
expressed his desire.  He was told that he had to learn the doctrine of the Episcopal 
church, and how to “join the New Light” (Interview 2-1).  Once he had done this, he was 
baptized with a large group of others.  Some people, he said, didn‟t know much about the 
church yet, but were baptized anyway and allowed to learn about the church later on.     
Like Joseph and Deng, Lual didn‟t immediately convert in the Ethiopian camps.  
When they first got to Ethiopia, he said the Lost Boys “were just in a group, we don‟t 
even know about what is God” (Interview 3-1).  However by 1989, two years or so after 
most of the boys had arrived in the camp, the teachers were telling the boys to go to 
church.  Despite this, the main reason, according to Lual, for going to church was not his 
teachers‟ insistence, but that “there were some friends in the group who used to go to 
church and they talked about how good it is” (Interview 3-1). Stressing the importance of 
following the wisdom of the group, Lual said that when someone says how good 
something is, you have to follow it and try to see how it is.  Like Joseph, it was older 
boys who told Lual about church and persuaded him to go.  When asked if they taught the 
bible in the schools, he said that it was just “general religion, not the bible, but religion 
books” (Interview 3-1).  
In approximately 1990, after going to Sunday school and learning about the 
church for a year or so, Lual decided he wanted to be baptized.  He was baptized in a 
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large group of boys, like my other informants.  Mayol Ajak also helped him convert by 
telling the boys about “about the word of God…and preached to them” (Interview 3-1).  
Much like the other Lost Boys stated, Lual said that the church was much bigger in 
Kakuma, and that the “word of God was spread a lot more” because of the church‟s 
strong presence (Interview 3-1).  When I asked Lual if he ever helped any of the other 
guys convert, he said that because all of the guys had been baptized, they didn‟t have to 
help each other convert, but sometimes they had to encourage someone who had been 
baptized, but had stopped coming to church to come back.  When this happened, he said, 
“then you talk to him and tell him, yeah, to come to church” (Interview 3-2).    
Kakuma 
 In 1991, after four years of relative stability and large-scale conversion in the 
Ethiopian camps, the Ethiopian government was overthrown by Eritrean and Tigrean
24
 
rebels who were backed by the Sudanese government and hostile to the current, socialist, 
Mengistu regime, the SPLA, and refugees Mengistu had allowed on Ethiopian soil 
(Bixler 2005, 64, Wheeler 2005, 59).  With nowhere to flee, Sudanese refugees including 
the Lost Boys, fled back into Sudan en masse as they were attacked by Ethiopian rebels.  
In order to get back into Sudan, the Lost Boys and  hundreds of thousands of other 
refugees had to cross the Gilo river, which separates Ethiopia and Sudan and was swollen 
from heavy rains that year (Bixler 2005, 65).  Many young boys were sucked under by 
the current, attacked by crocodiles, shot by Ethiopian rebels and Sudanese government 
                                               
24 Tigray is a region of Ethiopia named after the ethnic group which inhabits this area, the Tigreans or 
“Tigrayans” who were severely marginalized under the Mengistu regime  (Van Arsdale 2006) 
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troops from their respective sides of the river, or bombed from the air by Sudanese planes 
(Wheeler 2005, 59).   
 The unaccompanied boys who survived wandered for months, building 
themselves huts and digging foxholes as they moved between small towns inside the 
Sudanese border (Bixler 2005, 67-68 and HRW/Africa 1994).  Not only were these 
encampments targeted by the Sudanese military, but in 1991, the rift between the Dinka 
and Nuer factions of the SPLA and the subsequent arming by the government of the 
Nuer-led SPLA-United faction, threatened a large camp of boys at Pochalla (Bixler 2005, 
67 and HRW/Africa 1994).  The majority of the unaccompanied minors at this camp 
headed to another camp near the city of Kapoeta, which was also soon captured by 
government forces (Bixler 2005, 68).  After the fall of Kapoeta, the Lost Boys began their 
journey to the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, a huge camp that held a total of 28,000 
Sudanese refugees—over a third of which were Lost Boys—and thousands of refugees 
displaced in other east African conflicts (Bixler 2005, 68).  According to Wheeler, the 
Lost Boys demonstrated a “remarkable care and support for each other” as they marched 
to Kenya: “reading and writing lessons continued even as they marched…the strong 
carried their few belongings, or even those who were sick” (2005, 60).  About 10,500
25
 
Lost Boys made it the Kakuma refugee camp located near the city of Lokichokio, Kenya 
(HRW/Africa 1994, 17) described by Bixler as a “collection of tents and mud huts 
perched on a broiling tabletop plain of northern Kenya” (2005, 13).  
                                               
25 HRW/Africa has stated that the number of unaccompanied boys was originally estimated at closer to 
12,000.  The UNHCR and World Vision have speculated that the SPLA-Mainstream may have kidnapped 
between 1,500 and 3,000 boys from Lokichokio in one night and sent them back to fight or receive military 
training inside the border of Sudan.   
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In the Kenyan camps, the boys were no longer under the care of the SPLA, but 
rather of the Kenya authorities and humanitarian organizations such as the UNHCR who 
administered the camp (Bixler 2005, 68).  They provided a stimulating environment, with 
more freedom, but also with more structure for the boys.  According to Bixler, boys 
“attended school from 7 a.m. to 2 p.m., attended church on Sundays, and moved into 
adolescence with a routine of class work and soccer and grinding grain for dinner” (2005, 
13).   
The Lost Boys‟ own accounts of their time in the refugee camps confirm the more 
structured nature of Kakuma described in the literature.  According to both Joseph and 
Lual, the Lost Boys had more freedom in the camps because the UN took care of more of 
their needs than the SPLA had done when they administered the camps in Ethiopia. Deng 
added that the UN even paid Kenyans and Ethiopians to be teachers in Kakuma.  Because 
of their lighter responsibilities in Kakuma, the Lost Boys were able to focus on school 
and also to become more involved with the church.  Deng said that everything revolved 
around school and church in Kakuma; guys would go to school all day and then study late 
into the night, while the church was the “center of activity in Kakuma, people would go 
there to sing and dance and to have fun.”  Joseph similarly stated that “what you do [in 
Kakuma] is to go to school, and coming back from school, go home, that‟s it.”  Although 
Joseph had been baptized in Ethiopia, it was the freedom of Kakuma that really allowed 
him the time to get heavily involved with the church.  Lual said that because the SPLA, 
with the help of some other Sudanese, were in charge of the Lost Boys in Ethiopia, they 
were “restricted from doing some other stuff,” but in Kenya “because UN was the one 
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responsible for everything, and everything was under their control, so they [we] were 
allowed to do more activities than we used to [do in Ethiopia].”  Deng also agreed that 
there was more time in Kakuma to do what you wanted to do.   
Kakuma was also a place where the nascent faith of the Lost Boys in Christianity 
began to solidify.  While most were baptized in Ethiopia, it was in Kenya where they 
began to attend church on a regular basis.  Both Lual and Peter discussed how broadly the 
churches were represented in Kakuma, with Peter saying that there were Presbyterian, 
Baptist, Catholic, Episcopal, and Pentecostal churches, among others represented in 
Kakuma.  In Panyido, the Ethiopian camp that he and many of the other Lost Boys were 
in, only Catholics and Episcopalians had been represented.   
Peter, in describing a Christmas celebration typical of Kakuma, painted a picture 
of the strong Christian presence in the camp, as well as the solidarity and sense of 
community that Christianity gave to the Lost Boys.  He also discussed how these types of 
celebrations may have caused those who not yet been baptized to want to join the church: 
Peter:  If you go to Kakuma refugee camp [on December 24th or 25th], you will know exactly 
Jesus will come very soon (laughs), you will really feel it, a lot of drums, nobody is sleeping, 
everybody is drumming. 
KS:  This is on Christmas? 
Peter: Yeah, during Christmas time.  A lot of things are being done: everybody is marching on 
the street...  Everybody is wearing the red: red shirt, red pants, red cross.  And, everybody is 
marching on the road, and you see people beating the drum and a lot of song is sung on the 
roadside.  And if you are not a Christian, those songs, those echoes, you know, those echoes that 
you hear from very far away?  
KS: Yes. 
Peter:  Maybe sound very good to your ear, and you feel like when you understand it, you may 
feel “oh that that thing sounds very good I understand it.  Why don‟t I join?‟  And then you may 
have a chance to read the bible by yourself and that may give you a clue to decide what to do.”   
KS: You probably feel pretty left out too if everyone else is having, doing all this for Christmas 
and you‟re just sitting there and you don‟t believe in God?   
Peter: Yeah, yeah.26 
 
                                               
26 Taken from Interview 4-2. 
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Although Kakuma was certainly more structured and stable than the Ethiopian 
refugee camps as these massive Christmas displays suggest, the Lost Boys‟ lives were 
still hard.  They built their own huts from leaves, mud and sometimes concrete if it was 
available (Bixler 2005, 13).   Most of the boys lived off of one cup of maize or sorghum a 
day (Bixler 2005, 13), which needed to be ground by hand.  Often, the boys would take 
turns grinding the grain, with the designated grinder and cook for the day staying home 
from school to complete the chores.  It should be noted that there is a strong taboo among 
the Dinka against men cooking, especially in the company of women.  The only time men 
have traditionally cooked is when they are alone in cattle camp and no women or girls are 
around to do it for them.  Several of the Lost Boys told me that if a girl happened to walk 
by as they were cooking in the refugee camps, they would hide, as even touching a 
cooking utensil in front of a girl was shame-inducing.  Out of necessity, the Lost Boys 
have continued to cook for themselves now that they have resettled in the U.S. and which 
young men are good cooks is the subject of many jokes among them.   
The Lost Boys spent years in Kenya and eventually began to settle into a routine 
of school, church, cooking, and soccer.  Many, however, were understandably anxious to 
be reunited with family and to move on with their lives.  Although the UNHCR usually 
tries to repatriate refugees back into their country of origin, or if that is impossible, into a 
nearby country, Sudan was still unstable in the late 1990s and the Kenyan government 
was unwilling to permit the Lost Boys to work within Kenya (Bixler 2005).  By this time, 
most of the Lost Boys had been in Kakuma for seven or eight years.  In 1999, officers 
from the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) arrived in Kakuma 
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to begin interviewing Lost Boys to be resettled in the U.S. (Bixler 2005).  By the end of 
2000, the Lost Boys who were selected had begun arriving in cities around the country 
(Bixler 2005).  Although the U.S. government had initially expected to let in more than 
the 3,800 Lost Boys who had arrived by September of 2001, September 11th put a 
temporary stop to all immigration, including the remaining Lost Boys still in Kakuma 
(Bixler 2005, 132).  When immigration picked back up again a few years later, Lost Boys 
still in Kenya were considered adults, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was close to 
being signed between northern and southern Sudan, and the U.S. had other refugee crises 
to deal with on top of the war in Iraq.  The Lost Boys were no longer a priority.  Those 
left in Kakuma were largely forgotten by the government, in essence “warehoused” as 
long-term refugees.  With the signing of the peace agreement in 2005, many also began 
to make their way back into Sudan to find family and to be integrated into a country in 
which they had not lived for almost twenty years.   
 In the next chapter, I will discuss what the lives of the Lost Boys would have been 
like had the civil war not ripped them from their homes, families, and cattle, highlighting 
the aspects of Dinka culture, namely group autonomy and pragmatism, which allowed 
them to adjust to the radically new circumstances they found themselves in.  I will also 
examine how the Christianity that the Lost Boys converted to in Ethiopia, which flowered 





Chapter 7—The Lost Boys and Identity 
 
  The conversion of the Lost Boys I interviewed can in many ways be viewed as 
representative of the experiences of the vast majority of Dinka Lost Boys from the Bor 
area. The reasons for the relative ease of their conversion gives insight into the 
motivation for the conversion of the Lost Boys group as a whole. Chief among these 
reasons was the separation of the Lost Boys from nearly everything that they had come to 
regard as normal in their lives, including their families, their villages and their cattle. At 
the same time, the long-held Dinka values of pragmatism and group autonomy, perhaps 
the only constants in the lives of the Lost Boys, allowed them to be open to a religion that 
was rejected by southerners in the past and to retain this religion as they moved from 
Ethiopia to Kenya to the U.S, eventually making it a cornerstone of their identity.   
To illuminate the radical separation of the Lost Boys from their former ways of 
life in this chapter, I will first discuss what the norm was for boys and young men in 
Dinka society, including the importance of age-sets, family relations, and cattle camps. In 
addition, I will illuminate the role that Christianity played in-flight and posit reasons that 
conversion was such an attractive prospect to the Lost Boys as they fled, particularly in 
relation to Dinka cultural norms, as a substitute for families and cattle, and as a way to 
fight the effects of extreme trauma. Finally, the group autonomy that the Lost Boys 
learned in their villages, before separation, will be explained and the role this value 
played in their conversion will be discussed. 
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Traditional Dinka Identity: Early Childhood 
 The early childhood of Dinka boys is marked in its closeness to the maternal side 
of the family, in sharp contrast to adolescence when the paternal side of the family and 
age-sets become the focus of much of their attention.  Dinka mothers, often with the help 
of a younger female relative are the primary caretakers of infants.
27
 After a baby has been 
weaned, it is sent to its maternal kin to spend the next several years until he or she 
reaches the age of six or so getting to know  his/her mother‟s family. During this time, 
much love and attention is lavished on the child by its maternal grandparents.  Despite the 
almost total absorption in the mother‟s side, the child is continually reminded of his 
loyalty to the father‟s side, learning to recite the names of all of his father‟s ancestors as 
soon as he learns to speak. At the age of six or so, the child is brought back to live with 
his father and other boys and men in the cattle camp. This shift is notable in the abrupt 
change it marks in a boy‟s life; whereas his early life is marked by close ties with the 
women and maternal relatives in his life, who generally shower him with displays of 
love, he is now expected to join the world of men, in which outward display of affection 
are not nearly as acceptable.
28
 This shift, one which the majority of Lost Boys would 
have gone through before being separated from their parents, is a testament to the 
adaptability that is instilled in Dinka boys from early childhood. It is also in these camps 
where boys are encouraged to develop their individual and collective identity as an age-
set.  
                                               
27 In Sudan, mothers bring their babies everywhere they go using a sort of sling that they can wear over 
their arm like a purse or can sling over their knee if seated in a chair.  





 In the cattle camps, Dinka boys and adolescents begin to learn the values that will 
allow them to protect their families and cattle and instill the traits that are valued in Dinka 
men: bravery, self-reliance, and the importance of the group. Deng says that at this time 
in their lives, boys “are made to value the sense of solidarity demanded and expected of 
them as the core of family unity, harmony, and continuity” (1972, 51). They are taught to 
fight honorably through staged fights with each other, feed themselves while away from 
their mother‟s cooking in the main village and to sleep lightly in order to fend off animal 
and human attacks on the cattle and people in the camps (Deng 1972).
29
  
Most importantly, childhood is when Dinka boys learn how to herd cattle, and 
through herding, learn the values of “collective work” both in that it is often done as a 
group, or at least with each group member taking turns caring for cattle, and as each 
member of the herd must be given equal care (Deng 1972). The importance of 
independence from one‟s parents and reliance on one‟s age-set is further instilled through 
cattle herding, as Jeppsson and Hjernl,
30
 point out, through long periods of herding cattle 
in grasslands far from the village (2005, 2). According to Jeppsson and Hjernal, the social 
organization and culture of the cattle camps provide young boys with: 
                                               
29 The fighting of which Deng speaks was something I noticed among young boys when I was in Sudan as 
it was more prevalent than anything I‟d seen among boys that age in the U.S. Punching, kicking, rock-
throwing were common and on several occasions when I told boys who I thought were on the verge of 
seriously hurting each other to stop, I was met with either complete disregard, and less commonly, a 
grudging stop to the fight. Looking back, I realize that the boys, who were normally taught to be very 
obedient to elders, especially foreign elders, were not trying to be disrespectful, but were simply not used to 
be told to stop this kind of behavior. Deng explains this behavior as “geared toward developing in a boy an 
independent and courageous personality” (1972: 64).  I also witnessed several boys killing small (and not 
so small) animals such as lizards. This didn‟t seem to be out of cruelty, but seemed almost akin to sport, 
and in hindsight, was probably good practice in a culture where big game such as antelope and ostrich are 
often hunted and killed by the men. 
30 Jeppsson and Hjernl conducted Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) research among the Lost Boys 
when they were in the Kakuma refugee camp. 
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Common strength and protection against threats and enemies, a social support which provides 
food, water, protection and warmth, and a source of courage, emotional security, closeness and 
friendship” (2005, 3).  
 
One youth, who was interviewed by another group of researchers working with Lost 
Boys in Kakuma to learn about coping mechanisms quoted one youth as saying:  
In Dinkaland, when they [boys] are 4 or 5 years, they go up to the cattle. Because young children 
go to the cattle camp and they feed with milk … you protect yourself as a human. At that time, 
you stay alone for certain months—like from January to May. So separated from your parents. 
And people manage it that way too (Luster, Qin, Bates et. al 2009, 208).  
 
Adolescence  
The boys often spend years learning in the cattle camps, before they begin 
preparation for initiation. When they are around 16-18 years old, age-sets
31
 acquire a 
“father,” usually an elder from a chiefly lineage who looks after the boys, gives the age-
set a name in concert with the village chiefs, and gives the age-set permission to be 
initiated when the time is right (Deng 1972). When permission is granted, the initiates 
generally receive a series of stacked cuts on their foreheads, which are often v-shaped 
and thought to symbolize the horns of cattle (Coote 1992, 291).   
After initiation, young men experience yet another change in their lives—they 
live together in special villages and are not allowed to touch cattle as they are considered 
somewhat “impure” (Deng 1972, 73). Deng calls this period in a young man‟s life the 
most “colorful” period in his life, when they are encouraged to gorge themselves on food, 
have few responsibilities, and compose numerous songs that explain the liminal period 
that they are in and the somewhat ambivalent attitudes their fathers hold toward them as 
                                               
31 It should be noted that girls are also organized into age-sets, but the literature tends to focus on the 
importance of male age-sets as they relate to cattle camp and provides few details on female age-sets.  
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they move from being obedient sons to men with a claim to their father‟s cattle (1972, 
72). 
Adulthood  
After their period of isolation ends, the teenagers emerge, considered for the most 
part to be adults. Deng says that the end of the initiation period marks the beginning of 
adulthood and the assumption of a young man‟s role as a “gentleman and a member of a 
corporate group with a defined vital role to play in society” (1972, 73). As a “gentleman,” 
a young man is imbued with dheeng, or “dignity” as Deng translates it (1971). To fully 
become an adult however, a young man must be married (Deng 1972, 93).
32
  
In the past, the rules and activities permitted during courtship were somewhat 
more liberal than they are today. Teenagers were allowed to spend time alone together, 
and in some cases, were allowed to have sexual relationships as long they didn‟t result in 
pregnancy (Deng, 1972). Widespread Christian conversion in the South has drastically 
changed attitudes toward premarital sex to the point that is completely unacceptable for 
women, and definitely frowned upon for men (although it is my opinion that it is tacitly 
allowed for men if it is done in a discreet manner) to have sex outside of marriage.  
According to Deng, the first step toward marriage is “seeing” a girl, or when a man has 
decided to marry and expresses this desire to his family (1972, 94). The family must 
                                               
32 I found out firsthand about this rule when I was in southern Sudan. At 27 years old at the time, I 
considered myself squarely in the adult category, but found myself asked several times by young girls and 
young men whether I was a “girl.”  At first, I was a little bit offended, thinking that maybe despite my long 
hair and the long skirts I had been instructed to wear while in Sudan I was being mistaken for a man. I 
would counter this by asking what they meant and would then be asked if I was married. I usually 
responded “no” and would then launch into an explanation about how I was not yet married, but would 
soon be as I was engaged at the time. One of the young girls who asked me this studied me for a bit and 




agree to the union and then proceeds to determine if there is any possible familial 
relationship between the bride and groom or other circumstances that might bar marriage 
(Deng 1972, 95). Once it has been determined that no relationship is present between the 
bride and groom,
33
 negotiations for the brideprice can begin. This can be a lengthy 
process, imbued with much ceremony and pomp (Deng 1972). Deng puts the average 
brideprice at around 50 cows, but says that this number can grow to over 100 for a girl 
from a prominent family (1998).  
Once a brideprice has been agreed upon by both sides, the girl, accompanied by 
her age-mates, is finally “given away,” to the family of her husband (Deng 1971, 167). 
The age-mates of both bride and groom stay for several days of revelry and the bride and 
groom spend their first night together and consummate the marriage (Deng 1971).  
Francis Deng identifies three overriding goals in the lives of the Dinka: 
procreation, unity and harmony, and human dignity.  As no birth control is used 
traditionally among the Dinka, and children are considered integral to carrying on one‟s 
name, in effect being the only way for a person to have life after death (although cattle 
can, in some ways, do the same), couples attempt to become pregnant as soon as possible 
after marriage (Deng, 1972, Lienhardt, 1961).
34
 The importance in bearing children is 
further illustrated by the presence of levirate and ghost marriage in Dinka culture, 
customs in which a dead man‟s relatives bear children with his widow in order to carry 
                                               
33 It is not at all uncommon for kin relationships to be uncovered that bar marriage. In the Lost Boy 
community in Denver, it often came up in conversation that one of the Lost Boys was interested in 
marrying a particular girl in Sudan, only to have his hopes quickly dashed by finding that they shared some 
distant relative.  
34 It should be noted, however, that the Dinka do not entirely rule out the presence of the deceased in the 
lives of those on earth; according to Deng, the dead still communicate with the living through dreams and 
divinations (Deng:1972).  
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on his legacy and ensure that he has an avenue to life after death through these children 
(Deng 1972, 9).  
Identity in Flight 
 When the Lost Boys were separated from their families in the mid- to late 
eighties, few were old enough to have become initiated. By and large, they were a group 
of children who had known both the warmth and comfort of their early childhood, as well 
as the collective independence and autonomy they had learned in the cattle camps. While 
the warmth and comfort they had come to know nearly vanished, the value of the 
egalitarian groups that the Lost Boys grew up in remained—both in-flight and in the 
refugee camp—and stayed constant. In many ways, these groups were a contributing 
factor to their conversion and remained a strong part of their identity.  
 Evidence of the experience the Lost Boys had as members of an age-set in cattle 
camp, and value of these egalitarian groups can be seen in a report from a study of post-
traumatic stress among a group of Lost Boys in Kakuma. In the report, 79 percent of the 
Lost Boys said they had spent time away from their parents in cattle camps before they 
were separated (Jeppsson and Hjernl 2005, 8). As the attacks on southern villages 
intensified in 1986 and 1987, the groups of boys who were separated from their parents 
were able to put to use the skills they had gleaned in the cattle camps, whose distance 
from the main villages was quite likely the reason they were able to escape. As their 
villages were attacked, young men and boys who lay hidden in the underbrush and trees 
crept out and banded together, not for any cultural reasons, but rather for survival; in 
many cases, young boys were the only people who were not in the village and therefore 
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saw signs of the attacks from the distance, often smoke, gunshots, or the pounding of 
horse or camel hooves on the earth. As mentioned before, other boys were sent by their 
parents, sometimes at the behest of the SPLA, with the belief that they would be 
educated, or even that they would join the army, in either case, sent away in desperation 
as their parents waited for the next attacks. As lines of young men and boys snaked 
eastward toward Ethiopia, however, the group identity they had formed in the cattle 
camps was employed not only for survival, but as a way to create a life that had meaning. 
 As they walked, the Lost Boys cared for each other, sharing what little food they 
could find or had brought with them and caring for those who fell sick and were injured 
(Bixler 2005, Deng, Deng, Ajak & Berstein 2005). In particular, boys looked out for their 
younger brothers and boys from their own villages. There was one exception to this rule, 
however: when a boy became too ill to move, or seemed to have given up (as often 
happened), all but his closest friends would stop associating with him. On a practical 
level, this helped boys from passing illnesses to each other, and on a psychological level, 
it helped the stronger boys disassociate themselves from those who would likely die, 
lessening the emotional blow that his death would bring. 
 Upon their arrival in Ethiopia, the Lost Boys found nothing. In his account of the 
life of one of the Lost Boys that weaves both fact and fiction, author Dave Eggers 
describes the differences between what Achak, the book‟s main character, thinks Ethiopia 
will look like and the stunning nothingness that it actually is:  
…in Ethiopia, we were told, we would be safe and there would be food, dry beds, school. I 
admit that in that way, I allowed my imagination to flower. As we drew closer to the border, my 
expectations had come to include homes for each of us, new families, tall buildings, glass, 
waterfalls, bowls of bright oranges set upon clean tables. 
But when we reached Ethiopia, it was not that place.  
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-We are here, Dut said. 
-This is not that place, I said. 
-This is Ethiopia, Kur said. 
It looked the same. There were no buildings, no glass. There were no bowls of oranges set upon 
clean tables. There was nothing. There was a river and little else (Eggers, 2006, 233). 
 
 Eggers fictionalized account is strongly support by reports from Human Rights 
Watch Africa, which say that when one international NGO visited the Ethiopian camp 
Panyido (or Fugnido as it is sometimes written) in 1987, they saw only “naked bodies, 
very thin, of boys, as far as the eye could see. They did not even have tukls [huts] to live 
in” (Human Rights Watch Africa 1994, 14). The boys were divided into smaller groups 
designed to keep those who had fled together and were from the same area together and 
then into larger groups of 200-300 boys (Jeppsson and Hjernl 2005,4).  In  a testament of 
what the boys were able to achieve as a group, they eventually built their own living 
quarters and schools; teachers were either drawn from their group or assigned by relief 
agencies (Human Rights Watch Africa 1994, 14, Jeppsson and Hjernl 2005, 4).  
The bonds of the groups the Lost Boys were assigned to were further solidified 
through the strict daily routines that they had and by the fact that the boys were kept 
separated from the other refugees in the Ethiopian camps.  These groups, for the most 
part, kept intact the groups the boys had fled in and/or the groups they had settled into on 
their long journey to Ethiopia (Jeppsson and Hjernl, 2005, 4), meaning that they were 
usually made up of boys from the same tribe, region, and often, age-set. In Ethiopia, boys 
were responsible for the “whole range of household chores normally split up among 
family members according to age and sex” (Bixler 2005, 65). On several occasions, the 
Denver Lost Boys related to me how they were assigned the typically “feminine” chores 
of fetching water and cooking. Cooking, in particular, is considered shameful for men to 
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engage in in Dinka culture, and as a result, the Lost Boy put in charge of cooking would 
often hide, particularly in Kakuma where the chance of a woman catching a man cooking 
(considered an extreme embarrassment) were much higher than anywhere else.  
Despite the fact that up to one-fifth of the boys in Ethiopian camps had families in 
the camps, they were kept apart in their own groups, made up largely of boys their own 
age (HRW/Africa 1994, 14). Human Rights Watch says that this practice was allowable 
because the SPLA, not the UN, was administering the camps and because of Dinka 
cultural practices that often kept young boys separated from their parents (1994, 14). In 
particular, Human Rights Watch cites the cattle camps that have been previously 
discussed, and the practice of Dinka parents of sending their children to missionary-run 
boarding schools to be educated away from their families as reasons why the boys were 
kept separate (1994, 14). As discussed previously, Human Rights Watch had reason to 
believe the boys were also kept separate for the purposes of military training (Human 
Rights Watch 1994, Bixler 2005). While international aid workers were in the camps 
during the day, according to several sources, the SPLA took over after dark and the boys 
were made to participate in military training (Bixler 2005, HRW/Africa 1994). The SPLA 
was able to accomplish this by requiring all aid workers to leave by the late afternoon, 
using “security concerns” as an excuse to get Westerners out of the camps (Bixler 2005, 
62). Between their chores and military training, it should come as no surprise that the 
Lost Boys received very little formal education in the Ethiopian camps; according to 
HRW/Africa, a 1989 survey of the Ethiopian camps found that 90 percent of the boys 
were either illiterate or in grade one (1994, 14).  
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The Lost Boys I interviewed confirmed the highly structured life they had and 
reliance on the age-set grouping in Ethiopia. Joseph said that the boys were divided into 
about 15 groups (out of a total population of about 7,000 boys in Panyido camp). Despite 
the rigor of everyday activities, however, it was not like a military barrack or normal 
refugee camps and although a “military major” might sometimes come to protect them, 
they would “apply their own rules” for the most part. Lual also talked about Panyido, 
saying that initially boys were divided into 12 groups and as more boys trickled in over 
the years, that number grew to 16 or so (Interview 3-2).  
Although the boys were introduced to a warmer, more enriching environment 
once they got to the UN-run Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, they did not abandon the 
groups they had formed or the reliance they had on each other. Again the boys had to 
build their own homes and cook their own food, but were at least afforded the stability of 
being in a relatively safe, stable country.  Of Kakuma, Bixler says “…here, finally,  was a 
place without constant threat of attack, sanctuary from a war that ground up life like a 
tornado skipping from place to place”(200, 69). In Kakuma, the Lost Boys also 
experienced consistency in their schooling and had a variety of extracurricular activities 
to choose from including basketball, soccer, and drama groups (Bixler 2005). The Lost 
Boys were offered the opportunity to be fostered by families in the camps, but the 
majority chose to remain in their groups, with only 2,500 of the 10,500 or so Lost Boys 
joining foster families (HRW/Africa 1994, 20).   
The research conducted by Jeppsson and Hjernl with the Lost Boys in Kakuma 
confirms how much they relied on each other for care and support in the camps: 35 
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percent of the boys interviewed cited a friend as the person they would go to if they were 
sad, while only 24 percent said they would go to a caretaker and 20 percent a relative 
(Jeppsson and Hjernl 2005, 10). 
Christian Identity 
As discussed in Chapter 2, refugees often begin to question the “utility of beliefs, 
values, technology, statuses, exchange systems, and all other aspects of society” (Harrell-
Bond and Voutira 1992, 9) as they are in flight. According to Appadurai, they also 
constantly renegotiate their identity, even as they retain ties to their homeland (1992).  
For the Lost Boys, much of this questioning and renegotiation surrounded the traditional 
Dinka religion, something that as described in the last chapter, they knew relatively little 
about and had largely been barred from participating in as children. As they renegotiated 
their identity, however, they managed to retain much of the Dinka culture, and in many 
ways, the pragmatic, egalitarian values of Dinka culture allowed them to more readily 
accept new beliefs that they found most useful.  
None of the Lost Boys I interviewed expressed what extreme despair they must 
have found themselves in as the realization that they would not be returning home 
anytime soon sunk in. None told me if they had seen family members killed. None told 
me what it felt to be cut off from nearly everything (with the exception of their age-sets) 
they had ever known. In part, this was because, as I described before, this is a topic that 
has been well-documented and which I have heard the Lost Boys talk about at fundraisers 
and other events where they are called on to tell their stories. Furthermore, I did not have 
IRB approval to ask about this. While I have been present when others have asked the 
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Lost Boys what I felt to be callous and invasive questions about their journey, to which 
the Lost Boys dutifully gave answers, they do not generally volunteer this information. 
Whether this is due to the much-noted Dinka stoicism or simply because they have told 
their stories so many times before, I am not sure, but whatever their reasons, I felt it was 
important to allow them to talk about their separation only when and if they were 
comfortable. 
Although it remained unspoken, what was abundantly clear was that the separated 
from their homes and families, the Lost Boys were in likely the most liminal position 
they had ever been in. It is not hard to try, as Appadurai suggests, to “imagine the 
imagination” of the Lost Boys as they began to construct a new identity for themselves, 
one that was now devoid of parents, home village and the cattle that in Dinka culture 
represent such a big part of a young man‟s identity. In a 1998 report by U.S. advocacy 
group, Refugees International, arguing for the resettlement of the Lost Boys, it was 
reported that the Lost Boys did not fit into the normal roles that Dinka and Nuer young 
men held (Bixler, 2005). According to Bixler, who cited the report in his book, the Lost 
Boys‟ “separation from relatives meant they grew up with limited education on cattle 
herding, the traditional skill that defines men as competent and whole in southern Sudan” 
(2005, 85). Furthermore, they lacked cattle for dowries, and they hadn‟t been marked 
with the scars that identify men as being initiated, and therefore fully adult and male 
(Bixler 2005). Joseph talked with me about this in an interview about this, stressing the 
differences between a “normal” Dinka man who was reserved, stayed with his cattle and 
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other men, and didn‟t concern himself with women and children. In order to be a 
Christian, he had to give this stoic attitude up, saying that to act like a Christian:  
I had to give up a lot of things, culture things. A lot of things like, see, there is a great difference 
between Christians and a „normal‟ Dinka man. Because a normal Dinka man, I [he would] have 
to do what the culture want me [him] to do. I [would] have to be aggressive…exactly, you know 
yourself you are in position exactly, you are as a man! You stay as a man, every day…you don‟t 
want to mess up with kids, you don‟t want to mess up with the women, you don‟t talk to 
women…You follow with a man‟s side [hang out with men]. (Interview 1-3) 
 
At the same time that they lacked the skills and rites of passage that would make 
them “Dinka men,” in some ways, the Lost Boys‟ worldviews had become suddenly and 
unexpectedly broader than what they than those of their families and friends who 
remained in the insular villages of southern Sudan. In Ethiopia, and particularly in Kenya, 
they were exposed to not only other tribes from southern Sudan that they rarely would 
have had contact with, but also refugees and aid workers from other African, European, 
and Asian countries. In order to construct a new identity that worked in the circumstances 
the Lost Boys found themselves in, at the same time diminished as they were broadened, 
the Lost Boys implemented the long held Dinka values of group autonomy, discussed 
above, and the pragmatism that has been a hallmark for Dinka men.  
The pragmatism of the Dinka and other Nilotic tribes is well-documented by 
Nikkel, Deng, Lienhardt, and others who have worked with the Dinka. Although resistant 
to change, the Dinka have been known to adopt foreign practices that “work.” This 
utilitarian pragmatism was a theme that ran throughout my interviews with the Lost Boys. 
When asked about the traditional Dinka religion, which nearly all of their parents and 
villages actively practiced, the Lost Boys told me two things: 1) that they knew little of 
this religion, and as children were not involved to any meaningful degree in the 
traditional religion, and:  2) these old ways “were no longer working” for them due to 
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radically different situation they found themselves in.  The conversion experiences of the 
Lost Boys, briefly reiterated below, are a testament to these two points.  
As discussed in the last chapter, Joseph had a distinctly group-centered 
experience, with one of the older Lost Boys calling him and other young boys to listen to 
bible stories and sing together at night. What ultimately convinced him to convert, 
however, was his own pragmatic decision that the people in the Christian group seemed 
happy and that he himself had no one to protect him. Upon realizing this, he said to 
himself, “I better join this group.” Although Joseph was the most emotional of all the 
Lost Boys I interviewed when describing his conversion, his reasons were ultimately 
practical: those in the church group were happy, he was not, they were protected as 
members of a group, he was lonely, they had each other. It only made sense to convert. 
Deng, who said he initially didn‟t want to be baptized, also eventually gave in to 
the rational truth that those who went to the church were taught to read and write Dinka. 
From what was originally a pragmatic understanding that the church could provide him 
with skills that he desired, his imagination broadened and he began to learn church 
doctrine and about the “New Light.”  
For Lual, the decision to convert was based on the wisdom of the group. Seeing 
that so many other Lost Boys were going to church and were telling him how good it was 
convinced him that it was worth trying. Much like the egalitarian way that the Dinka 
make decisions—often through individuals making speeches to persuade the group to one 
position or another—Lual listened to the evidence that the group provided him and made 
a decision that their collective wisdom was sound.  
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Depending on the wisdom of the group both for basic matters of survival such as 
for preparing food and protection, as well as in conversion, was not just based in 
pragmatism, it was something that the Lost Boys had had instilled in them since 
childhood. Although the reliance they have on each other has become even more honed 
as they have endured isolation and separation as a group that is extreme even for the 
Dinka, the age-set system, particularly for Dinka boys, is something that had been 
reinforced to them through their separation from their parents as children and the games 
and trials of their youth spent in cattle camps.  
The Lost Boys‟ relative lack of knowledge about the traditional Dinka religion 
also lent itself to this pragmatism. As few among them knew much about the traditional 
religion and had been taught that it was not for kids, they could not easily access this 
religion; as Peter said, they were “green” in the ways of traditional religion. Practicing 
the Dinka religion in flight was further complicated by its reliance on cattle sacrifice, 
something children were not allowed to participate in, and was made impossible by the 
fact that the Lost Boys no longer had any cattle. Christianity, however, was actively 
marketed to the boys by elders and older boys among them, and there were plenty of 
people in the camps who could teach them how to worship. Furthermore, Christianity 
didn‟t require cattle or other sacrifice.  
One step in the process of conversion, the taking of Christian names, was based 
on practicality, but also called for a more radical shift in worldview. Although to an 
outsider, changing one‟s name may seem like a drastic step, most Lost Boys changed 
their names, describing it to me with a decidedly practical bent. Joseph said of this 
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process: “the concept was at least to identify the Christian among those who are not 
Christian. I think that‟s why Christian leaders came up with these ideas of giving a 
[Christian] name to people, which mean now, we are Sudanese and we have the name of 
a white people.” However, Joseph (who continues, at least at work and among American 
friends, to go by his Christian name” said that he now thinks it is a “wrong concept be 
given a name other rather than the one you have before” (Interview 1-1).  Lual, who no 
longer uses his Christian name, said that “they just give you a list of names, and then you 
have to pick.” When I asked him if it was hard to give up the name his parents gave him 
he said no, it was not hard, but when he got older he said somewhat wistfully, “oh, I just 
want to keep my own name.”  
While taking a Christian name was an important step for Lost Boys just beginning 
to add Christianity to their identity, it is not an aspect that has necessarily stuck. Of those 
the Lost Boy community in Denver, about one-third use their Christian name (always in 
conjunction with their given Dinka last name, as there are too many Johns, Isaacs and 
Daniels to differentiate without some other kind of identifier attached), another third use 
their Dinka names exclusively and another third seem to easily switch between their 
given name and Christian, using their Christian name often with American friends and 
co-workers and their given name with other Lost Boys. Despite the fact that some Lost 
Boys have now changed their names back, the fact that so many were willing to give up 
the names their parents had given them and take on a new, foreign name demonstrates 
just how important Christianity was to the identity of the Lost Boys.   
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Beyond names, the method the Lost Boys use, both in the U.S. and Sudan, to get 
people to convince the unconverted or lapsed members of the church to come to church 
demonstrates the emphasis they place on Christian identity, and highlights the value they 
place on group autonomy. This method, which employs what Joseph called an 
“information committee,” or Lek, as it‟s called in the Sudanese Episcopal Church, meets 
to select the parts of the bible they will preach and where they will go to spread the word. 
They then inform the people whom they are going to visit that they will be coming and 
that they should not prepare food as is the usual Dinka custom when receiving visitors. 
When they get to the house of those they are trying to evangelize, they will sing some 
songs and tell them what the bible says. When they take their leave, they tell those they 
have visited “we will leave you, it is your choice” if you want to convert. If the person 
who was visited happens to be related to someone or friends with someone on the 
committee, they might come to that person and ask for clarification about something in 
the bible (Interview 1-2). Joseph said he had personally approached other Lost Boys and 
had talked to them about the bible. These committees, as least by Joseph‟s account, were 
highly persuasive: After a visit from the Lek, he said, people would convert or begin to 
attend church again (Interview 1-2).  
Another practical function of Christianity was that it brought together boys from 
all tribes, serving to help them become part of the broader group of Lost Boys, which 
included the Nuer, Shilluk, Bari, DiDinga and other tribes. Like the young Dinka 
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converts that Mark Nikkel
35
 discusses in an article about the symbolism of Dinka crosses 
among new converts, Christianity for the Lost Boys has created a surrogate “age-set” that 
was not bound by the usual parameters of tribe and age, but included the entire Lost Boy 
group (1997, 92). This age-set allowed boys from disparate areas and tribes, tribes that in 
southern Sudan may or may not have been warring at that particular moment, to have 
common ground. To use Appadurai‟s language, Christianity in this way helped them to 
broaden their ethnoscapes. Joseph said of the Lost Boys that even though the Lost Boys 
as a group have: 
a difference of some years here, some have 30 years, some have less than 30 years, but we 
consider ourselves as we are an age-set group. But from then, we‟ve been living as brothers 
together, and we‟re kind of forgetting about age-set, you know like „you are older or you are 
younger‟…We try to bring everyone together under the same label. So we [the Lost Boys] are 
considered as an age-set. (Interview-1-4).  
 
The line that the Lost Boys walked between retaining traditional values, like the age-
set and the way they tried to break from old traditions was reflected in the response 
Joseph gave when I asked how this identity as a single age-set came into play in the 
refugee camps, especially as younger boys were traditionally expected to show deference 
to older men and boys, he said: 
When we left Sudan and came to Ethiopia, we encountered a lot of change, but we tried to 
differentiate our society from previous ones. What I mean is, we are not going back the old 
generation that used to be. If there were old generation criteria, we would use those, but since we 
move to going to school, that changed our label of who we are—I could be the youngest in the 
class and still get number one in the class! This will demolish the boundaries [between age-sets]. 
When we have this attitude, it changes the behavior of „you are older than me, I am older than 
you‟ (Interview 1-4).  
 
                                               
35  In Nikkel‟s article “The Cross as a Symbol of Regeneration in Jieng Bor Society,” he discusses the age-
set concept in terms of southern Sudanese converts, and is not specifically referring to the Lost Boys. I 
have used his idea of the surrogate age-set and extended it to the Lost Boy group. 
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Beyond identity, Christianity also gave Lost Boys a practical way to understand 
the meaning of the dire circumstances they found themselves in. According to Jeppsson 
and Hjernl, 30 percent of the Lost Boys they interviewed explained the war using a 
religious framework “where the war was interpreted as an act of God, either as a 
punishment or with a divine meaning beyond the realm of humans” (2005, 10). 
Furthermore, over 90 percent of boys believed that God could help them (Jeppsson and 
Hjernl 2005). Another team of researchers who interviewed Lost Boys resettled in the 
U.S. also found that religion helped the Lost Boys find meaning in their struggles. One 
Lost Boy told them, “I cannot say that I was the one taking care of myself. There was 
Someone taking care of me. And if there was no God, I would not be here today” (Luster 
and Qin et al. 2009, 207).  
Particular passages of the bible resonated with the Lost Boys and seemed to them 
to foretell the struggles they had been through. Luster and Qin et al. say that passages 
from Moses that discuss the years-long wanderings of the Israelites in the desert were 
often preached to the Lost Boys in the refugee camps to teach them the virtues of waiting 
and give them hope for being reunited with their parents and homes (2009). In my own 
interviews with the Lost Boys, I asked them what bible passages they found meaningful. 
Much like Luster and Qin‟s study, Lual said that he found the passages in the bible that 
talked about things happening in the past, particularly with the Israelites and the disciples 
helped him believe in God and convert (Interview 3-2). Lual also said that passages of 
Isaiah helped give meaning to the war: 
In the part of the bible, I think it is Isaiah something, talk about Sudan and how the war in Sudan 
will be happening. So it looks like when we read it, a lot of these things have happened, through 
the war and the way that we have been walking around the country, it gives us the sense that 
154 
 
whatever is written in the bible will happen sometime because it seemed to happen to us 
(Interview 3-2).   
 
When asked if he thought the passage talked specifically about the Lost Boys, however, 
Lual said “I think they are not talking about the Lost Boys, but the whole of Sudan” But, 
he said, if it was about the Lost Boys, he would just “take it” 
36
 (Interview 3-2). Asked 
what he thought the Isaiah passage says about the future of Sudan, he said 
…it was in the bible, I think Isaiah says, there will be war in Sudan, there were be a lot going on, 
people will be scared, they will be countries to countries, move from countries to countries. So 
the war would be happening. So what will be the conclusion of it [the war]? That‟s what I don‟t 
know. But some of the things mentioned in the bible happened before now (Interview 3-2).  
 
Joseph also talked about how Isaiah referred to the plight of Sudan, but not to the Lost 
Boys specifically. He said: 
They don‟t call Sudan in the bible, but they call Sudan „Kush.‟ That Sudan will enter in war 
sometime, and maybe after that war they will become independent and they will be capable 
people and they will believe God and God will really help them and nations will be afraid of 
Sudan sometime (Interview 1-2). 
  
Joseph also said that someday he really hoped that “God would come through for Sudan.” 
He also liked the John 3:16 passage, which says “for God so loved the world that he gave 
his only begotten son.” About it, he said: 
I love that quotation for sure. Jesus came and died for all of us, those who say that they will be a 
Christian, and even those who are not believing in God. There is time for everything as bible 
said…you are not believer today, but maybe tomorrow you will be a believer. 
 
Deng cited an Ecclesiastes passage as a source of guidance because it was filled with 
advice for young people such as “enjoy your youth, but one day God is gonna judge 
you.” He also mentioned the same passage that Joseph did from the book of John, which 
                                               
36 The Lost Boys often use the word “take” when talking about religion and other experiences in a 
pragmatic way. For example, a Lost Boy might say about a college course he dislikes “I will take the parts I 
like and leave the rest,” meaning he will get out of it what he can.  
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talks about there being a time for everything, a passage that seemed to resonate with the 
Lost Boys and provide the advice and guidance they were seeking.  
It was not just to the bible that the Lost Boys looked for guidance; they also found 
surrogate parents among older boys and men in their group, much like the age-set fathers 
they would have had in their villages and especially among the priests and members of 
the church. As Nikkel says, “amidst this tumult church people tried to offer solace, 
nurture, and education, a supplement to the military discipline provided by the SPLA” 
(2001, 239). Asked about if the Sudanese priests in the camps acted as parents, Lual 
referenced Mayol Ajok, a Dinka priest who baptized several of the Denver Lost Boys and 
scores of other Lost Boys saying “yeah, they can take care of us, sure, they did. 
Especially those, that guy called Mayol [Ajok] was really taking care of the people” 
(Interview 3-1). The strong role that the church people played in the lives of the Lost 
Boys also allowed them to expand their imagined futures—seven percent of the Lost 
Boys interviewed by Jeppsson and Hjernl mentioned becoming a priest as their goal for 
the future (2005, 11), a telling assertion given that before their separation, cattle-keeping 
was the only acceptable occupation for a traditional Dinka man.  
In addition to expanding their imagined futures, and providing practical 
explanations of the war, Christianity also provided the Lost Boys with a way to cope with 
the reality of post-traumatic stress that nearly all were dealing with and a way to counter 
the “Lost Boy” identity with which they had been labeled. Jeppsson and Hjernl cited 
“religious practices” as the most common response Lost Boys gave for how they coped 
with troubling memories of the attacks on their villages and their flight to the refugee 
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camps: 34 percent of the boys interviewed mentioned practices such as going to talk to a 
priest, praying or reading the bible as things that helped them cope (2005, 9). This 
number is in sharp contrast to the seven percent who stated that going to school served 
the same function (Jeppsson and Hjernl 2005). When I asked Joseph if he had proof that 
God was working for him, he said: 
Yes, in terms of confusion, in terms of bad dream, in terms of nightmare, I had those when I was 
traveling on the way walking down to Ethiopia. I can even start at night and cry for no apparent 
reason and try to run away and I don‟t even know where I‟m running. I think it was maybe 
something that was related with that I was scared when terrible things would happen. But when I 
came to Christianity and believed in God, and every time when I go to bed at night I prayed, sing 
a little song, I went to bed. If I do that, I will sleep nice at night and I wouldn‟t wake up and I 
wouldn‟t have bad dreams and I wouldn‟t have all this kind [of things] and so I became 
acquainted to it until I got used to it. Every night if I don‟t pray and go to bed, I wake up 
tomorrow with a bad dream, very bad dream, very bad dream (Interview 1-3). 
 
In the many years that the Lost Boys spent on the run and in refugee camps, they 
retained their identity as a group and as a group, converted to a religion that although 
radically different than what they had known, filled the void in their lives left by the 
absence of their parents, a lack of knowledge about the traditional Dinka religion, and 
cattle. Christianity became for them a way to cope with the extreme trauma and stress 
they had been subjected to, provided them with surrogate parents through the teachings of 
the bible and clergy members, and gave them an avenue to explain and identify with the 
new people and circumstances they found themselves in. Like countless groups of 
refugees before them, the Lost Boys, faced with radically changed circumstances, began 
to question what “normal” was and through adopting a Christian identity, broadened their 
ethnoscapes (Appadurai 1992). Pragmatism and the value placed on decisions made by 
the group combined with these unique circumstances to facilitate conversion. Without 
their pragmatic, utilitarian nature that allowed them to adopt a foreign practice that 
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“worked,” the Lost Boys may have been bent on learning the traditional religion or 
rejected Christianity as the majority of their ancestors had done for hundreds of years 
before. Without the value placed on group autonomy, the Lost Boys would have been on 
their own, with little guidance as to what might “work” to fill the void left by their 
separation.  
 To understand the role that Christianity has continued to play in the lives of the 
Lost Boys and how they continue to incorporate the values of pragmatism and group 
autonomy, the Lost Boys‟ lives in Denver, based on participant observation that I 





Chapter 8—Lost Boys in Denver 
 
The role that Christianity played in the lives of the Lost Boys in the refugee 
camps has changed in the U.S., but it is still a defining factor in their lives and their 
identities as Americans, along with work and school. To learn more about the role it 
plays, I attended Dinka-language services as a guest at St. P.J.‟s with the Lost Boys on a 
handful of occasions, and attended numerous Sudanese events held at St. P.J.‟s and other 
Episcopal churches throughout the metro including birthday parties, graduation 
celebrations and SPLM rallies. 
Despite how dispersed they are throughout Denver and its suburbs, the church 
offers a central gathering spot for the Lost Boys. The small amount of literature that I 
found concerning the Dinka language church services that many Lost Boys in Denver 
attend left me ill-prepared for my first experience at one of these services.  Feeling 
apprehensive and unsure of the etiquette required of an anthropology student attending a 
service conducted entirely in Dinka and generally to an all-Sudanese congregation, I 
initially put off this part of my fieldwork. Although I had asked one of the Lost Boys 
several times about attending one of the Dinka-language services that a large group of 
Lost Boys regularly attended at St. John‟s Episcopal Cathedral in downtown Denver, his 
response was somewhat evasive and noncommittal.  Although he welcomed me to come 
to a mass, he mentioned that he had been attending church elsewhere, but did not 
elaborate.  I started to get the feeling that maybe I wasn‟t welcome, but persisted in 
asking anyway. Several months later, after asking—more directly this time—if it would 
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be okay if I attended church at St. John‟s that very Sunday, I received a more direct 
response: The vast majority of the Lost Boys were not attending St. John‟s anymore, nor 
had they been for several months.  When I asked why, I was told that there had been 
some kind of dispute between the Sudanese priests and the Lost Boys and that through 
volunteers at Project Education Sudan (PES), the Lost Boys had secured their own space 
at another Episcopal church called St. Phillip and St. James Episcopal Church,
37
  where 
they were free to conduct their own services.  Although my informant would not 
elaborate on the problem that had arisen, I had been told a while back by a volunteer at 
PES, (which itself was initially was administrated through St. John‟s), that PES had 
decided to seek nonprofit status and separate its organization (although the majority of 
American volunteers continue to attend English-language services at St. John‟s) from the 
church after the older Sudanese priests became “jealous” of the attention and resources 
that PES was providing to the Lost Boys.  I was told by this particular Lost Boy that he 
could discuss this issue with me after it was “settled” but he preferred not to talk about it 
right now.  Another one of the Lost Boys, Peter, did share that there had been problems 
between the Lost Boys and the older Sudanese in charge at St. John‟s, but because of the 
sensitivity of the topic, preferred that I did not write about it. Because of the obvious 
discord between the Lost Boy group and St. John‟s, I decided not to attend a service
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there, not only because I thought this would jeopardize the trust that I had built with the 
Lost Boys, but also because all of the young men I interviewed had already begun 
attending St. P.J.‟s. In hindsight, I am glad that I made this decision as the services at St. 
                                               





P.J.‟s, run independently by the Lost Boys, and not the Sudanese elders, were yet another 
reflection of the autonomy of the Lost Boy group, who fit the hierarchal nature of the 
church to their own needs and character.   
After reading Boulder anthropologist Laura DeLuca‟s short account of her trips to 
the laid back Dinka-Arabic language masses at St. John‟s, I prepared myself for a similar 
experience at St. P.J.‟s where the Lost Boys were now conducting their own mass.  
Although St. P.J.‟s is a less imposing physical structure than St. John‟s massive 
cathedral-like structure off of Colfax Avenue, there was a decidedly more formal air at 
St. P.J.‟s than DeLuca had encountered at St. John‟s. St. P.J.‟s is set a top a small hill in 
western Denver, close to Lakewood. A modest building, it is flanked by a parking lot and 
a shaded yard where the Lost Boys usually gather after services. To paint a clearer picture 
of a St. P.J.‟s service, I will briefly recount my experience at one of these services below.  
A Sunday at St. P.J.’s 
Although I knew ahead of time that it was largely Lost Boys who attended the St. 
P.J.‟s  service,
39
 I was nevertheless caught off guard when I entered the church to find 
eight or so young men seated on one side of the church and two young men seated at the 
altar facing one another.  I was given curious but not unfriendly looks by the men whom I 
did not know and was quickly called to a seat next to Joseph, whom I had been invited 
by.  The service started almost immediately with a hymn sung in Dinka and then readings 
from the bible.  I was prepared for one of the men on stage to ask for someone to translate 
for me (as happened to DeLuca), but no one did, although my friend whispered English 
                                               
39 Although I attended St. P.J.‟s a number of times, this recounting relies on a trip I made in the summer of 
2006 that I feel is particularly indicative of a typical St. P.J.‟s service.  
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translations to me of the titles of the hymns and instructed me when to sit and stand, 
which I found in a Dinka language service—much like the Catholic services I attended as 
a child—is almost constantly.  When it was my friend‟s turn to do a reading, I was 
surprised that it was done in English, something I realized after the next reading (done by 
another young man in Dinka) was most likely for my benefit.  During the sermon, my 
friend translated the entire sermon for me, although it seemed to be basically a retelling 
of the readings we had just heard in Dinka and that I had read to myself in the English 
bible from the pew in front of me.   
Far from the cell-phone ringing and milling about that DeLuca observed at St. 
John‟s, the few men who came in late went quietly and  immediately to their seats after 
being greeted by one of the men on stage.  Peter described the fairly structured 
environment of St. P.J.‟s as more like church services in the refugee camps, where people 
come on time, services are planned in advance and each person has “their own jobs to 
do” at the service (Interview 4-2). At one point, two older Sudanese women, one with a 
small child, came in and sat directly behind us, surprising as I had been under the 
impression that it was only Lost Boys who attended this service.   
 Having been warned by a friend doing fieldwork among the Sudanese community 
in Australia that I would probably be required to stand, introduce myself, and provide an 
explanation for my presence at a Dinka service, I had prepared to explain my thesis in as 
much detail as was necessary.  Despite this, the brisk sermon and more formal nature of 
this service made me think that only a brief introduction was desired, so I stood, quickly 
thanked the group for welcoming me and told them my name when I was asked to by my 
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friend to introduce myself.  Like all other Dinka events I have attended, everyone was 
expected to shake hands at the conclusion of the ceremony, women included, and 
introduce themselves to anyone they had not met.  All of the men and women approached 
me eagerly and shook hands and we all moved outside. Out in the shaded yard of the 
church, I made small talk with the guys I already knew in English while the rest of the 
group talked among themselves in Dinka.   
As I attended more Dinka services, I began to realize that while a broad swath of 
the Sudanese community attended the services, the Lost Boys were the anchor, leading 
the services and filling the room with their presence. While all seemed to be welcome, it 
was the distinctive, egalitarian character of the Lost Boy group that shaped the services. 
All services were led by two young men at a time, and while there were two Lost Boys 
who often got the job, there was a rotating handful of men who filled the role of priest; 
there was never a solo priest as is common in most American churches. Like many 
churches, music was performed as a group, but rather than being displayed on the stage 
or risers as is common to most American services, the musicians were seated in the first 
several rows of the church, mixed in with other parishioners. While there was no one 
“lead” singer, several among the group would guide the group in song from their pews, 
their leadership only obvious by the volume of their voices. Perhaps most notably 
egalitarian was the content of the services. In particular, there was a total absence of 
“preaching.” Instead of a passage of scripture being interpreted and made to demonstrate 
a lesson, readings were simply retold by whoever was in charge of the sermon that day, 
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giving the listener a chance to interpret and take meaning away that fit with his/her own 
experience.  
Much as it did as they fled and in the camps of Ethiopia and Kenya, the church in 
Denver plays an integral part in the identity of the Lost Boys. As DeLuca also found, it is 
not just a physical place, but an area that represents comfort, familiarity, and community 
for all who attend (2005:33). Not only used as a church, St. P.J.‟s and other Episcopal 
churches in metro Denver were the site of many Sudanese gatherings I attended. The 
sense of ease and familiarity the Lost Boys and Sudanese seemed to feel at their church 
was strikingly different than the formality and discomfort I remember from my own 
childhood memories at my parents‟ Catholic church. I‟m sure in large part this had to do 
with my own unease with the church in general, and also from the more formal and less 
accessible character of the Catholic church, but regardless, the ease with which the entire 
Sudanese community uses church space is also a testament to the vast amount of time 
they spend there, and how ingrained it is in their daily lives and identities, much like it is 
for the Lost Boy group. 
Work 
Another defining factor in the Lost Boys identity in the U.S. is their work. In stark 
contrast to the calm of the church in Denver, the relative freedom that the Lost Boys 
experienced in the refugee camps has been replaced in the U.S. by an almost frenetic 
amount of activity. Like most other refugees who land in the United States, the Lost Boys 
in Denver were given an initial living allowance in the form of Refugee Cash Assistance 
for at least the first several months after their arrival. As Bixler points out, this money is 
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usually available for up to eight months, but it is stopped once a refugee finds a job 
(2005, 106). Most of the Lost Boys in Denver found jobs relatively quickly, and were just 
as quickly on their own, splitting rent with three or more roommates and socking away 
money to pay for college and technical school courses. All of the Lost Boys I know in 
Denver religiously send money back to their families in Kenya and Sudan, often every 
dime they have left over after paying for rent, food, school, and cars.  
It is not just paid work that takes up the Lost Boys‟ time, but also volunteer work. 
Of the Lost Boys I interviewed, one was heavily involved in the activities of PES, and the 
other three were more intermittent volunteers. Many of the Lost Boys also worked with a 
Louisville-based organization called the Colorado Friends of the Lost Boys, which 
provides support to the Lost Boys in the form of tutoring and educational assistance. For 
both of these organizations, the Lost Boys speak at numerous events and at local schools, 
attend fundraisers, fairs, and political events, and spend countless hours in board, 
planning, and steering committee meetings. In addition, Joseph and another Denver Lost 
Boy regularly (for a short time, at least) taught a group of Americans, including me, how 
to speak Dinka. The Lost Boys did this eagerly, in addition to all of the other constraints 
they had on their time and it was only because the American students stopped showing up 
(and possibly our almost complete failure as a group to grasp the nasal, tonal range that is 
a hallmark of the Dinka language) regularly to the classes that they were discontinued.  
The fact that the Lost Boys already come from an Episcopalian background, 
coupled with the egalitarian nature of Dinka culture, has in many ways made them well-
suited to the often interminable nature of nonprofit politics. They are used to the hour-
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long meetings that are required and the egalitarian way in which decisions are made. The 
Episcopalian religion that they share with many members of these organizations also 
allows them to share common ground and has created an environment, much like the 
other aspects of their lives, that blurs religion, work, and leisure time, arenas that for most 
westerners are maintained with much stricter boundaries 
In many ways, the Lost Boys‟ work forms the cornerstone of their lives in the 
U.S., and perhaps even more than church, colors their daily interactions. It can be said 
without any exaggeration that the Lost Boys work constantly. Jobs vary, but many Lost 
Boys work in factories, for the government as bus drivers, and in any number of retail 
and service occupations. Nearly all the Lost Boys I interviewed worked multiple jobs, 
often at odd hours, seeing their roommates only in passing. Although all of the Lost Boys 
knew and understood that most Americans they came into contact with worked nine-to-
five type jobs that rarely required weekend or evening work, there seemed to be an 
understanding that their work situations were the best they could come by, and were 
generally accepted as a fact of life. 
School 
 School, for the Lost Boys, is a different story, because although most pursue their 
work dutifully, school for most is imbued with a passion second only to religion. While 
two of the four Lost Boys I interviewed were not, at least at present, pursuing school at 
all, this was by far not the norm. Nearly all of the Lost Boys I knew were pursuing some 
sort of two-year, four-year, or technical degree. The fact that any of the Lost Boys who 
worked second- and third-shift jobs, took care of families and attended church were even 
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able to find time to attend class, let alone study, is remarkable. Joseph, whom I tutored in 
both psychology and math, never ceased to amaze me in his eagerness to retain what he 
learned and how present he was able to be during tutoring sessions, which often occurred 
after his long hours at a t-shirt factory or before hours-long nonprofit board meetings. 
Much like Christianity, education is paramount to the values that were instilled in the 
Lost Boys in refugee camps, particularly in Kenya, and is a hallmark of both their 
ascribed and constructed identity. The value placed on education is also a departure from 
the value placed on cattle keeping, and although the value placed on education, just like 
Christianity, is increasing exponentially in the new southern Sudan, when the Lost Boys 
first came into contact with it, being educated was not the norm for anyone in southern 
Sudan. The importance of education for the Lost Boys was summed up well by Joseph 
when I asked him if he believed that Christianity would replace cows in Dinka culture. 
He said no, that if anything would replace cattle-keeping, it would be education. But even 
while education would force Dinka to question practices like keeping land communal so 
that all the cattle can graze together, cattle are the “source of life” and will never be 
totally replaced (Interview 1-1). 
Social Life 
Although it may seem that with the massive amounts of time the Lost Boys spend 
in church, school or work that there would be no time for socializing, this is not the case. 
In some ways, this is because the lines between all three of these arenas are blurred: I 
attended a number of events held for and by the Lost Boys that were held in the church to 
celebrate a birth or a graduation, weekend-long retreats for PES that combined nonprofit 
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strategic planning with horseback riding and hiking, and soccer tournaments and events 
like the Bolder Boulder that served both to bring the Lost Boys together as a group and 
raise awareness for southern Sudan (and sometimes for Darfur as well). Perhaps most 
striking about these get-togethers was that what they lacked frequency, they made up for 
in their marathon-like length and the variety of activities they included. Perhaps the most 
memorable of these events was a belated wedding celebration for one of the Lost Boys 
and his new wife, who was one of the Lost Girls. Held at a large event center in 
Lakewood, the event began in the early afternoon. The building was profusely decorated 
in pastel balloons and streamers, and one of the rows and rows of tables held a huge sheet 
cake that had been given as a gift by an American friend of the groom who was a baker. 
My husband and I arrived around 3:00 or so, feeling guilty for our tardiness. Instead, we 
found that we were some of the first guests to arrive and were informed that the party was 
expected to last until at least midnight. What ensued was a protracted day of socializing, 
eating (at every Sudanese event I attended in Denver, with the exception of everyday 
church services, massive meals catered by the women in the church were served),
40
 and 
finally dancing. While my husband and I were at the ceremony for what we thought was 
a lengthy six hours, we heard from others that the dancing did indeed continue on well 
past midnight.  
                                               
40 This usually included massive amounts of goat, kisra (Sudanese bread very similar to Ethiopian injera), 
French bread, a sticky pureed okra dip, and salad. Turning down food was futile— for anyone who was in a 
hurry, or like me, sometimes not hungry at the particular time of the celebration, Styrofoam to-go 
containers were at the ready to be filled to take on the road. In addition to the food, there was always an 
array of assorted bottled water, soda and juice (never alcohol), usually served to guests on trays by young 
girls as the celebration took place. At one SPLM rally that I attended in a church basement, the women had 
thoughtfully premade sandwiches for those of us who had to rush off before the main meal was served, 
leading to my first (delicious) experience with a peanut butter and eggplant sandwich.  
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 While the length of Sudanese events in the U.S. is reflective of the ways things 
are done in Sudan, where church services and community events are often day-long 
events that require the provision of food and drinks to attendees, these extended events 
are also pragmatic because they allow Lost Boys, with their varied work and school 
schedules, the guarantee that an event will still be going on when they are free. It is also a 
way to spend quality time with friends, community elders, and American friends, even if 
it is infrequent.  
The things the Lost Boys learned to value during their childhood and in the 
refugee camps—school, family, church, and each other—remain the glue of their lives in 
Denver. Perhaps the only thing that is missing is cattle, but as Joseph pointed out to me, 
even cattle are not entirely gone. They are visible in the cattle names that all of the Lost 
Boys have and many still use, and are tangible in the huge sums of money Lost Boys 
must come up with to purchase cattle for the families of girls they want to marry in Sudan 
or in the Kakuma refugee camp.  
To a greater degree than in the refugee camps, the Lost Boys in Denver are drawn 
into ethnoscapes that are beyond what even they could have imagined themselves—
working in international development as members of nonprofit boards, going to college 
with students from around the world, working in jobs as far-ranging as the assembly line 
in meatpacking plants to the offices of Colorado state senators—something with which 
they have used Christianity to cope. Being Christian has given them a way to both 
acculturate to and escape American culture, while also reshaping the Episcopal faith to 
make it more Dinka, as evidenced through the various ways the church is used and the 
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way Dinka services are conducted according to Dinka traditions of separating men and 
women, using the church for multiple purposes, and the egalitarian nature of the services. 
The values that the Lost Boys adopted as a group—Christianity and education—have 
continued to define both how they see themselves and the identity that Americans ascribe 
to them in the U.S., and display the way in which they have used and fitted traditional 









This thesis was predicated on the assumption that the Lost Boys, as a group, had a 
distinct conversion experience. While trying to illuminate this experience, I have also 
sought to fill a hole that exists in the anthropological and refugee studies bodies of 
literature about this particular group of young men. Much has been written about how to 
discuss refugees and the processes that affect them, such as assimilation, acculturation, 
globalization, construction of nations, and conversion. And, although there is no shortage 
of studies about Dinka culture, the Sudanese civil war, and the harrowing journey of the 
Lost Boys, very little literature exists that discusses the distinct conversion experiences of 
the Lost Boys, either as individuals or as a group. The small amount of literature that 
does exist on this topic is largely the work of missionaries, which often fails to 
incorporate an emic understanding of Dinka culture. Because of the dearth of non-Church 
generated literature on this topic, I have sought to add to the little that is known about the 
Lost Boys‟ large-scale conversion to Christianity, using the uniquely anthropological 
methods of ethnographic interviews and participant observation to provide context and an 
“insider‟s” perspective into this radical transformation.  
To provide an etic context, I have included an account of Sudanese history, 
illuminating the processes of colonization and enslavement of southern Sudanese by the 
British, Turkish, Egyptians, and northern Sudanese, forces that all played into the 
eventual breakdown of the nascent Sudanese nation-state. The separate identities that the 
two halves of Sudan have always maintained have been key factors in the ongoing 
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violence and misery of this country and have created a situation where the violent 
separation of thousands of boys from their homes and families was possible.   
I outlined the traditional Dinka religion and discussed the importance of cattle in 
nearly every aspect of Dinka life in order to highlight the radical shift the Lost Boys 
experienced when they were separated from their homes and cattle. I provided an 
overview of conversion among the Dinka who remained within Sudan until the end of the 
war and the role that losing their cattle to a Nuer raid played in their conversion. 
Similarly, I discussed the “Khartoum Clubs” of the 1960s, in which men and women 
displaced from southern Sudan came together in a rapid period of conversion. Much like 
the Lost Boys, Dinka in both of these situations quickly learned that without cattle and in 
the midst of chaos, the old ways were no longer working, a belief that lead many to 
Christianity.  
 To frame this work, I relied upon the study of refugees to understand the 
experiences of the Lost Boys on a broad level, as a group that had pre-flight, flight, and 
post-flight experiences by explaining life in Sudan prior to the war, the Lost Boys‟ trek to 
Ethiopia and Kenya, and their lives in the U.S. On an individual level, I detailed the 
conversion experiences of four of the Lost Boys who live in Denver. I also sought to 
convey the liminal position that the Lost Boys found themselves in as they transitioned to 
radically different circumstances and the role this transitional state had on their 
conversion to Christianity. At the same time, I demonstrated that the Lost Boys, much 
like Malkki suggests, did not simply check their identities at the door as they fled, but 
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rather held onto the Dinka values of pragmatism and group autonomy that worked for 
them, itself a pragmatic decision (Malkki 1995:509).  
Findings 
The answers that I found to the questions that I posed at the beginning of this 
thesis—why did so many Lost Boys decide to convert to Christianity/what social 
functions/needs has this conversion met for the Lost Boys, and what role/functions does 
Christianity play today in their lives in Denver —have been guided by theories laid out in 
Chapter 2 of identity, the nation-state, globalization/ethnoscapes, and conversion. 
Borrowing from theories of refugee identity put forth by Harrell-Bond and Voutira and 
Malkki has given me a way to understand that although refugees are in a liminal position, 
they do not lose their identity just because they leave their nation or state. In order to 
survive radical circumstances, the Lost Boys “kept” what was working from their 
culture—namely the long-held Dinka values of group autonomy and pragmatism, values 
that played a key role in their conversion to Christianity. At the same time, the Lost Boys 
as a group developed a unique character that was formed by the unprecedented 
circumstances in which they found themselves. This new and strange reality left them 
without their families, knowledge of the traditional religion, or their cattle, the three most 
important parts of a traditional Dinka man‟s life. Further, in the process of dispersing and 
resettlement, they found themselves separated from home villages and country, and 
among boys from various tribes and areas.  
Without parents, the Lost Boys needed stable figures to guide them. While they 
were quickly introduced to SPLA members who administered the Ethiopian camps, it 
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was the church leaders who they encountered in the refugee camps who were “struggling 
to keep them alive and to provide a gentler environment alongside the military discipline 
of the SPLA” (Bixler 2005:58). More than church elders, who were benevolent, but 
intermittent forces on their lives, however, the Lost Boys called upon the communal 
values that had been instilled in them in the cattle camps, understanding that in order to 
survive, they needed to depend on each other. While the Lost Boys depended on the 
groups into which they had been divided for basic matters of survival—finding food, 
cooking, building shelter, etc.—they also depended on each other for guidance, emotional 
support, and a connection to their culture. In the Dinka tradition of relying on the wisdom 
of the group, they based their decisions on nearly every matter, including religious 
conversion, on what their peers did.  
Without cattle, which typically form the basis of Dinka identity, particularly for 
adolescents and men, the Lost Boys needed something else to give their lives meaning. 
As Bixler says, caring for cattle is the one thing that “defines men as competent and 
whole in southern Sudan” (2005:85). Everything, from their names to their sense of 
aesthetics had been based on cattle before their separation. A traditional Dinka man‟s 
identity was irrevocably bound to his cattle; as Nikkel says, “social standing and self-
esteem are, for the Dinka, intimately related to the ownership of cattle” (2001:25). 
Without cattle, a void was left.  Christianity filled this void for the Lost Boys, giving 
them a place to focus the attention they would have given to their cattle and an avenue to 
the dheeng (dignity) that they would have found in caring for and displaying their oxen.  
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Without religion—both because children were not involved in the traditional 
Dinka religion and because they lacked cattle to perform the central rite of cattle 
sacrifice—the Lost Boys lacked all avenues to life after death and had no way to explain 
the epic journey they had been on. When they began to learn about Christianity, however, 
they were offered a narrative that they believed explained their circumstances and gave 
them access to an afterlife. Religion also supplied them with coping mechanisms that 
were outlined in the studies of PTSD conducted by Jeppsson and Hjernl with the Lost 
Boys and in my own interviews. Joseph offered a particularly poignant picture of the 
coping skills he gained from Christianity when he said that: 
When I came to Christianity and believed in God, and every time when I go to bed at night I 
prayed, sing a little song, I went to bed. If I do that, I will sleep nice at night and I wouldn‟t 
wake up and I wouldn‟t have bad dreams (Interview 1-3). 
 
Religion was not the only thing absent from the Lost Boys‟ lives—they were also 
without their homes. Without their villages or country, and thrown in with boys from 
different tribes and areas of the South, the Lost Boys needed a way to create a cohesive 
identity. As their imagination broadened (and it became clear that they would not return 
home anytime soon), Christianity became a way to understand the radical shift their 
world had undergone—from insular villages in Sudan, to the many different tribes they 
encountered in Ethiopia, to the international milieu of the Kakuma refugee camps in 
Kenya, to the realization that they would be resettled across the world. Christianity also 
became a common unifier among the Lost Boy group, regardless of what part of Sudan or 
tribe they came from. Bereft of the mediating forces of country, parents, religion, and 
cattle, but still maintaining the time-honored, pragmatic Dinka practice of accepting 
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“what works” and relying on the wisdom of the group, the Lost Boys found themselves in 
a situation where mass conversion could take place.  
To say that the Lost Boys simply converted because they retained the pragmatism 
they grew up with and used it to adapt to the circumstance around them, however,  risks 
oversimplifying  a complex situation. In addition to the key reasons outlined above, 
conversion was further eased by other factors, such as the fact that English and 
Christianity were taught hand in hand in the refugee camps, essentially meaning anyone 
who went to school would come away with at least some knowledge about Christianity. 
As well, the emerging Christian rhetoric of the SPLA, which facilitated the presence of 
the Sudanese priests in camp, imbued Christian conversion with a sense of national 
identity. Furthermore, whereas foreign missionaries in the past had had a hard time 
connecting with the Dinka, there were a sufficient number of indigenous Dinka converts 
by the time the Lost Boys were in the camps that they largely had contact with Sudanese 
Christians who were able to fit western religious concepts to Dinka culture and make 
them accessible. All of these factors were integral to the conversion of the Lost Boys and 
had any one of these factors been absent, I cannot say with any certainty that the Lost 
Boys would have converted, at least not on the scale that they did.  
Suggestions for Future Research 
While this research contributes to a topic that has received little attention to this 
point, it also highlights the need for more research. Comparative studies of conversion, in 
particular, are needed. For example, how did other groups of Lost Boys come to be 
Christian, such as Lost Boys from other areas of southern Sudan who were Nuer, Shilluk 
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or other tribes? What about Lost Boys who chose other religions? The Episcopal religion 
is known for its relatively egalitarian structure, which relies on decisions by committee. 
Was it harder for Lost Boys to accept the more hierarchical structure of the Catholic 
church?  Did Lost Boys who became Catholic have similar conversion experiences that 
were guided by the autonomous nature of their Lost Boy groupings? And what about the 
Lost Girls? While they did not have the cattle camp experiences that instilled a sense of 
group solidarity like the Lost Boys did, they were still raised in the same communal 
culture and taught to cook, care for children, and perform other essential skills as a group. 
Once in the refugee camps, however, they were usually placed with families, meaning 
they presumably did not have the kind of group autonomy the Lost Boys had. Did this 
have an effect on how they learned about Christianity or if they remained Christian? Did 
they become Christians in the same way the Lost Boys did?  
Further work that examines the Sudanese Episcopal church in the U.S. and other 
countries where the Lost Boys have been settled in large numbers, such as Australia, 
could provide rich information about traditional Dinka practices that have been 
incorporated into the Episcopal faith that were beyond the scope of this study. Has the 
Lost Boy group retained their religious beliefs the same way, or have cultural differences 
between the U.S. and other host countries caused variations in practicing or retaining 
Christianity?  
As well, the individual factors in conversion could each be researched in more 
depth, for example the role that Christianity played in alleviating PTSD is a topic that 
could be looked at more closely by someone who has more experience with this disorder. 
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In fact, Joseph, who recently graduated college with a degree in psychology, told me that 
he would like to collaborate on a paper about PTSD among the Lost Boys. In addition, 
there is room for more work to be done about Christian conversion among other refugee 
groups and decolonized nation-states. Have other countries, such as Sierra Leone, that 
have large numbers of separated, displaced, and military-trained children seen similar 
conversion? Will Christianity play a role in the reconciliation between North and South 
Sudan, as it has in other decolonized African countries like Rwanda? What will happen to 
southern Sudanese Christians if Sudan goes back to civil war in 2011 (when it will vote 
on whether or not to become independent from the North) as many are predicting? Will 
religious beliefs waiver, as belief in the traditional religion did in the last phase of the 
war, or will Christianity continue to “work” for its adherents?  
Additionally, a comparative study of conversion and religious practices among 
the Lost Boys who were repatriated back into Sudan and the Lost Boys who made it to 
the U.S is needed. These two groups presumably had identical conversion experiences, 
but now live in radically different worlds. How are the Lost Boys who live in Sudan 
practicing their religion and does it incorporate more aspects of the traditional religion 
than the Lost Boys in the U.S.? Did the Lost Boys who returned to Sudan become 
interested or convert back to the traditional religion after returning home and being 
exposed to these practices? Does Christianity  continue to “work” for them as it has for 
the Lost Boys in the U.S.? 
More could be learned about where the Lost Boys are at today. While they 
arguably have left behind the liminal position they found themselves in as they fled to 
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and lived in refugee camps, the Lost Boys remain in a different sort of liminality in the 
U.S. This liminality is well-expressed in Dave Eggers‟ book, What is the What, where 
Eggers details the two worlds between which the Lost Boys find themselves. Many are 
just completing college after almost ten years in the U.S., or finding that because of work 
schedules, they still do not have the time to complete their degrees. Others have become 
so disillusioned by the red tape that surrounds getting their GEDs, which are often tied up 
in proving that they actually attended and graduated high school in Kakuma, or with 
requirements to transfer community college credits to four-year colleges, that they have 
simply given up, or at the very least, have had to greatly lower their educational 
expectations. What have been the effects of this change of what they can imagine for 
their lives?  
Most Lost Boys have also had to continue to endure separation from their families 
who remain in Sudan, Kenya or Ethiopia. Without family in the U.S., they continue to 
rely on each other for support, but many have begun to question the utility of remaining 
here—especially with the delays they have experienced in education—while their family 
members have been repatriated back to their home villages in Sudan. Even if they have 
not completed their education here, returning to Sudan with education and a little money 
brings the promise of elevated status, although none of the Lost Boys I know have yet 
made a firm decision to permanently move back to Sudan and the uncertainty of the 
peace between North and South further hampers this option.  
Adding to this liminal status is the fact of marriage. While Dinka men 
traditionally marry much later than women, and even marrying well into one‟s thirties (at 
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least for men) is not considered strange in Sudan, the Lost Boys face pressure from their 
families to marry. Several of the Lost Boys told me that the pressure was further 
increased by the expectation that an older brother must marry before his younger brothers 
can do the same. Because many of the Lost Boys‟ parents who were not killed in the war 
had more children after they were separated from their sons, the Lost Boys are feeling 
pressure from both parents and siblings to hurry up and marry so that their younger 
brothers can do so as well. As a group however, the Lost Boys have again shown their 
pragmatism in the matter of marriage at the same time that they are willing to assert new 
values. While some of the Lost Boys have married, many maintain that they do not want 
to do so until they have finished their education, reflecting their willingness to adopt 
cultural practices from other cultures that “work” for them. Even for those who are ready 
to marry, marriage is further complicated by the lack of single Sudanese women in the 
U.S. and pressure that most Lost Boys feel to marry within their culture. This pressure is 
strong: Of the ten or so married Lost Boys I know, all have Sudanese wives. Rather than 
marry outside of their culture (or find a Sudanese women who already lives in the U.S., 
which is not only hard to find, but also requires a dowry), many of the Lost Boys have 
raised the needed dowry (sometimes up to 100 cows, or close to a year‟s salary) and been 
married to a woman who still lives in Sudan, with the hopes that they can eventually 
bring her here to live in the U.S. The liminal status created by lacking access to family 
and marriage, is a rich topic that could provide a wealth of insight into the lives of the 
Lost Boys and further elucidate how religion has come to fill these voids.  
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 A further topic for research—and another area where the Lost Boys face a degree 
of liminality—is their identity as black men. The Lost Boys frequently lament the 
perceived hostility they encounter from African Americans. One of the Lost Boys related 
to me his experiences of being verbally harassed, and in one case chased down and hit 
with rocks by African American women who made fun of his appearance and accent. 
Numerous other Lost Boys expressed their frustration with black Americans who they 
encountered and the misunderstandings, on both sides, which occurred. The Lost Boys, 
for their part, arrived in the U.S. with a certain level of fear of mistrust of African 
Americans after being warned by elders in Kakuma that they should stay away from 
black Americans. The unfortunate result of these misunderstandings is a continued, 
mutual distrust between the two groups that has persisted to this day. Further solutions-
oriented research needs to be done on this issue.  
  While much further research on the topic of Lost Boys and Christianity remains to 
be conducted, I hope that this small contribution elucidates the path and reasons behind 
Christian conversion for one group of Lost Boys living in Denver. In adding to the work 
that has been done among the Lost Boys by missionaries, I have attempted to add a 
perspective grounded in anthropological and refugee studies theories of identity, 
acculturation , nation-states, and globalization, rather than one that is grounded in 
religion.  In doing so, I hope to have added to a more complete understanding of the Lost 
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